# Capitalism Kritik – Starter Pack – HSS 2016

# \*\*NEG STARTS HERE

## 1NC

**1NC – Cap K**

#### BITs ascribe to a liberal economic regime through the recolonialization of the host state---this perpetuates cultural domination in the name of maximizing capital productivity

Vandevelde ‘98

Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Professor of Law @ Thomas Jefferson School of Law, "The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty." The American Journal of International Law 92.4 (1998): 621-41. ProQuest.

As the foregoing suggests, economic liberals espouse an outward-looking philosophy that regards integration into the global economy as the key to economic development!17 They favor the removal of barriers to transfrontier investment flows that inhibit global integration and diminish the production of wealth. Further, liberals contend that the negative effects ascribed to foreign investment are often in fact attributable to flawed host state regulatory efforts and thus the proper response is less, rather than more, regulation.48 Particularly within developing states, economic nationalists, with their emphasis on nation building and economic development, have found common cause with Marxist economists, who advocate a more equal distribution of wealth within the international community.49 These theorists share an inward-looking philosophy” and are generally suspicious of unregulated foreign investment. They support intervention in the economy when necessary to ensure that foreign investment conforms to their political goals of promoting the national independence and economic development of Third World states. Their concern about a liberal foreign investment regime is twofold.“ First, foreign investment may not produce the promised increase in efﬁciency. Dependency theory, for example, asserts that foreign investment fosters underdevelopment rather than economic growth in developing states.52 The essence of the argument is that the subsidiary in the developing state will be operated for the beneﬁt of the parent company and thus will transfer resources from the developing to the developed state rather than in the other direction.53 It is alleged, for example, that foreign investment may reduce both foreign currency reserves54 and employment.55 Even where they accept the liberal economic analysis as essentially correct in theory, critics of liberalism point to extensive market failures in developing states that they believe will prevent an unregulated market from delivering the promised growth.56 The second concern is that, even where the promised productivity materializes, in- creased productivity and economic development are not the same thing.57 Economic development theory, particularly since the 19705, has emphasized that economic develop- ment requires both increased productivity and a more equitable distribution of wealth?8 From this perspective, the real goal is development, not simply increased productivity, and liberalism promises only the latter. The second concern thus focuses on the distribu- tional consequences of foreign investment. These consequences are both internal and external. Foreign investment redistributes wealth and power internally in that not all members of the society will beneﬁt equally or at all and some may be disadvantaged by it?9 The beneﬁts may be most likely to accrue to better educated urban populations60 or to politically dominant ethnic groups,“ which serves only to reinforce or extend existing gaps between the wealthy and the poor.62 Alternatively, the creation of new centers of wealth, power and opportunity may weaken the position of traditional elites.63 Foreign investment redistributes wealth and power externally by transferring control over local assets to persons who are outside the national political system.64 This may be particularly objectionable where the enterprise subject to foreign control is important to the host state’s military defense, cultural identity or other vital interests.65 Indeed, the Marxist critique of foreign investment characterizes it as a recolonialization of the host State.66 The apprehension about foreign control ranges from fears of intervention in the political process to concerns about cultural imperialism.” The critique of liberalism is not limited to developing states. Economic nationalists in developed states may fear inward foreign investment, particularly that from other developed states, for many of the same reasons that economic nationalists in developing states fear it.“ Economic nationalists also may fear outward investment because of con- cerns that it will transfer productive capacity, hence employment, abroad.69 11. THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY OF THE BITS BITs present themselves as quintessentially liberal documents. The typical BIT cites two goals in its preamble: the creation of favorable conditions for investment by nationals and companies of one party in the territory of the other, and increased prosperity in both states.70 In short, the avowed purpose of a BIT may be distilled into ﬁve words: increased prosperity through foreign investment. The preamble thus afﬁrms the basic liberal doctrine that free movement of capital will yield greater productivity. Further, the history of the BITS indicates that a principal inducement for states to enter into a BIT has been precisely that it afﬁrms liberalism. Although the ﬁrst BIT program was inaugurated in 1959 by Germany,71 BIT negotiations proceeded throughout the 19603 at a largely desultory pace. In the ten years from 1959 through 1968, only seventy-four BITS were concluded, that is, fewer than eight per year worldwide.72 Of these seventy-four, half were concluded by Germany. The pace of negotiations did not noticeably change until the mid—1970s, when ideologi- cal debates concerning the standard of compensation for expropriation that was required by customary international law emerged as the central issue in discussions of international investment law.” Developed states proposed the negotiation of BITS providing for prompt, adequate and effective compensation for expropriation as an antidote to eco- nomic nationalist assertions that expropriated investors were entitled to no more than national treatment and Marxist claims that no compensation at all was owed.“ Thus, the BITS acquired a distinct ideological purpose. Indeed, the United States was unwilling to negotiate any BIT that did not embrace the prompt, adequate and effective standard, despite the fact that the treaty might have offered real protection in other respects for foreign investors, because any such protection would have been insufﬁcient to justify the ideological consequences of agreeing to a weaker compensation standard.” In direct response to United Nations General Assembly debates on the measure of compensation, the United States launched its BIT program in 1977.76 Several other developed states also inaugurated their programs in the 19705.77 France concluded its ﬁrst BIT in 1972,78 the United Kingdom in 1975,79 Austria in 1976,80 andjapan in 1977.“ During the ten years from 1977 to 1986, some 153 BITS were negotiated, meaning that the pace of negotiations in the decade starting in the mid-19705 was about double that of the ﬁrst decade of the program. The pace of negotiations quickened a second time in the early 19903, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the Central and East European economies from socialism to free markets.82 Conclusion of a BIT represented a relatively easy way for these states to demonstrate their renunciation of Marxist economics and their com- mitment to a liberal economic regime. For example, some 196 BITS were signed in 1996 alone,83 an astonishing contrast to the fewer than 8 per year signed in the 19605.84 BITS have therefore been concluded in many cases because they symbolize a commit- ment to economic liberalism. The sincerity of that commitment, however, can be mea- sured by examining the provisions of the BIT.

#### Economic rationality prioritizes short term profit over the well-being of environment and human life-makes extinction inevitable

Nhanenge ‘7

(Jytte, South Africa development studies masters, “Ecofeminsm: Towards Integrating The Concerns Of Women, Poor People And Nature Into Development”, February, <http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>)

Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modern society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, **generate** **domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation**. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. **The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs**. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. **Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth**. The next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. **Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war**. The next section is important as a means to understanding "rational" economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic "rationality" and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. **The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world**. The following three sections are intending to show that the new global capitalism is doing just that. First, the neo-liberal economical scheme is presented. Secondly, its application in the Third World as Structural Adjustment Programmes and as the New Economic Partnership for African Development is critiqued. Thirdly, the extreme application of the disturbed "rational" human mind, manifested in the form of an institutional psychopath "the corporation", is discussed. After concluding that economics is a patriarchal system of domination, alternative economic models, which can support women, Others and nature, are presented.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative in order to abandon belief in capitalism

Johnston ‘4

(Adrian, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, Volume 9/Issue 3)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed practical roadmap in Žižek’s political writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby truly to open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance 127 (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle 128). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining just an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the earlier analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing 93 more than a kind of “magic,” that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The “external” obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, “internally” believe in it—capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socioperformative force emanating from this same material.

## FW

### 2NC – FW – Top Level

**Counter-interpretation—the AFF has to defend the plan and its assumptions—this is key to neg ground—if the AFFs starting point is incorrect, we shouldn’t have to debate from it-it decks policy making by beginning from the false premise that the Federal government is the only subject of politics--**

**The judge is an intellectual—focus on the assumptions underpinning the AFF *before* the hypothetical benefits of the plan—the law was designed by elites with capital interests in mind which replicates a capital-oriented ontology**

**Shantz ‘13** (Jeff, Kwantlen Polytechnic University critical criminology professor, 2013, *In Defense of Radicalism*, Radical Criminology (2): <http://journal.radicalcriminology.org/index.php/rc/article/view/34/html>)

Anti-radicalism is inherently elitist and anti-democratic. It assumes that everyone, regardless of status, has access to channels of political and economic decision-making, and can participate in meaningful ways to address personal or collective needs. **It overlooks the exclusion of vast segments of the population from decisions that most impact their lives and the unequal access to social resources that necessitate, that impel, radical changes.** Activists, as well as sociologists and criminologists, must defend radicalism from below as the necessary orientation to struggle against injustice, exploitation, and oppression and **for alternative social relations**. **Actions should be assessed not according to a legal moral framework provided by and reinforced by state capital** (for their own benefit). Assessment should be made on real impacts in ending (or hastening the end of) injustice, exploitation, and oppression, on the weakening of state capital. As Martin Luther King suggested, a riot is simply the language of the unheard. Self-righteous moralizing and reference to legal authority, parroting the voices of state capital, is an abdication of social responsibility for activists. For sociologists and criminologists it is an abandonment of the sociological imagination which in its emphasis on getting to the roots of issues has always been radical (in the non-hegemonic sense). Critical thinkers and actors of all stripes must defend this radicalism. They must become radicals themselves. **Debates should focus on the effectiveness of perspectives and practices in getting to the roots of social problems, of uprooting power.** **They should not center on fidelity to the law or bourgeois morality.** They should not be constrained by the lack of imagination of participants or by the sense that the best of all worlds is the world that power has proposed. Again, radicalism is not a tactic, an act, an event. It is not a matter of extremes, in a world that takes horrifying extremes for granted. It is an orientation to the world. The features of radicalism are determined by, and in, specific contexts. This is the case now in the context of mass mobilizations, even popular uprisings against statist austerity offensives in the service of neoliberal capitalism. Radicalism always **threatens to overflow attempts to contain it.** It is because it advances understanding-poses social injustice in stark relief-that it is by nature re/productive. It is, in current terms, viral.

**Method first key – otherwise alternative modes of knowledge concerning neoliberalism are delegitimized**

Gunder et al. ‘9 (Michael, Aukland University senior planning lecturer, 2009, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy. Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues. Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "˜dominant stakeholders` can ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and Hillier 2007a, 469). The current post-democratic` milieu facilitates the above through **avoidance of critical policy debate challenging favored orthodox positions and policy approaches**. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative solutions, are **eradicated from political debate** so that while token institutions of liberal democracy' are retained conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003, 59). Consequently, the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are repeatedly used or their work drawn upon by different stakeholders, while more **critical voices are silenced** by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007, 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues to **partition reality** ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "successful” or "best practice” economic development or spatial planning responses. **This further maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo** while providing "˜**a cover and shield against critical thought** by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the political held from any research that is independent and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time, adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game (Blair and Kumar 1997).

**Not a voting issue – reject the argument not the team—even if they win the debate is focused on USFG policy, you can still vote neg because the link and impact outweigh the case**

**2NC – Epistemology 1st**

**Refuse the AFF’s knowledge production-markets create subservient subjects who conform to the rationality of markets no matter what.**

**De Angelis**, East London political economy professor, **2004**

(Massimo, “Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of Enclosures”, Historical Materialism; 2004, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p57-87, ebsco)

If capital encloses, it cannot do it without a corresponding discourse. This discourse however, is not crystal-clear, but fuzzy and takes many names. While it has to reﬂect the telos and objectives of capital by promoting separation, at the same time, it has to discourage alternative projects and objectives, especially those that are based on a movement of direct association between waged and unwaged producers and social wealth. **The discourse of enclosures**, in other words, **must present itself not as a** negative **force**, one **that** separates, brutalises, and **disempowers**; **but**, on the contrary, it also **has to wear the mantle of rationality, and project a vision** of the future **that makes sense to a multiplicity** **of** concrete **subjects**. Thus, we may understand enclosure in terms of a rationale of capital accumulation and indifference to social needs (such as common access to entitlements or knowledge). But enclosure is endorsed in the meta-discourse of economics, through talk of ‘trade liberalisation’, ‘antiinﬂation’ policies, ‘ﬁscal responsibility’, ‘debt management’, and so on. We can also cite ‘growth prospects’, ‘democracy’, ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘good governance’. This, I would argue, is not simply a smokescreen. Enclosures are not just about taking resources away from people, **but the ﬁrst step towards attempting to deﬁne new subjects normalised to the capitalist market.** Capital does not enclose simply in order to rob, but also so as to integrate the social body in particular ways. The integration of the social body predicated on enclosures requires the constitution of social subjects who are normalised to the commodity-form, that is to stratiﬁed enclosures. The construction of ‘economic man’ normalised to markets and enclosures is the result of policies emerged from theoretical frameworks such as economics which work on the assumption of such a normalised subject.

**A2: Jarvis**

**Jarvis misreads and essentializes critical scholarship making his claims worthless**

Michael J **Shapiro**, Professor of Politial Science at the University of Hawaii. International Studies Association review of Books **2001** p. 126-128

D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodern­ism: Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to what he calls "postmodernism,"Jarvis presumes that he must defend tradi­tional, neopositivist IRagainst (in the words of the book jacket) "the various postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of International Relations."To put the matter simply at the outset**,** Jarvis appears to be almost entirely ignorant of the philosophical predicates of the critical IR literature he attacks**.** He invents a model of thought that he finds vulnerableand then proceeds with his method of argumentation, mostly to scoff at the enemy he has invented. **But** Jarvis's scoffing amounts to whistling in the dark**.** He has entered a field of critique with predicates that are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about the consequences of critical work**.**The monster Jarvis creates is a work of fiction**, for** he begins with the pre­sumption that postmodern orientations are "sweeping" and therefore threaten­ing the discipline**.** (I estimate that roughly one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association reference postructural­ist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian genre of Gothic fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary roles—the monster and the victim—Jarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the Frankenstein monster and the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover**,** Jarvis's overwrought style of characteriza­tion of the dangers of postmodern IR fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well**.** As is noted in Fred Botting's treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most threatening form**" (p. 5).**Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern**" (**which he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor**, for** most of his citations are not to postructur­alist texts but to thinkers hostile to them**)** an elastic category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his pre-Kantian empiricism.It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that uses interpretive method.Although the use of a deconstructive mode **of critique** is extremely rarein international studies (the major practitioner is David Campbell),Jarvis fre­quently uses the term "deconstruction" as a synonym for postmodernist method**.** He assumes, without showing any evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of affirmation. This characterization is belied by Derrida's state‑ments and demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war, security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression "structure of feeling" as a "postmodern phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famous—though not sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent postmod­ernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory—in international studies or elsewhere—requires that the domains of theory and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a Foucauldian treatment of discourse as event or a Deleuzian critique of representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory**.** Jarvis's view **of the theory–data relationship** was seriously impeached by enough neoempiricist philosophers by the **19**60s to field a softball team(among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine, Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson)**.**The critical work for which Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imag­ines to "the discipline," unless we construct the IR discipline as a trained inat­tention to the problematics, within which the work of theory proceeds**. The** writings of **Michel** Foucault(some of whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a critical and affirmative perspective that does not com­promise the kind of theory building that IR empiricists do. Itextends the arena**—**in which to theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivity—toregimes of discourse and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impo­sitions of identity**.** Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contin­gent, explicable in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority**,** this does nottherebyinvalidate theory**. Rather,** it opens the way to work on the ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theo­rize with a sensitivity to theory's constituencies (beyond the policymakers that seem to be prized by Jarvis). **As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowl­edge and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies,** an important legacy of contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion. Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep resigna­tion" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two sons**.** At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical fable crass and uninformed—like the rest of the book.

## Impact

### 2NC – Impact – Top Level

#### Capitalism guarantees environmental and societal collapse—productivist economics will inevitably run up against a wall of finite resources—current consumption patterns outstrip replenishment which takes out any environment defense—that’s Nhanenge

#### Turns the case---capital-oriented scholarship displaces blame from structure to proximate causes---as long as market competition dictates our lives, all policy changes will be failed from the get go---that’s Zizek

#### Its try or die neg—Capitalism’s narcissistic drive makes democratization of the market impossible—humanity is at a crossroads—the timeframe is now

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

So there you have it: insatiable growth and consumption is destroying the planet and dooming humanity-but without ceaselessly growing production and insatiably rising consumption, we would be even worse off. Such is the lunatic suicidal logic of capitalist economics. Adam Smith's fatal error was his assumption that the "most effectual" means of promoting the public interest of society is to just ignore it and concentrate instead on the pursuit of economic self-interest. In the 18th century, this narcissistic economic philosophy had little impact on the natural world. Today it has a huge impact and is, moreover, totally at odds with the world's scientific bodies who are crying out for a PLAN to stop global warming and save nature. Capitalist Limits to Corporate Environmentalist!! Corporations aren't necessarily evil, but corporate managers are legally responsible to their owners, the shareholders, and not to society. This means that the critical decisions about production and resource consumption-decisions that affect our health and survival-are mainly the private prerogative of large corporations and are often only marginally under the control of governments. The blunt reality of this situation was well summed up by Joel Bakan in his recent book (and film), The Corporation: Corporations are created by law and imbued with purpose by law. Law dictates what their directors and managers can do, what they cannot do, and what they must do. And, at least in the United States and other industrialized countries, the corporation, as created by law, most closely resembles Milton Friedman's ideal model of the institution: it compels executives to prioritize the interests of their companies and shareholders above all others and forbids them from being socially responsible - at least genuinely so.38 So when corporate and societal interests conflict, even the "greenest" of corporate CEOs often have no choice but to make decisions contrary to the interests of society. British Petroleum's CEO, Lord John Browne, is good example. In the late 1990s, Browne had an environmental epiphany, broke ranks with oil industry denial, and became the first oil company executive to warn that fossil fuels are accelerating global warming. BP adopted the motto "Beyond Petroleum" in its advertisements, painted its service stations green and yellow, and bought a boutique solar power outfit. But under Browne, BP has spent far more on advertising its green credentials than it invests in actual green power production. Fully 99 percent of its investments still go into fossil fuel exploration and development, while solar power is less than 1 percent and seems to be declining. 9 In 1999, BP spent $45 million to buy the solar power outfit Solarex. By comparison, BP paid $26.8 billion to buy Amoco in order to enlarge its oil portfolio. BP's 2004 revenues topped $285 billion, while its solar power sales were just over $400 million. In February 2006, Browne told his board that the company had more than replenished its marketed output in 2005 with new proven reserves of oil and gas, and that "with more than 20 new projects due on stream in the next three years, and assuming the same level of oil price, the annual rate of increase should continue at some 4 percent through 2010."40 So, far from shifting to renewable sources of energy, BP is not only expanding its output of fossil fuels but increasing its overall reliance on fossil fuel sources of profit. BP now possesses proven reserves of 19 billion barrels produced in 23 countries, and the company currently explores for oil in 26 countries. Given the proven and stupendous profits of oil production versus the unproven profitability of alternative energy, how can Brown go "green" in any serious way and remain responsible to his owner-investors?41 Were he to do so, he would soon be out of a job.42 Ecosocialism or Collapse If we're going to stop the capitalist economic locomotive from driving us off the cliff, we are going to have to fundamentally rethink our entire economic life, reassert the visible hand of conscious scientific, rational economic planning, and implement democratic control over our economies and resources. We're going to have to construct an entirely different kind of economy, one that can live within its ecological means. Such an economy would have to be based around at least the following principles: An Ecosocialist Economy of Stasis First, in a world of fast-diminishing resources, a sustainable global economy can only be based on near-zero economic growth on average. That means that to survive, humanity will have to impose drastic fixed limits on development, resource consumption, the freedom to consume, and the freedom to pollute. Given existing global inequities and the fact that the crisis we face is overwhelmingly caused by overconsumption in the industrialized North, equity can only be achieved by imposing massive cutbacks in the advanced countries combined with a program of rational planned growth to develop the Third World, with the aim of stabilizing at zero growth on average. This will require drastically cutting back many lines of production, closing down others entirely, and creating socially and environmentally useful jobs for workers made redundant by this transition. This will also require physical rationing of many critical resources on a per capita basis for every person on the planet. Human survival will thus require a profound rethinking of our most fundamental ideas-bourgeois ideas-of economic freedom. For too long, many Americans, in particular, have come to identify their notion of "freedom," if not their very being and essence, with insatiable consumption-unlimited freedom of "choice" in what to buy. But 50 styles of blue jeans, 16 models of SUVs and endless choices in "consumer electronics" will all have dramatically less value when Bloomingdales is under water, Florida disappears beneath the waves, malarial mosquitos blanket Long Island beaches, and the U.S. is overrun with desperate environmental refugees from the South. Once we as a society finally admit the "inconvenient truth" that we have no choice but to drastically cut production and severely reduce consumer choice, it will also become apparent that we have to put in place a planned economy that will meet our needs and those of future generations as well as the other species with whom we share the planet. A Restructured Economy of Production for Social Need and for Use Second, we need to massively restructure the global economy. Enormous sectors in the global capitalist economy-plastics, packaging, much of the manufactured consumer electronics, petrochemical-based and other synthetic products, many pharmaceuticals, all genetically modified foods, and the vast and ever-growing production of arms-are either completely unnecessary or waste increasingly scarce resources and produce needless pollution.44 Our parents did without nearly all of this before WWII, and they were not living in caves. Many lines of production and most retail industries are built around unnecessary replacement and designed-in obsolescence. How much of the American economy from cars and appliances to clothes is purposefully designed to be "consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an ever-increasing rate"46 so the cycle of waste production can begin all over again? How much of the planet's natural resources are consumed every year in completely unnecessary annual model changes, fashion updates, and "new and improved" products whose only purpose is simply to sell and sell again? If a global population of 6 to 9 billion people is going to survive this century, what choice do we have but to reorganize the global economy to conserve what shrinking natural resources we have left, reorient production for need rather than profit, design products to last as long as possible, enforce as close to total recycling as possible, and aim for as close to zero pollution as is possible? A Socialist Economic Democracy Third: an ecosocialist democracy. Endless growth or stasis? Resource exhaustion or conservation? Automobilization of the planet or enhanced public transport? Deforestation or protection of the wild forests? Agro poisons or organic farming? Hunt the fish to extinction or protect the fisheries? Raze the Amazon forest to grow MacBurgers or promote a more vegetarian diet? Manufacture products designed to be "used up, burned up, consumed as rapidly as possible" or design them to last, be repaired, recycled and also shared? Enforce private interests at the expense of the commons or subordinate private greed to the common good? In today's globalized world, decisions about such questions will determine the fate of humanity. Who can make these critical economic and moral decisions in society's interest and in the interest of preserving a habitable planet? In Adam Smith's view, which is still the operable maxim of modern capitalists and neoliberal economists, we should all just "Look out for Number 1," and the common good will take care of itself. If Smith were right, the common good would have taken care of itself long ago, and we wouldn't be facing catastrophe. After centuries of Smithian economics, the common good needs our immediate and concentrated attention. Corporations can't make such decisions in the best interests of society or the future, because their legal responsibility is to their private owners. The only way such decisions can be scientifically rational and socially responsible is when everyone who is affected participates in decision-making. And time is running out. We don't have 20 or 30 years to wait for Ford and GM to figure out how they can make a buck on electric cars. We don't have 60 or 70 years to wait while investors in coal-powered power plants milk the last profits out of those sunk investments before they consider an alternative. Humanity is at a crossroads. Either we find a way to move toward a global economic democracy in which decisions about production and consumption are directly and democratically decided by all those affected, or the alternative will be the continuing descent into a capitalist war of all-against-all over ever-diminishing resources that can only end in the collapse of what's left of civilization and the global ecology. To be sure, in an economic democracy, society would sometimes make mistakes in planning. We can't have perfect foresight, and democracies make mistakes. But at least these would be honest mistakes. The conclusion seems inescapable: Either we democratize the economy, construct the institutions of a practical working socialist democracy, or we face ecological and social collapse.

**The impact is both biological and ontological extinction of humanity.**

Simonovic ‘7 [Ljubodrag Simonovic, Ph.D., Philosophy; M.A., Law; author of seven books, 2007, A New World is Possible, “Basis of contemporary critical theory of capitalism.”]

**The final stage of a mortal combat between man**kind **and capitalism is in progress**. A specificity of **capitalism** is that, in contrast to "classical" barbarism (which is of destructive, murderous and plundering nature), it **annihilates life by creating a "new world**" – a "technical civilization" and an adequate, dehumanized and denaturalized man. Capitalism has eradicated man from his (natural) environment and has cut off the roots through which he had drawn life-creating force. Cities are "gardens" of capitalism where degenerated creatures "grow". Dog excrement, gasoline and sewerage stench, glaring advertisements and police car rotating lights that howl through the night - this is the environment of the "free world" man. **By destroying the natural environment capitalism creates increasingly extreme climatic conditions in which man is struggling harder and harder to survive – and creates artificial living conditions accessible solely to the richest layer of population, which cause definitive degeneration of man as a natural being**. "Humanization of life" is being limited to creation of micro-climatic conditions, of special capitalistic incubators - completely commercialized artificial living conditions to which degenerated people are appropriate. The most dramatic truth is: capitalism can survive the death of man as a human and biological being. **For capitalism a "traditional man" is merely a temporary means of its own reproduction. "Consumer-man" represents a transitional phase in the capitalism**-caused process of mutation of man **towards the "highest" form of capitalistic man: a robot-man**. "Terminators" and other robotized freaks which are products of the Hollywood entertainment industry which creates a "vision of the future" degenerated in a capitalist manner, incarnate creative powers, **alienated from** man, which become vehicles for destruction of man and life. A new "super race" of robotized humanoids is being created, which should clash with "traditional mankind", meaning with people capable of **loving**, **thinking**, **daydreaming, fighting for freedom and survival** - and impose their rule over the Earth. Instead of the new world, the "new man" is being created - who has been reduced to a level of humanity which cannot jeopardize the ruling order. Science and technique have become the basic lever of capital for the destruction of the world and the creation of "technical civilization". It is not only about destruction achieved by the use of technical means. It is about technicization of social institutions, of interpersonal relations, of the human body. Increasing **transformation** of nature **into a surrogate of "nature**", increasing dehumanization of the society and increasing denaturalization of man **are** direct consequences of **capital's effort**, within an increasingly merciless global economic war, **to achieve complete commercialization of both natural and the social environment**. The optimism of the Enlightenment could hardly be unreservedly supported nowadays, the notion of Marx that man imposes on himself only such tasks as he can solve, particularly the optimism based on the myth of the "omnipotence" of science and technique. The race for profits has already caused irreparable and still unpredictable damage to both man and his environment. By the creation of "consumer society", which means through the transition of capitalism into a phase of pure destruction, **such a qualitative rise in destruction of nature and mankind has been performed that** life on the planet is literally facing a "countdown". Instead of the "withering away" (Engels) of institutions of the capitalist society, the withering away of life is taking place. [sic]

### 2NC – SVio – Outweighs

#### The war against nature is invisible but its real—it turns the AFFs war impacts and culminates in extinction

Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasoci ety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

### A2: Cap Good – Space Colonization

#### We solve the internal link – the only reason we’d have colonize space is destroying the earth

#### Colonization will just lead to extension of capitalist ideology to space – we’ll do the same dangerous things that we’ve done to the earth – impact is destruction of the universe

#### Your turn is a link – only the rich white elites will have access to get off the rock tech

#### Space exploration causes asteroid terrorism – extinction

Singer ’01 [Clifford E. Singer, professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign, Spring 2001, Swords and Ploughshares, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage\_docs/pubs\_docs/S&P\_docs/S&P\_XIII/Singer.htm]

However **the technology to build isolated extraterrestrial settlements** naturally **brings along with it another potentially powerful technology–the ability to move sizeable asteroids**. Back **in** 19**79** **it was shown that this is not as difficult as one might at first think**. The requisite technique is to land a spacecraft on one asteroid, dig up material and throw it the path of another asteroid that will approach nearby, and perturb the orbit of that asteroid until it passes nearby another large object. Once an asteroid or comet makes a controlled approach near any planet but Mercury or Pluto, then it can easily be directed near or at the earth at enormous velocity. Fortunately for our hypothetical descendants here destroying all human life on earth by asteroid impact would likely require moving objects with a diameter in excess of ten kilometers. While there are many of these, the required orbit perturbation would require a lot of lead-time and work and could be very difficult to motivate and conceal. Nevertheless **with contributions from this technology a dispute between the earth and a handful of its fragile far-flung offspring in space that is carried to the extreme could conceivably lead to human extinction**. Only when settlements in space are sufficiently numerous or far flung would such a possibility effectively be ruled out, primarily by physical considerations.

**Space makes conflicts inevitable and shifts resources from other helpful projects**

Lamb ’01 [David, Philosophy and Bioethics at the University of Birmingham, “The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence: A Philosophical Inquiry”]

The arguments against terraforming other planets are based on moral objections: **is it morally right to cause such drastic changes to another planet?** Mars might contain as yet undiscovered forms of microscopic life that have evolved under Martian conditions, and consequently our presence will jeopardize these by bringing our micro-organisms which may attack and kill the Martian ones. This objection would be stronger if there was evidence of Martian life-forms, as a major climatic change could also upset their development. 2 **There is also an objection that human efforts to transform Earth have resulted in a catalogue of** man-made **disasters and unforeseen catastrophes. How much worse would it be if we started in an environment of which we know less than we do of Earth? Something might go wrong, leaving things even worse off with regard to the planet's ability to foster life.** There might even be repercussions on Earth. 3 The fact that terraforming is a long-term project would act as a disincentive to governments with regard to investment. Moreover, **scarce human talent and resources would be diverted from worthy projects on Earth, such as social and environmental problems. . 4 If terraforming and hence colonization are successful, they would not divert resources away from warfare: on the contrary, wars would very likely be fought over the new territory; and military uses of the new-colonies would simply extend the arena for socio-political problem**s. <117>

**Space exploration causes space diseases, wiping out life on earth**

Mullen ’03 [Leslie, 8-25-2003, “Alien Infection,” Astrobiology Magazine, http://www.astrobio.net/news/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=570]

Chris Chyba, who holds the Carl Sagan Chair for the Study of Life in the Universe at the SETI Institute, says **there are two types of potential alien pathogens: toxic and infectious**. Toxic pathogens act as a poison on other organisms. Infectious pathogens are viruses or bacteria that are passed between organisms, causing sickness. Some viruses and microbes rely on specific biological systems in order to replicate and infect their host, so not all pathogens affect all organisms the same way. Chicken farmers, for instance, can remain untouched by a disease that decimates their flocks. It could be that a martian microbe would enter the human body, but is rendered harmless because it is incompatible with human physiology. "**After living in the dirt of Mars, a pathogen could see our bodies as a comparable host**; they could treat us 'like dirt,'" says John Rummel, NASA's Planetary Protection Officer. "But, to quote Donald Rumsfeld, we're dealing with the unknown unknowns. It could be that even if the microbes lived inside us, they wouldn't do anything, it would just be this lump living inside you." The conditions on Mars are much different than those in the human body, so an inert pathogen seems the most likely scenario -- especially since any life on Mars would have evolved without humans being present. Co-evolution is why some pathogens only affect certain organisms. Infectious pathogens evolve based on the reactions of their hosts. As the host develops defenses against a predatory pathogen, the pathogen has to devise new means of sustaining itself within the host (or risk its own extinction). Some toxins also developed through co-evolution. As predatory organisms seek food, their prey develop ever more sophisticated means to escape being eaten. Many organisms developed specially targeted toxins as part of this evolutionary arms battle. Rummel says that humans have evolved a complex defense system to prevent us from getting sick from a whole host of disease and pathogens. But non-specific microbes - where human physiology did not influence their evolution - may evade our defense mechanisms. The best way to understand the spread of potential alien pathogens is to examine the spread of such non-specific pathogens on Earth. One example of a non-specific toxic pathogen is cyanobacteria that produce hepatotoxins (toxins affecting the liver) and neurotoxins. According to Chyba, cyanobacteria living in lakes on the alpine pastures of Switzerland have been implicated in a hundred cattle poisonings over the past 25 years. Chyba says the cyanobacteria most likely did not develop their toxins in order to escape predation from cows (or to kill the cows in order to eat them!). "Rather, the susceptibility of cattle to these toxins seems simply to be an unfortunate coincidence of a toxin working across a large evolutionary distance," Chyba writes. An example of an infectious pathogen working across large evolutionary distances is the bacterium Serratia marcescens. It is found in a variety of animal species, and also can be found free-living in water and soil. Its transmission from human sewage has resulted in the decimation of Caribbean elkhorn coral. "The distance between humans and corals emphasizes the possibility that certain **organisms may prove pathogenic across a wide evolutionary divide,**" Chyba writes. Of course, the evolutionary divide between humans and coral would not be as wide a gulf as between any martian organisms and human beings. Yet one theory for the origin of life on Earth is that it was transferred here from Mars by meteorites. This variant of the "Panspermia" theory suggests that life on Earth and any life on Mars might be closely related. If Mars and Earth share the basis for life, this life would presumably have evolved well beyond the original form. Such a large evolutionary divide could provide protection from infection. But it could also mean that **if infection does occur, it might be related closely enough to some Earth life to blaze through that population unchecked.** Human infection is not the only concern of planetary protection. Life on Earth forms an interconnected, highly dependent web, so **a pathogen affecting any life on Earth could have serious repercussions for the health and environment of our planet.**

**Space doesn’t prevent extinction – space only embraces a regressive mindset that stops reforms to prevent extinction level events**

Jozef ’01 [Jozef Hand-Boniakowski, Ph.D, “THE STATE OF HUMANITY”, November, http://www.metaphoria.org/ac4t0111.html]

**Human optimism is tempered by minds such as Stephen Hawking's who states**, "I am afraid the atmosphere might get hotter and hotter until it will be like Venus with boiling sulfuric acid...I am worried about the greenhouse effect." Hawking's projection optimistically foresees the extinction of humanity within a millennium. I give it much less time than that. As a solution, Hawking suggests human transplantation into space where "**at least it would ensure that people don't become extinct." Hawking does not offer how to prevent extinction, rather how to circumvent or cheat it. In my mind, this is analogous to the regressive mindset that ignores the pursuit of difficult solutions in favor of quick, short-sighted and often self-fulfilling prophetic courses of action. No need, for example, to eliminate the causes of war when bigger wars and bigger weapons of war (as the thinking goes) can lead to victory in those wars. No need to resolve the issues that lead to the terror of September 11, when reciprocal and bigger terror (under any name but) can be used in victorious vengeance.**

### A2: Cap Not Sustainable

#### Capitalism is at a crossroads---it needs the AFF, but that locks in irresolvable environmental contradictions that accelerate ecological collapse---this debate is a question of social relations---an aff ballot organizes social relations around a market model that’s driving the planet toward irreversible collapse

Massimo De Angelis 12, Professor of Political Economy and Development at the University of East London, 2012, “Crises, Movements and Commons,” Borderlands E-Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol11no2_2012/deangelis_crises.pdf>

The world is today traversed by several crises, which raises the pressing question of their solutions. The recurrent and intensified crises of precarity and livelihoods, of environmental degradation, climate change and of social justice, all point to a global context that would require a radical reconfiguration of social relations, a new world, new social systems articulating our production in common. But how and whether these crises will be an opportunity to embark on this journey of transformation of social reproduction is not clear nor is it given. While social contestations are gaining momentum in a variety of theatres and contexts, it is clear that neoliberal capital seems adamant that it can push through a new phase of global governance without questioning the basic structures and policies that have precipitated the financial crisis in 2008 with the consequent intensification of all other crises. Indeed, not only the remaining bundle of social entitlements and rights are under threat under intensifying austerity policies around the world. There are also clear signs that the multimillion dollar operation that rescued banks in 2008 is now being institutionalised into the DNA of modern neoliberal capital governance. In Europe, for example, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is being set up as a permanent rescue-funding programme to succeed the temporary ad hoc mechanisms set up in the rescue operation of the financial system. Not only ‘the granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality’ (European Council 2012). Also, upon joining the mechanism, the countries involved will be obliged to contribute funding to the rescue package. Neoliberalism has never been about the withdrawal of the state from welfare, but the shift in the modality of welfare from the poor to the rich. In the first part of the neoliberal period, from the late 1970s, this amounted to slash in social services, privatisation, cut in higher tax rates and subsidies to exporters and incentives to foreign investors. In the middle part from the mid 1990s it was all about finding ways to govern the wasteland created and the conflict generated therein. After the attempt to incite the masses to work for the country in the war on terror period (from 2001), in this last fourth phase after the crisis of 2008, capital demands that public money is functionally funneled into the rescue of banks and the maintenance of the disciplinary function of finance without which modern capitalism could not operate. In the early 1980s we were told to look up at the world of finance for inspiration on how ‘betterment’ for all could be achieved with rigor and entrepreneurial risk taking. In the early 2010s we are told to pay with rigor the austerity necessary to compensate the failed risk taking of the 1%, otherwise the entire paper castle would fall, with us inside. And we are told to accept this is the de-facto norm of our systemic interaction with one another. Yet, in spite of waiving the safety net for the financial system, capital seems to be at an impossible crossroad. On one hand, it needs nonfinancial growth to buffer, accommodate and decompose struggles, and, at the same time, to fulfill its drive for accumulation and allow some debt to be repaid. On the other hand, however, today more than ever, growth can only exacerbate the contradictions at the basis of these struggles, if only because there cannot be any overall growth with simultaneous reduction in greenhouse emissions, nor without an intensification of existing inequalities also caused by the operations of current financial systems that governments are so eager to rescue. This crossroad is not avoided if instead of a future scenario of growth we postulate one of stagnation or de-growth. If on one hand this scenario would somehow mitigate the pressures on climate change, in so far as capitalist relations remain dominant in articulating and valuing social co-operation, it would do so with heavy social costs and at a likely intensification of precarity, social injustice and social conflict against these. In both scenarios, and given the historical experiences in other crises and looking at current dynamics, we can postulate the development of four phenomena. First, the growth of struggles of different sectors within the global society throwing a spanner in the wheel and resisting the reduction in rights and entitlements necessary for further neoliberal governance of the crisis, against debt and demanding some form of re-distributive justice to the state. This is what we will refer to as social movements. Second, the growth of collective self-help solutions to the problems of social reproduction faced by communities. This corresponds to what we call the development of the commons. Third, the development and refinement of capital’s commons cooptation strategies, or what I have elsewhere (De Angelis 2012) called commons fix. Fourth, the development and refinement of strategies of repression of struggles and enclosures of commons. In this paper I will not discuss in detail these four postulated developments, but problematise the interrelation among the first three for the purpose of contributing to the debate over the establishment of alternatives to capitalism. Indeed, what underpins this analysis is an attempt to answer, or at least develop a framework with which to start to answer an important naïve question. The role of naïve questions, Socrates taught us, is to problematise the systems of knowledge at the basis of our certainties, of our mental schemes through which we give meaning to the world around us and thus intervene in it. In this paper I want to address very big and naïve questions, in fact, meta-questions at the basis of what we may call a critical theory of the commons. How can social movements and struggles change the world? And how can they do it in the direction of a far better place for all (or at least the ‘99%’), more convivial and cohesive, socially economically and environmentally just, where dignity, peace, freedom, autonomy, solidarity, conviviality, equality are not so much articles of faith, but guiding values of an orienting compass of ongoing social transformation? I do not intend nor aspire to provide a firm answer, as this can really be generated through praxis. Here I only want to discuss few points that I believe must be considered as part of the answer.

**Capitalism is terminally unsustainable – empirics are on our side**

**Sauga ‘15** (Michael, Der Spiegel writer, “The Zombie System: How Capitalism Has Gone Off the Rails”, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/capitalism-in-crisis-amid-slow-growth-and-growing-inequality-a-998598-4.html>)

The buzzword is "inclusion" and it refers to a trait that Western industrialized nations seem to be on the verge of losing: the ability to allow as many layers of society as possible to benefit from economic advancement and participate in political life. The term is now even being used at meetings of a more exclusive character, as was the case in London in May. Some 250 wealthy and extremely wealthy individuals, from Google Chairman Eric Schmidt to Unilever CEO Paul Polman, gathered in a venerable castle on the Thames River to lament the fact that in today's capitalism, there is too little left over for the lower income classes. Former US President Bill Clinton found fault with the "uneven distribution of opportunity," while IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde was critical of the numerous financial scandals. The hostess of the meeting, investor and bank heir Lynn Forester de Rothschild, said she was concerned about social cohesion, noting that citizens had "lost confidence in their governments." It isn't necessary, of course, to attend the London conference on "inclusive capitalism" to realize that industrialized countries have a problem. When the Berlin Wall came down 25 years ago, the West's liberal economic and social order seemed on the verge of an unstoppable march of triumph. Communism had failed, politicians worldwide were singing the praises of deregulated markets and US political scientist Francis Fukuyama was invoking the "end of history." Today, no one talks anymore about the beneficial effects of unimpeded capital movement. Today's issue is "secular stagnation," as former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers puts it. The American economy isn't growing even half as quickly as did in the 1990s. Japan has become the sick man of Asia. And Europe is sinking into a recession that has begun to slow down the German export machine and threaten prosperity. Capitalism in the 21st century is a capitalism of uncertainty, as became evident once again last week. All it took were a few disappointing US trade figures and suddenly markets plunged worldwide, from the American bond market to crude oil trading. It seemed only fitting that the turbulence also affected the bonds of the country that has long been seen as an indicator of jitters: Greece. The financial papers called it a "flash crash." Running Out of Ammunition Politicians and business leaders everywhere are now calling for new growth initiatives, but **the governments' arsenals are empty**. The billions spent on economic stimulus packages following the financial crisis have created mountains of debt in most industrialized countries and they now lack funds for new spending programs. Central banks are also running out of ammunition. They have pushed interest rates close to zero and have spent hundreds of billions to buy government bonds. Yet **the vast amounts of money they are pumping into the financial sector isn't making its way into the economy.** Be it in Japan, Europe or the United States, companies are hardly investing in new machinery or factories anymore. Instead, prices are exploding on the global stock, real estate and bond markets, a dangerous boom driven by cheap money, not by sustainable growth. Experts with the Bank for International Settlements have already identified "worrisome signs" of an impending crash in many areas. In addition to creating new risks, **the West's crisis policy is also exacerbating conflicts in the industrialized nations** themselves. While workers' wages are stagnating and traditional savings accounts are yielding almost nothing, the wealthier classes -- those that derive most of their income by allowing their money to work for them -- are profiting handsomely. According to the latest Global Wealth Report by the Boston Consulting Group, worldwide private wealth grew by about 15 percent last year, almost twice as fast as in the 12 months previous. The data expose a dangerous malfunction in capitalism's engine room. Banks, mutual funds and investment firms used to ensure that citizens' savings were transformed into technical advances, growth and new jobs. Today they organize the redistribution of social wealth from the bottom to the top. The middle class has also been negatively affected: For years, many average earners have seen their prosperity shrinking instead of growing. Harvard economist Larry Katz rails that **US society has come to resemble a deformed and unstable apartment building: The penthouse at the top is getting bigger and bigger, the lower levels are overcrowded, the middle levels are full of empty apartments and the elevator has stopped working.** 'Wider and Wider' It's no wonder, then, that people can no longer get much out of the system. According to polls by the Allensbach Institute, only one in five Germans believes economic conditions in Germany are "fair." Almost 90 percent feel that the gap between rich and poor is "getting wider and wider." In this sense, the crisis of capitalism has turned into a crisis of democracy. Many feel that their countries are no longer being governed by parliaments and legislatures, but by bank lobbyists, which apply the logic of suicide bombers to secure their privileges: Either they are rescued or they drag the entire sector to its death.

#### Capitalist imperialism is unsustainable and makes global war a necessity – turns the aff and causes extinction

Foster et al. ‘8

[John Bellamy Foster is editor of Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, Hannah Holleman is a doctoral student at the University of Oregon, Robert W. McChesney is the Gutgsell Endowed Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “The U.S. Imperial Triangle and Military Spending”, October 8, http://www.monthlyreview.org/081001foster-holleman-mcchesney.php]

The U.S. Imperial Triangle Today What does the foregoing tell us in relation to our original question? Is it reasonable to argue, as Hobsbawm and others have, that the expansion of U.S. militarism and imperialism in the present period is the result of “a group of political crazies,” who have come to power in Washington and constructed a “radical right-wing regime” abounding in “megalomania”? As an explanation of the current phase of U.S. empire this is clearly inadequate. Despite the often neoconservative nature of the Bush administration’s top operatives, they have had the broad backing of the greater part of the establishment in the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, the War on Terrorism as a whole, the huge military buildup, etc. To be sure, if a Democratic administration under Al Gore had come into power in 2000 it is not at all certain that the United States would have gone to war with Iraq, in addition to Afghanistan, though an attempt would have been made to uphold U.S. imperial interests. The Bush administration from the first was distinguished by the particularly bellicose group of neoconservatives at its helm. But in pursuing their belligerent ends they hardly lacked solid backing within the circles of power. Strong support was extended by both political parties, Congress, the judiciary, the media, and the corporations generally. Disagreements were largely about troop levels, the amount of force to be applied, relations to allies, dates of withdrawal (partial or whole), distribution of forces between the major “theaters,” etc. More fundamental questions, even the use of torture, were avoided. Major dissent has mainly come from the bottom of the society. All of this suggests that expanded **militarism and imperialism is deeply entrenched at present**, at least within the top echelons of U.S. society. **It reflects a general concern to expand U.S. hegemony as part of an imperial grand strategy, including rolling back insurgent forces and “rogue states” around the world, and keeping** junior **partners in line**. The war in **Iraq is** best viewed as **an attempt to assert U.S. geopolitical control over the** entire **Persian Gulf and its oil**—an objective that both political wings of the establishment support, and **which is part of the larger aim of the restoration of a grand U.S. hegemony**.27 **The vast scale of U.S. military spending**—encompassing more than 50 percent of the federal budget (excluding social security, medicare, and other transfer payments) and constituting 7 percent of the entire GDP—**is** thus externally **rooted in the needs of** the U.S**. imperial grand strategy, which** continually **strains the** U.S. **system to its limits** (as measured by the budget and trade deficits). U.S. imperialism has been transformed in recent decades by the absence of the Soviet Union, giving the United States more immediate power (particularly in the military realm), coupled, paradoxically, with signs of a secular decline in U.S. economic hegemony. It is this dual reality of a temporary increase in U.S. power along with indications of its long-term decline that has led to urgent calls throughout the power elite for a “New American Century,” and to attempts by Washington to leverage its enormous military power to regain economic and geopolitical strength, for example, in the Persian Gulf oil region. In recent years, **the U**nited **S**tates **has enormously expanded its military bases and operations around the world with bases now in around seventy countries and U.S. troops present in various capacities** (including joint exercises) **in perhaps twice that number**. **Washington is** thus **not just spending money on the military and** producing destructive weapons, **or** engaging in wars **and interventions. It is** also **building a lasting physical presence around the world that allows for** control/subversion/rapid deployment.28 As a further reason not to dismiss the new surge in U.S. militarism and imperialism as merely the “megalomania” of a few, our argument points back to Kalecki’s imperial triangle, as constituting the principal dilemma facing opponents of imperialism. **The creation of a huge military establishment to serve the U.S. empire was also understood**, in military-Keynesian terms, **as a quasi-full-employment strategy aimed at combating economic stagnation. With the help of the media** (which, as General Electric Wilson insisted, had the task of “marshalling” public opinion in support of the permanent war economy), **the distinctive foundations of post–Second World War U.S. capitalism were laid.** The growth of the antiwar movement in response to the Vietnam War, and the end of the Cold War, represented setbacks for the imperial triangle, which showed up in terms of temporary drops in military spending as a percentage of GDP. **Each time, in the** late 19**70**s/early 19**80s** **and again in the late** 19**90s**/**early** **2000s**, such temporary **lulls in military spending have been followed by** a military **resurgence**.29 For Kalecki the weak link in the imperial triangle was clearly the mass media propaganda system, which had the job of selling the permanent war economy to a population that could conceivably opt for other more rational, just, and egalitarian courses. Unlike the Korean War or the Vietnam War, the Iraq War (like the Gulf War before it) was preceded by a massive antiwar movement in the United States, demonstrating the willingness of perhaps a majority of the population to seek another way, opposed to militarism and imperialism. **It was the monopoly media**, far more concentrated than in Luce’s day and now virtually indistinguishable from monopoly-finance capital (becoming simply its public voice), **that came to the rescue of U.S. war capitalism in its moment of need, giving credence to its obvious lies.** “**The press**,” as one of us has written, “**was** [soon] **eating out of the Bush** administration’s **bowl**.”30 **In a period of economic stagnation**, **financial crisis**, **declining hegemony**, **impending environmental collapse**, **and new populist insurgencies**, **Washington**, representing the U.S. oligarchy as a whole, **was** once again **able to enlist the media** monopoly **in the marshaling of public opinion in support of the imperial project** through the promotion of war hysteria. **What made this possible was the prior existence of a** well-oiled, privatized **propaganda system designed to limit the range of legitimate debate in the mainstream media**. In this system **even the outer reaches of the quite timid liberal punditocracy were** strictly **walled-in to fit within the proscribed boundaries of elite debate**. Today fundamental **dissent toward the existence of the military-imperial system**, no matter how thoughtful or well-informed, **is** decidedly off-limits, except for periodic ridicule. **Ours is decidedly a “military-industrial-media complex**.”31 Nevertheless, **the imperial triangle is now increasingly confronted with its own contradictions**. As Baran and Sweezy foresaw more than four decades ago in Monopoly Capital, the U.S. military system faced two major internal obstacles. First, **military spending tended to be tech**nologically **intensive** **and** hence **its employment stimulating effect was decreasing**. “Ironically,” they observed, “**the huge military outlays of today** may even be **contribut**ing substantially **to an increase of unemployment**: many of the new technologies which are byproducts of military research and development are also applicable to civilian production, where **they are quite likely to have the effect of raising productivity and reducing the demand for labor**.” Second, **expansion of “**weapons of total destruction**” and the devastating effects of the use of more powerful weapons, could be expected to generate a growing rebellion against the permanent war economy at all levels of society, as people perceive**d the **dangers of** global barbarism (or worse, annihilation).32 Today **the enormous weight of Washington’s war machine has not prevented it from being** stretched to its limits while becoming bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although still capable of great destruction, **the U**nited **S**tates **is** significantly **limited in its ability to deploy massive force to achieve its ends** whenever and wherever it wishes. **The dream of Pax Americana**, first presented by John F. Kennedy at the height of the Cold War**, has turned into** the **nightmare** of Pox Americana in the years of waning U.S. dominance. The role the media monopoly has assumed in recent years in the promotion of war propaganda has contributed to the rapid growth of a media reform movement, which is now challenging the concentration of communications in the United States.33 There is no doubt that **a society that supports its global position** and social order **through $1 trillion a year in military spending,** most likely far exceeding that of all the other countries in the world put together, **unleashing** untold **destruction on the world**, **while faced with intractable problems of inequality**, economic **stagnation**, **financial crisis**, **poverty**, **waste**, **and environmental decline** at home, **is** a society that is **ripe for change**. It is our task to change it.

**A2: Environment Resilient**

**Environmental resilience theory gets co-opted by corporate elites and is wrong- justifies regulatory rollback and liability limitation while ignoring the timescape clash between fast extraction and slow recovery**

**Nixon**, University of Wisconsin-Madison English professor, **2011**

(Rob, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 21-22)

That said, we need to be cautious about romanticizing the noncompliance that may inhere in a targeted resource: relative to the accelerated plunder involved, say, in the "second scramble" for Africa-as American, Australian, Chinese, European, and South African corporations cash in on resource-rich, regulation-poor, war-fractured societies-the resistance posed by nature itself should not be overstated. The recent turn within environmental studies toward celebrating the creative resilience of ecosystems **can be readily hijacked by politicians**, lobbyists, **and corporations who oppose regulatory controls and strive to minimize pollution liability**. Co-opting the "nature-and-time-will-heal" argument has become integral to attempts to privatize profits while externalizing risk and cleanup, both of which can be delegated to "nature's business." This was dramatically illustrated by the Deepwater Horizon disaster- in the laxity that contributed to the blowout and in the aftermath. Big Oil and government agencies both invoked natural resilience as an advance strategy for minimizing oversight. Before the blowout, the Minerals Management Service of the U.S. Interior Department had concluded that "spills in deep water are not likely to affect listed birds .... Deepwater spills would either be transported away from coastal habitats or prevented, for the most part, from reaching coastal habitats by natural weathering processes.?" Even after the disaster, this line of reasoning persisted. Oil industry apologist Rep. Don Young (R-AK), testifying at congressional hearings on the blowout, knew exactly how to mine this "natural agency" logic: the Deepwater Horizon spill was "not an environmental disaster," he declared. "I will say that again and again because it is a natural phenomenon. Oil has seeped into this ocean for centuries, will continue to do it.... We will lose some birds, we will lose some fixed sea-life, but overall it will recover.?" BP spokesman John Curry likewise explained how industrious microbes would cleanse the oil from the gulf: "Nature," he concluded sanguinely, "has a way of helping the situation.'" BP representatives repeatedly invoked the capacity of marine life to metabolize hydrocarbons and the dispersing powers of microbial degradation. But in conscripting nature as a volunteer clean up crew, BP and its Washington allies downplayed the way ravenous microbes, in consuming oxygen, thereby starved other organisms and exacerbated expanding oceanic dead zones." What will be the long-term cascade effect of the slow violence, the mass die-offs, of phyloplankton at the food chain base? It is far too early to tell. In short, the very environment that high-risk, deep-water drilling endangered was conscripted by industry through a kind of natural outsourcing. And so Big Oil's invocation of nature's healing powers needs to be recognized as part of a broader strategy of image management and liability limitation by greenwashing. Natural agency can indeed take unexpected, sometimes heartening forms, but we should be alert to the ways corporate colossi and governments can hijack that logic to grant themselves advance or retrospective absolution. Crucially, for my arguments about slow violence, the time frames of damage assessment and potential recovery are wildly out of sync. The deep-time thinking that celebrates natural healing is strategically disastrous if it provides political cover for reckless corporate short-termism.47

**A2: Markets Key to Peace (Gartzke Etc)**

**Gartzke’s model has significant missing values which biases its findings**

Zhen **Han 12**, MA, Political Science, University of British Columbia, March 2012, “The Capitalist Peace Revisited: A New Liberal Peace Model and the Impact of Market Fluctuations,” https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/41809/ubc\_2012\_spring\_han\_zhen.pdf?sequence=1

The missing value problem needs serious attention for the students who study liberal peace models. Dafoe finds that missing values in Gartzke’s models are systematically associated with its major explanatory variable—market openness96 , thus leads to a biased conclusion. For example, China, the U.S.S.R, and North Korea were involved in several militarized interstate conflicts, but a significant part of the market openness is missing for these countries97, and excluding these cases from the model leads to a bias. While Dafoe assigns value 1 (least open to financial market) to all the missing values of China, U.S.S.R and North Korea, he finds that market openness lost its significance and democracy become significant again98. But Dafoe’s approach can be problematic as well, because these nations may be open to each other while staying closed to the west or the global financial markets. In case of North Korea, foreign capital from the U .S.S.R and China are pivotal to the survival of the regime.

**Correcting for those missing values proves market liberalization causes conflict---Gartzke’s backwards**

Zhen **Han 12**, MA, Political Science, University of British Columbia, March 2012, “The Capitalist Peace Revisited: A New Liberal Peace Model and the Impact of Market Fluctuations,” https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/41809/ubc\_2012\_spring\_han\_zhen.pdf?sequence=1

Model 1 replicates Model 5 of Gartzke’s capitalist peace paper100. A major difference between the findings of Model 1 and Gartzke’s capitalist peace Model 5 is that, Model 1 of this paper shows that higher level of financial market openness is positively associated with more conflict, while Gartzke finds his market openness index is negatively associated with more conflict101. As Dafoe points out, Gartzke’s finding can be damaged by the missing values in his market openness variable, and the temporal dependence and cross-sectional dependence are not properly controlled102. Model 1 pays close attention to these problems, and finds that, at least in this period, market openness is positively associated with more conflicts. As the data of this paper focuses on a different time period, this result does not suggest Gartzke is wrong, but further explanation of why market openness is positively associated with more conflict is necessary. The low value of democracy is negatively associated with conflicts, and this finding is consistent with the argument of democratic peace theory. The positive impact of the high value of democracy possibly shows that a discrepant dyad—when the democracy low value is controlled—is more likely to fight each other. As Choi points out, the interpretation of the democracy high variable is often difficult, but it seems the democratic peace theory is well supported by this data. The traditional commercial peace theory, which focuses on the trade dependency created by international commodity trade, is also supported by this model. Development makes noncontiguous states more likely to fight each other, as the development facilitated the capacity of states to project power to a longer distance, but development also makes contiguous states less likely to fight each other103. This finding supports that the interaction effect between contiguity and development is also robust in this period. Being a major power makes the state more likely to be involved in conflicts. Similar to this finding, a state is more likely to be involved in MIDs if its national power index is higher. However, formal alliances have no significant impact on the probability of MIDs. Model 2 replaces the high value of democracy with the democracy distance variable104 . Since the democracy distance variable is a linear transformation of the high value of democracy105 , this replacement produces identical results to Model 1, but the interpretation of democratic peace in this model is much easier. The positive and significant impact of the democracy distance variable supports the expectation from Choi: politically different countries— the authoritarian states and the democratic states—are more likely to fight each other 106 . Different political ideology can be the underlining reason for tension. As this paper suggests before, since many pacifying mechanisms available for democracies do not exist in autocratic and discrepant dyads, the same democracy distance should have different impact in different types of dyad. Model 3.1 applies this proposal and makes the lower value of democracy interact with the democracy distance variable. The findings are impressive: The negative coefficient of the lower value of democracy becomes significant again; the coefficient of democracy distance loses its significance, but the interaction effects between these two variables are positively significant. This finding supports the democratic peace argument: countries are less likely to fight if they both are highly democratic, but this pacifying effect has been mitigated if the democracy distance is getting bigger. Figure 1 presents a prediction of the probability of conflict based on Model 3.1. It shows that the probability of conflict is almost the same for autocratic and discrepant dyads, and both of them are much higher than the probability for democratic dyads. Model 3.2 replaces the low value of democracy with a three-category indicator of dyad type 107 and makes the dyad type indicator interacting with the democracy distance variable. The result shows that, compared with the base category (democratic dyad), the risk of fighting is higher in the other two types of dyads. In the base category, democratic distance does not have significant impact on their chance of fighting. Figure 2 shows how the predicted probability of conflict, based on Model 3.2, changes across different dyad types. The predicted probability shows that one can confidently claim that democratic dyads are more peaceful than other types of dyad, but the upward trend, which is similar to the trend showing in the predicted chance of fighting for autocracies, shows that bigger democracy distance leads to more conflicts in these two types of dyads. The discrepant dyad group generally behaves similarly to the autocracy group, except that the downward trend of the curve, showing that instead of fighting for different democratic ideology, shows discrepant dyads often fight for other reasons. However, the confidence interval of the discrepant dyad group largely overlaps with the confidence interval of the autocracy group, so more data are needed to distinguish whether discrepant dyads behave differently from autocracy dyads. In conclusion, this paper argues that the democratic peace model can be improved by interacting the democracy distance variable with the other democracy measurement of the dyad. Findings from these interaction models support the dyadic claim that ―democratic countries are unlikely to fight each other‖, but they also suggest one cannot extend this claim to the monadic level. Democratic countries are not more peaceful, as the chance of conflicts is high in a discrepant dyad. Increasing ideological differences, as measured by the democracy distance variable in these models, can increase the chances of conflicts. On the commercial peace aspect, Model 1 of this paper suggests that higher market openness can lead to more conflicts. This positive correlation might be explained by the spillover effect of market fluctuation. In order to capture the impact of market fluctuation, Model 4 added a set of variables related to the measurement of foreign capital net inflows to the model. The results show that, once the capital flow factors are considered in the model, the market openness variable loses its significance, and a higher level of capital net inflow is positively associated with more interstate conflicts. The missing value indicator of capital net inflows is included in the model to control the damage caused by missing data in the capital net inflow variable. This missing indicator is positive and significant, suggesting that missing economic data are systematically associated with militarized conflicts. The lagged capital net inflows variable, measured as the percentage of GDP, is included in the model, and higher level of capital net inflows is associated with a higher risk of conflicts. The change of capital net inflow variable, which is measured by the level of current capital net inflows minus the level of the one-year lagged capital net inflows, is also positively associated with more conflicts, meaning the risk of conflict is higher if there are more foreign capitals pouring into the country. These findings support the theory of this paper that large capital inflows can destabilize the domestic economy and cause crises, but they are also contrary to the conventional understanding that foreign capital will leave the conflicting region. However, it can be explained by the following reasons.

**To the extent that capitalism creates peace, it’s only through social democratic capitalism---market liberalization has no theoretical correlation to peace**

Michael **Mousseau 12**, **Prof**essor **of** **I**nternational **R**elations at Koç University and Director of the Center for Conflict Studies in Istanbul, “A Market-Capitalist or a Democratic Peace?,” in What Do We Know About War, second edition, ed. Vasquez, p. 207-208

This chapter explored the state of theory and evidence on the capitalist peace and its prospects for explaining the democratic peace. Two kinds of capitalist peace theories were distinguished, the free-market and the social-market, yielding four observable causal mechanisms: trade, capital openness, and size of private sector as free-market theories, and contract-intensive economy as the social-market theory. Analyses of these causal mechanisms indicate that the free-market theories are not viable explanations for the democratic peace or the peace among the advanced industrial nations, primarily because none of them correlate substantially with democracy or developed democracy; they do not even correlate much with each other. Only the social-market measure of contract-intensive economy correlates moderately with democracy and developed democracy. Application of the theories to the case of the Falklands/ Malvinas War yields similar results: this war appears as an anomalous case for the trade (Weede 1996) and capital openness (Gartzke et al. 2001) models, while the public sector model (McDonald 2007) identifies Britain as a non-capitalist state; only the social-market model (Mousseau 2000) offers an account for this conflict. Finally, analyses of fatal militarized interstate disputes from 1961 to 2001 corroborate that the democratic peace is spurious, with contract-intensive economy the more likely explanation for both democracy and the "democratic" peace. The free-market theories also face problems of internal and external validity. Regarding internal validity, to account for a peace between developed nations, all of these theories critically assume that free markets cause economic development. Yet the scientific evidence tells us this is not so (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1990). Regarding external validity, for all but the most myopic observers of global affairs it is clear that the peace among the advanced capitalist nations is much more than restraint due to the high cost of killing each other (Weede 1996), fear of each other's resolve (Gartzke et al. 2001), or the credibility in their commitments (McDonald 2007). These theories may be correct, but it is apparent that these nations do more than just tolerate each other; they are friends. This is evident from the fact that whenever a capitalist economy takes a turn for the worse, the other capitalist nations seek to boost it back up, overcoming collective action problems with negotiations enhanced by shared norms of equity and law. The capitalist nations are not better balancers: they do not balance. They do not simply read each other's signals better or send or receive better information: they know that other capitalist nations will never attack them. Indeed, the very image of war today between France and Germany is comical, yet until they became market capitalist only five decades ago these two nations slaughtered each other with seeming zeal roughly every generation.

**Market liberalization increases statistical risk of war**

Zhen **Han 12**, MA, Political Science, University of British Columbia, March 2012, “The Capitalist Peace Revisited: A New Liberal Peace Model and the Impact of Market Fluctuations,” https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/41809/ubc\_2012\_spring\_han\_zhen.pdf?sequence=1

The third causal mechanism is socialization theory. Market integration provides more forums allowing national policy makers to meet, thus policy transparency can be increased, and misinterpretations, which can lead to more conflicts, are reduced62 . Similar policy interests can also be developed through the socialization processes63. \*\*\*TO FOOTNOTES\*\*\* 63 This is the hypothesis 3 in Gartzke’s Capitalist Peace argument. Gartzke, 2007. \*\*\*END FOOTNOTES\*\*\* However, Waltz argues that as the number of contracts increases through international market integration, the number of contract default will also increase64; therefore, socialization under globalization can work in a negative way and make conflicts more likely. On the other hand, the socialization effect caused by financial market integration can be limited, as the highly professionalized nature of financial markets creates interactions only within a small group of experts. Chewieroth suggests that state leaders often have little to say in the norm building of international financial structure, and the self-interested bureaucrats of IMF and other international financial organizations have a significant impact on financial liberalization65. These discussions suggest there are some reasons to argue that the pacifying effects of financial liberalization are not as strong as commodity international trade. The causal mechanisms of conventional commercial peace may not function well with the financial integration. Furthermore, the possible negative impact of liberalization needs to be considered, as liberalization does not always bring stability. Financial market fluctuations, often marked by significant amount of capital inflows and outflows, can destabilize economy and cause further crisis. While the negative impact of large capital outflows, often known as the capital flight, are well recognized, this paper suggests that large capital inflows can be risky too. One can observe a large foreign capital inflow in cases of speculative accumulation, which often leads to financial crises when market confidence starts to collapse. The Asian Crisis in 1997 is an example of this type of crisis66. A large capital inflow also can be observed if the state is consistently borrowing from international financial markets to fix its budget deficits, such as the case in the 2011 Euro crisis. In both cases, large capital net inflows destabilize the economy and causes economic crisis. In the processes discussed above, higher level of financial deregulation provides the tool for states to borrow more from foreign capitals market, and it also encourages foreign capitals to take the risk of entering a foreign market, as liberalization guarantee foreign capitals can pull out at any time as they want. For these reasons, it is reasonable to observe increasing capital net inflows67 before a crisis breaks out, and a higher level of liberalization increases the vulnerability of the state. These discussions lead to the Hypothesis 5 and 6 of this thesis. H5: A higher level of financial liberalization leads to a higher chance of having militarized interstate conflicts. H6: A higher level of capital flight leads to a higher chance of having militarized interstate Conflicts.

**Consensus of new studies rejects Gartzke’s capitalist peace model---neoliberal market volatility means it doesn’t contribute to peace**

Zhen **Han 12**, MA, Political Science, University of British Columbia, March 2012, “The Capitalist Peace Revisited: A New Liberal Peace Model and the Impact of Market Fluctuations,” https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/41809/ubc\_2012\_spring\_han\_zhen.pdf?sequence=1

Erik Gartzke’s prize-winning paper “the Capitalist Peace” is a pioneer of testing the relations between market openness in this new era and interstate conflicts by combining commercial peace data and economic data on market openness4 . He finds that if two states have a higher level of market openness, they are less likely to have interstate conflicts5 . His findings also challenge the democratic peace theory, as he finds that democracy has no significant correlation with peace once control for market openness6 . These findings raise questions of the two major components—democratic peace and commercial peace—of the liberal peace model. Some recent studies challenge Gartzke by arguing that 1.) His measurement of democracy is problematic7 ; 2.) Missing values in his data has created a selection bias in his conclusion; 3.) Temporal dependence and regional dependence are not properly controlled for in his statistical model8 . The debate between Gartzke and his critics begs a new liberal peace model—a model in which democracy and market openness are properly measured, and dependence across cases are properly controlled. This thesis tries to build and test such a model with data focusing on later time periods when the data availability is better. In section 2, this paper reviews the current debate on the two pillars of liberal peace—democratic peace theory and commercial peace theory, and suggests some new measurements to improve conventional quantitative studies on liberal peace. Section 3 reviews the debate on methodological issues, such as the proper way to control temporal dependence, and proposes a new statistical model to test the liberal peace theory. Section 4 introduces the datasets used in this study. The missing variable problem, which has poisoned some previous studies on commercial peace, is also discussed in this section. Section 5 reports the findings from the new liberal peace models of this paper, and section 6 provides some discussion for future studies. The results of these new statistical models of liberal peace theorie shows that while traditional democratic peace and commercial peace remain robust in the new era of global financial integration, the pacifying effect of commercial ties is weakened by the volatile fluctuations in the international financial market.

**Capitalism reduces conflict-last 3 decades prove**

**Tures, LaGrange political science professor, 2003**

(John, “Economic Freedom And Conflict Reduction: Evidence From The 1970s, 1980s, And 1990s”, <http://www.freetheworld.com/papers/John_Tures.pdf>)

The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial volumes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong government can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a powerful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totalitarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other economically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian “Asian tigers.” A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statistical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace .**Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.**

**A2: Squo Improving (Goklany)**

#### Goklany’s wrong, oversimplified, and neolib destroys all the reasons the status quo is improving

James **Surowiecki 7**, journalist and financial writer for The New Yorker, 7/18/7, “The Myth of Inevitable Progress,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/the\_myth\_of\_inevitable\_progres.hstml

"Day by day, in every way, I am getting better and better." That mantra, invented by the self-taught psychologist Émile Coué in the nineteenth century, kept running through my head as I read Indur Goklany's new book on the relationship between economic growth and human and environmental progress, The Improving State of the World. Just as Coué told his patients that incessant repetition of his mantra would make it come true, Goklany seems to believe that saying often enough -- and in enough different ways -- that life today is better than ever will make it so. Goklany depicts a global economy in which nearly all signs are positive -- and in which the problems that do exist, such as stagnation or setbacks in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union, will be solved if economic growth and technological improvements are allowed to work their magic. Nor is this, in Goklany's account, a new phenomenon. He marshals an impressive array of historical data to argue that the trajectory of the twentieth century has been generally upward and onward. Taken as a whole, Goklany argues, humanity really has been getting better and better day by day, so that today, as his subtitle puts it, "we're living longer, healthier, more comfortable lives on a cleaner planet." Seen from a broad historical perspective, this description is, for most people, accurate enough. Just about everyone living today is the beneficiary of what can almost certainly be called the single most consequential development in human history -- namely, the onset of industrialization. As the economic historian Angus Maddison has shown in a series of studies of economic development over the past two millennia, human economies grew very little, if at all, for most of human history. Between 1000 and 1820 or so, Maddison estimates, annual economic growth was around 0.05 percent a year -- which meant that living standards improved incredibly slowly and that people living in 1800 were only mildly better off than people living in 1000. But sometime around 1820, that all began to change. Between 1820 and today, world per capita real income grew 20 times as fast as it did in the previous eight centuries. In the West, above all, the effects of this transformation have been so massive as to be practically unfathomable. Real income, life expectancy, literacy and education rates, and food consumption have soared, while infant mortality, hours worked, and food prices have plummeted. And although the West has been the biggest beneficiary of these changes, the diffusion of technology, medicine, and agricultural techniques has meant that developing countries have enjoyed dramatic improvements in what the United Nations calls "human development indicators," even if most of their citizens remain poor. One consequence of this is that people at a given income level today are likely to be healthier and to live longer than people at the same income level did 40 or 50 years ago. In one sense, all of this should be obvious, since a moment's thought -- or a quick read of a nineteenth-century novel -- should suffice to remind you of how much better, at least in material terms, life is today than it was a century ago, let alone in the 1600s. But as behavioral economists have persuasively demonstrated, human beings quickly adapt to their surroundings and come to take their current state of affairs for granted. In other words, it is difficult, even after your life has changed dramatically for the better, to remain aware of just how much better it is, and even harder to truly appreciate how much better you have it than your great-grandparents did. So part of Goklany's project here -- and it is a valuable part -- is to make clear just how much real progress there has been over the past two centuries and even (in many places) over the past two decades in the life of the average human being. THE ANTI-MALTHUS Goklany's target is not just the natural tendency of human beings to take things for granted. His real opponents are what he calls the "neo-Malthusians" -- those who are convinced that there are natural limits to growth and that humanity has been butting up against them for quite some time now. The neo-Malthusians had their heyday in the 1960s and early 1970s, with works such as Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb and the Club of Rome's appropriately titled The Limits to Growth. Although their doomsaying about population growth and industrialization is no longer front-page news, their deep-seated skepticism about the virtues of economic growth and their conviction that the richer people get, the worse things become for the earth remain an important strand of modern environmentalism. If Goklany sees progress everywhere he looks, the neo-Malthusians see impending disaster: air pollution, the disappearance of habitats, the emptying of aquifers, the demolition of forest cover, and the proliferation of new diseases. Day by day, in every way, in other words, we are getting worse and worse. The problem with neo-Malthusianism, as Goklany appropriately suggests, is that it has consistently underestimated the beneficial effects of technological change. The e = mc2 of the neo-Malthusians was introduced three decades ago, when Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren invented the equation I = PAT. Environmental impact (I) was said to be the product of population size (P), level of affluence (A), and technological efficiency (T). According to this logic, not only are population growth and economic growth bad for the earth, but so, too, is technological change, since it has a multiplier effect on the other two factors. The only way to save the planet, from the neo-Malthusians' perspective, is to set strict limits on human behavior, doing everything possible to rein in businesses and consumers. The I = PAT formula was not pulled completely out of thin air. As societies get richer and more populous, they do consume more resources, and, especially in the early phases of economic growth, they do so with a measure of indifference to the overall impact on the environment. But what the equation misses, and what Goklany spends a good chunk of his book demonstrating, is that technology can actually reduce environmental impact, thereby diminishing the demands made by affluence and population growth. A classic example of this effect is the massive expansion in the efficiency of agricultural productivity over the past 40 years. Productivity gains have dramatically reduced the environmental burden of farming (at least on the land -- there have not been similar advances in the efficient use of water) and shrunk the amount of land needed to feed the world. More recently, technological improvements in the scrubbing of power-plant smokestacks have brought about a sharp reduction in the amount of sulfur dioxide in the air. Improvements in the efficiency of wind and solar power have reduced (albeit only a little) the demand for fossil fuels. And although the impact of these innovations has been felt most strongly in the developed world, they have also improved conditions in the developing world, at least with regard to things such as access to clean water and some types of air emissions. Goklany may be exaggerating somewhat when he says that the entire planet -- as opposed to just the developed world -- is cleaner, but it is in fact not an outrageous claim. The paradox here is that technological change is generally associated with (or is actually the result of) increased affluence, which makes it likely that an economy will get cleaner even as it gets richer. And empirically, that does seem to be the case. After all, developed countries do generally have cleaner air, cleaner water, more forest cover, and less cropland devoted to food production than developing countries do, even though the latter are much poorer. The obvious, and important, exception is CO2 emissions and the broader problem of climate change. But Goklany -- who spends too much of his book offering an overly familiar critique of excessive action in response to global warming -- argues that now that Americans are increasingly concerned about climate change, technology will soon help mitigate the problem. All of this does not mean that the United States is less polluted than it was in 1787, let alone than it was when it was inhabited only by Native Americans. But it does mean that the United States is arguably less polluted today than at any time in the last 100 years and that the last 40 years or so, in particular, have seen a dramatic improvement in the quality of air and water. And the same is true, to lesser and greater extents, in the rest of the developed world. One hypothesis for why this has historically occurred is demonstrated by what is called the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). When graphed, the relationship between prosperity and environmental degradation looks like an upside-down U. Initially, as countries grow, they trade off environmental well-being for economic growth -- that is, as they get richer, they also get more polluted. At some point, however, they become prosperous enough to shift their priorities and begin to seek out ways to grow more cleanly. Goklany suggests a variation on the EKC, the "environmental transition hypothesis," which tries to account for time and technology as well as affluence. The invention and spread of new technologies, he suggests, make it easier and more likely for countries to get on the right side of the U-curve quickly, even before they have become rich; the "green revolution," for instance, allowed poor countries to reduce the environmental burden of farming. FREE MARKETS, FREE PEOPLE The environmental transition hypothesis is a reasonable way of thinking about the relationship between prosperity, technology, and people's expectations about the environment. And Goklany's rebuttal to the environmental doomsayers is both welcome and convincing. So why, then, is his overall take on the world -- and in particular on how we got to where we are and what we need to do to keep things moving in the right direction -- unsatisfying in that Couéist way? The simple answer is that Goklany's account leaves out too much that matters and pretends that incredibly complex phenomena can be explained away with a few catch phrases. In its overly sanguine and simplistic take on globalization, regulation, and the role of state and economic power, The Improving State of the World is symptomatic of what has become, in the eyes of many, a quintessentially American point of view -- a view according to which the task of creating a better world can ultimately be boiled down to the motto of the Wall Street Journal editorial page: "free markets and free people." Free markets and free people are, to be sure, wonderful things. But what Goklany offers up in his book is a fundamentally deterministic take on the world: as countries get richer and more technologically advanced, their citizens (all, or almost all, of them) naturally get healthier and better educated, eat better, live longer, and care more about the environment. The free market, recognizing people's resulting desires, delivers the goods they want. The environmental transition hypothesis is the most striking example of this view, since it postulates that environmental improvement happens, as it were, naturally. The reality, of course, is that the fight over environmental regulation, at least in the United States, was -- and remains -- a fierce one and that environmental skeptics and businesses have done their best to prevent regulations such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts from ever becoming law. It is also the case that without those regulations, the "cleaner planet" Goklany sees today would not exist. Goklany attempts the argument that air and water pollution in the United States were declining long before regulations were put into effect. Unfortunately, his own evidence shows that emissions for a host of pollutants peaked right around 1970, when the Clean Air Act was passed, or after, and myriad studies demonstrate that the United States' rivers and lakes are dramatically more swimmable and fishable today than they were before the Clean Water Act. The point is that far from being the inevitable product of a strong economy, environmental improvement is often the result of political struggles that could very easily have gone the other way. It is also unlikely to occur in the absence of a strong state that is accountable to its citizens. Yet Goklany's entire work -- perhaps not surprisingly for someone at the libertarian Cato Institute -- is predicated on the idea that the state mostly functions as an obstacle to the benevolent workings of the market. This assumption is especially peculiar in the context of a discussion of pollution, since economic theory tells us that polluters, in the absence of regulation, have no reason to take the costs of their emissions into account. Pollution is the quintessential case of a negative externality and, accordingly, of market failure: since polluters do not pay the cost of their pollution, they will produce more than is socially optimal even if they may reduce their emissions as a byproduct of improvements in overall efficiency. The only way, ultimately, to reduce pollution is to constrain polluters to do otherwise. It is not, in other words, free-market-driven economic growth and technological change alone that make the I = PAT equation false; it is those things coupled with the right incentives, incentives that the market by itself cannot provide. The same facile assumption that the unfettered market is the solvent for all serious problems pervades Goklany's discussion of globalization and its impact on global well-being. As Goklany points out, correctly, it is a myth that the advent of globalization has been accompanied by a rise in poverty and inequality. In fact, the percentage of the world's population that is poor has actually fallen over the past two decades (although 2.7 billion people still live on less than $2 a day). And inequality -- at least among individuals globally -- has actually declined some as well. The surprisingly persistent picture of globalization as a process whereby the developed world exploits and immiserates the developing one is just wrong. The problem, however, is that the number of countries that have dramatically improved their standards of living in the era of globalization is surprisingly small -- and most of them are in Asia. So even if economic growth is, as it seems to be, fundamental to "the improving state of the world," we have not done a very good job of figuring out how to spread the benefits of that growth around the globe. As Goklany acknowledges, the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union have in many cases not just stopped growing but actually shrunk over the past 15 years or so. Most of Latin America has seen only trivial economic growth in the past two decades, while even Asia's "little tigers" (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) -- whose economies have grown rapidly since the 1970s -- have spent much of the past seven years recovering from the damage wrought by the 1990s Asian financial crisis. It is true that most of these countries have nonetheless seen their human development indicators improve, thanks to the diffusion of technology and health care. But outside of Asia (and a few places such as Botswana and Chile), the economic benefits of globalization have been hard to find, which is precisely why there has been such a backlash against what has come to be known as the Washington consensus. Goklany argues that it only makes sense to attack globalization if there is evidence that rich countries are getting richer on the backs of the poor. But it is not surprising that people are made unhappy by the sight of others getting richer while they stay the same or actually get poorer.

**The status quo only appears to be structurally improving because elites are gaining so much while the masses starve---aggregate measurements overlook structural inequality that makes the system unsustainable**

Stephen **Gill 12**, Distinguished Research **Prof**essor **of Poli**tical **Sci**ence, **York University**, Toronto, and a former Distinguished Scholar in International Political Economy of the International Studies Association, 2012, Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, p. 6-8

Nonetheless, some might query whether there really is, actually or potentially, a ‘global’ organic crisis, since many parts of the world, such as India and China, have continued to grow and develop; indeed, Craig Murphy has noted that many parts of the global South have had a ‘good crisis’, insofar as many of the reforms that they implemented in response to the Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997–8 have made their financial structures and patterns of economic development more internally robust and better insulated from external financial shocks originating in New York, London or Tokyo (Murphy 2010). Murphy’s point is well made. It is of course important to emphasize the geographical and social unevenness of both the experience and impacts of financial and economic crises across the global social and geopolitical hierarchy. However, this is only part of the story. It is also important to reflect critically on the nature and quality of existing development patterns, particularly those that serve to generalize the dominant model of market civilization – a development model that is wasteful, energy-intensive, consumerist, ecologically myopic and premised on catering mainly to the affluent. Moreover, the development of China and India is far from the happy story some seem to paint – a point that the Chinese leadership seems to have recently acknowledged by prioritizing redistribution and social welfare in its next five-year plan, not least to deal with growing social and ecological contradictions and widespread political unrest. For example, every day in China there are enormous numbers of localized protests concerning living conditions and corruption. Illustrating the displacement of livelihoods and the crisis of social reproduction that characterizes the present phase of primitive accumulation in China, the government estimates that 58 million ‘left-behind children’ (almost 20 per cent of all children in China and about a half of the children living in the countryside) now live with their grandparents or in foster centres, because their parents have left to earn income in the factories and cities (Hille 2011): Mao sent millions of parents into labour camps and their children to the countryside; he forced families to abandon the stoves in their homes and to use communal kitchens and dorms. Even so, Mao failed, ultimately, to destroy the family as the basic cell of Chinese society. Today, what the dictator was unable to accomplish with force is being realized instead by the lure of money. Meanwhile, in India, we see mass suicides of farmers as a debt crisis envelops their lives; elsewhere in the country perhaps as many as 800 million poor people have been hardly touched by the changes. Most live in the shadow of ‘shining India’. The global situation is therefore replete with deep contradictions. On the one hand, few would deny that material conditions are improving for many Chinese and Indians, and that this should continue to be the case. On the other hand, if the market civilization model of capitalist development not only continues in the wealthier countries but also becomes more generalized in India, China and other large developing countries such as Brazil (notwithstanding President Lula’s redistributive policies), and also assuming that the US rulers sustain their policies and military capabilities along similar lines to now in order to defend and extend that model, I hypothesize that the global organic crisis will intensify. Its effects will be felt in ways that will be uneven geographically, unequal politically and socially and materially hierarchical. Put differently, the organic crisis may also be globalizing across regions and societies at varying speeds, and it will probably be differentiated in its effects on life chances and basic conditions of existence, generating diverse political effects within and across jurisdictions and throughout the social and political spectrum. Politically, and perhaps paradoxically, at this moment the global organic crisis has not been manifested as a crisis of legitimacy in the global North (although less so in many parts of the global South).However, the question is: will this situation persist – and, indeed, can the current neoliberal frameworks of global leadership retain legitimacy and credibility while developing a constructive and meaningful set of policies to address it? If not, what are the prospects for alternative concepts of global leadership and frameworks of rule?

**Their ev is a snapshot that can’t account for the future trajectory of neolib---it’s unsustainable and causes environmental system collapse**

Benny **Goodman 11**, Faculty of Health, Education and Society, Plymouth University, June 2011, “Transformation for Health and Sustainability: “Consumption is Killing Us,”” http://www.academia.edu/666114/Transformation\_for\_health\_and\_sustainability\_Dualism\_and\_Anthropocentrism

Ben Ami (2010) tells us however that growth is good, consumption is good and we could have "Ferraris for air. He argues that in advanced industrial societies we have seen decreases in infant and maternal mortality rates and increasing life expectancy coupled with control of infections. We live longer healthier lives. Hans Rosling in his online gapminder series also points out that these indicators are also rising in many developing countries, but he warns that success may literally cost the earth. So how can consumption be killing us? Well, it isn't. Goklany (2006) argues that economic growth, technological change and free trade has helped to power a "cycle of progress" that in the last two centuries enabled unprecedented improvements in every objective measurement of human well-being. Poverty, hunger, malnutrition, child labor, illiteracy and unsafe water have ceased to be global norms; infant mortality has never been lower; and we live longer and healthier lives. Further, Goklany’s research suggests that global agricultural productivity is up, food prices are down, hunger and malnutrition have dropped worldwide, public health has improved, mortality rates are down, and life expectancies are up. So that its then, we are fine. Except that since he wrote that in 2006 the world saw one food crisis in 2008 and this year 2011 the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation are giving the global food market 'critical' status, again. The Millennium Development Goals have still to be met and maternal and infant mortality is still at numbers too high in many countries to enable any level of complacency. However, if you view the world anthropocentrically within the frame of reference of consumer capitalism and you happen to live in advanced industrial nations in wealthy suburbs. You can even muster hard empirical evidence to show the beneficence of the global economic system. The problem with this viewpoint is time frame. Seen from the last 200 years enormous, unprecedented progress has without doubt been made. However the time frame for a proper assessment of the current global system is much longer than that. Even in human time frames the last 200 years is a very short period of history. Depending on definition, the Roman Empire lasted over 400 years, and from the steps of the senate, Julius Ceaser may have dreamed of a millennium of Roman domination. World history is littered with the ruins of human civilizations, hubris comes before a fall. We are not Rome or Byzantium. We have controlled the natural environment (up to a point) to produce food and shelter for billions. However there is a poverty of spirit, a neglect of the 'bottom billion', willful ignorance of the casualties of inequalities based capitalism, a disconnect from environmental destruction and a lack of vision of alternatives that may lead to more healthy, sustainable lives on a finite planet as we bump up against limits. Of course, assertions about limits needs some evidence. A key paper in this respect is that which addresses the issue of planetary boundaries - i.e. that there are limits to what we can achieve on this planet, that we need urgently to identify what these limits are and then to address what socioeconomic conditions would allow all of humanity to live within the planet boundaries. If we do not do this, the argument runs, then the ecosystem services upon which all of us (the biosphere) may well collapse leading to a cull of humanity in line with the extinctions we are already exacting on the living world right now. Rockstrom et al (2009) have tried to identify what the key boundaries are and what the limits are within each. They suggest that humanity has already transgressed three of nine boundaries: 1. CO2 emissions for climate change. 2. Biodiversity loss. 3. Biochemical boundaries - the nitrogen cycle (the phosphorous cycle has not yet been transgressed) The other boundaries discussed include: 4. Ocean acidification 5. Stratospheric ozone depletion 6. Global fresh water use 7. Change in land use 8. Atmospheric aerosol loading (not yet quantified). 9. Chemical pollution (not yet quantified). They also argue: "In the last 200 years, humanity has transitioned into a new geological era—termed the Anthropocene—which is defined by an accelerating departure from the stable environmental conditions of the past 12,000 years into a new, unknown state of Earth". "In order to maintain a global environment that is conducive for human development and well-being, we must define and respect planetary boundaries that delineate a 'safe operating space' for humanity. We must return to the long-term stable global environment that nurtured human development'.

**The claim that the squo is improving is neoliberal ideology with no evidence---the system’s getting more unequal and more environmentally destructive**

Stephen **Gill 12**, Distinguished Research **Prof**essor **of Poli**tical **Sci**ence, **York University**, Toronto, and a former Distinguished Scholar in International Political Economy of the International Studies Association, 2012, Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, p. 13

The enormous business literature on global leadership is also concerned with the problems confronting the transnational capitalist class, but sees these principally not as political and ecological challenges (and implicitly questions of legitimacy) but as problems of efficient corporate management or administration, decision-making and processes, and cultural and political sensitivity to local conditions. The litmus test of leadership is the level of profit in global markets. Oddly enough, relatively neglected in the management literature – as well as in much of the literature just reviewed – are the many important global forums that help to shape the strategic perspectives of capital and the state. Examples include the World Business Council on Sustainable Development and the scenario planning used by corporations and government agencies (e.g. by Shell, whose methods have been used by the CIA) not only to influence policy but also to anticipate political challenges to economic and cultural globalization. Organizations such as the World Economic Forum, the Trilateral Commission and the new Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) bring together dominant globalizing elites from government, corporations, universities, political parties, media, entertainment, the sciences and the arts to forge a consensus and to initiate strategic concepts of global leadership. What seems to be missing from these initiatives is precisely what Sklair (2000) claims was being attempted over a decade ago: comprehensive *evidence* of well-resourced, broad-based and serious efforts to deal with ever-widening global inequality, the systematic undermining and dispossession of livelihoods and growing threats to the integrity of the biosphere. The fact that this evidence is not forthcoming is perhaps not surprising if one reflects on the realities of the existing state of relations between rulers and ruled on a world scale. Why should international capitalists worry about growing global inequality and class polarization, or, indeed, the future of the planet, if there are no powerful political forces that force them to do so? Perhaps a more convincing hypothesis is that, far from creating a coherent redistributive and ecologically sustainable structure of globalization presided over by a transnational capitalist class, the opposite is true. What is gradually emerging is a more and more unequal and increasingly hierarchical global political and civil society directed by dominant social forces associated with disciplinary neoliberalism that seek to extend market civilization on a world scale, in ways that will further class polarization and the ecological crisis alike.

[Italics in original]

**A2: Tech Solves**

**Tech’s not sufficient to make global industrial civilization environmentally sustainable**

Dr. Samuel **Alexander 14**, lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute; and Jonathan Rutherford, Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Middlesex, 2014, “The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition,” Simplicity Institute, <http://simplicityinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Deep-Green-Alternative.pdf>

Evidence continues to mount that industrial civilisation, driven by a destructive and insatiable growth imperative, is chronically unsustainable, as well as being grossly unjust. The global economy is in ecological overshoot, currently consuming resources and emitting waste at rates the planet cannot possibly sustain (Global Footprint Network 2013). Peak oil is but the most prominent example of a more general situation of looming resource scarcity (Klare, 2012), with high oil prices having a debilitating effect on the oil-dependent economies which are seemingly dependent on cheap oil to maintain historic rates of growth (Heinberg, 2011). At the same time, great multitudes around the globe live lives of material destitution, representing a vast, marginalised segment of humanity that justifiably seeks to expand its economic capacities in some form (World Bank, 2008). Biodiversity continues to be devastated by deforestation and other forms of habitat destruction (United Nations, 2010), while the global development agenda seems to be aiming to provide an expanding global population with the high-impact material affluence enjoyed by the richest parts of the world (Hamilton, 2003). This is despite evidence crying out that the universalisation of affluence is environmentally unsupportable (Smith and Positano, 2010; Turner, 2012) and not even a reliable path to happiness (Lane, 2001; Alexander, 2012a). Most worrying of all, perhaps, is the increasingly robust body of climate science indicating the magnitude of the global predicament (IPCC, 2013). According to the Climate Tracker Initiative (2013: 4), the world could exceed its 'carbon budget' in around 18 years, essentially locking us into a future that is at least 2 degrees warmer, and threatening us with 4 degrees or more. It is unclear to what extent civilisation as we know it is compatible with runaway climate change. And still, almost without exception, all nations on the planet - including or especially the richest ones - continue to seek GDP growth without limit, as if the cause of these problems could somehow provide the solution. If once it was hoped that technology and science were going to be able decouple economic activity from ecological impact, such a position is no longer credible (Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011). Technology simply cannot provide any escape from the fact that there are biophysical limits to growth. Despite decades of extraordinary technological advance, which it is was promised would lighten the ecological burden of our economies, global energy and resource consumption continues to grow, exacerbated by a growing population, but which is primarily a function of the growth-orientated values that lie at the heart of global capitalism (Turner, 2012).

Against this admittedly gloomy backdrop lies a heterogeneous tradition of critical theorists and activists promoting what could be called a 'deep green' alternative to the growth-orientated, industrial economy. Ranging from the radical simplicity of Henry Thoreau (1983), to the post-growth economics of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al, 1972; 2004), and developing into contemporary expressions of radical reformism (Latouche, 2009; Heinberg, 2011; Jackson, 2009), eco-socialism (Sarkar, 1999; Smith, 2010), and eco-anarchism (Bookchin, 1989; Holmgren, 2002; Trainer; 2010a), this extremely diverse tradition nevertheless agrees that the nature of the existing system is inherently unsustainable. Tinkering with or softening its margins - that is, any attempt to give capitalism a 'human face' - is not going to come close to addressing the problems we, the human species, are confronted with. What is needed, this tradition variously maintains, is a radically alternative way of living on the Earth - something 'wholly other' to the ways of industrialisation, consumerism, and limitless growth. However idealistic or Utopian their arguments might seem, the basic reasoning is that the nature of any solutions to current problems must honestly confront the magnitude of the overlapping crises, for else one risks serving the destructive forces one ostensibly opposes.

**Tech fails---don’t believe their overly optimistic authors**

**Martenson, 9** [Dr. Chris Martenson, PhD Economist, independent economist and author of a popular website, ChrisMartenson.com. Chris earned a PhD in neurotoxicology from Duke University, and an MBA from Cornell University. A fellow of the Post Carbon Institute, Chris's work has appeared on PBS and been cited by the Washington Post. He is a contributor to SeekingAlpha.com and FinancialSense.com, and former VP of Pfizer and SAIC “Copenhagen & Economic Growth - You Can't Have Both,” Dec 24 http://www.energybulletin.net/node/51229]

I want to point out that a **massive discrepancy exists between the official pronouncements emerging from Copenhagen on carbon emissions and recent government actions to spur economic growth.** Before and during Copenhagen (and after, too, we can be sure), **politicians and central bankers across the globe have worked tirelessly to return the global economy to a path of growth.** We need more jobs, we are told; **we need economic growth, we need more people consuming more things**. **Growth is the ever-constant word on politicians' lips.** Official actions amounting to tens of trillions of dollars speak to the fact that this is, in fact, our number-one global priority. But **the consensus coming out of Copenhagen is that carbon emissions have to be reduced by a vast amount over the next few decades.** **These two ideas are mutually exclusive. You can't have both. Economic growth requires energy, and most of our energy comes from hydrocarbons** - coal, oil, and natural gas. **Burning those fuel sources releases carbon. Therefore, increasing economic activity will release more carbon.** It is a very simple concept. **Nobody has yet articulated how it is that we will reconcile both economic growth and reduced use of hydrocarbon energy**. And so the proposed actions coming out of Copenhagen are not grounded in reality, and they are set dead against trillions of dollars of spending. **There is only one thing that we know about which has curbed, and even reversed, the flow of carbon into the atmosphere, and that is the recent economic contraction.** This is hard proof of the connection between the economy and energy. It should serve as proof that any desire to grow the economy is also an explicit call to increase the amount of carbon being expelled into the atmosphere. **The idea of salvation via the electric plug-in car or other renewable energy is a fantasy**. The reality is that **any new tech**nology **takes decades to reach full market penetration, and we haven't even really begun to introduce any yet**. **Time, scale, and cost must be weighed when considering any new tech**nology**'s** **potential to have a significant impact on our energy-use patterns.** For example, a recent study concluded that **another 20 years would be required for electric vehicles to have a significant impact on US gas**oline **consumption**. Meaningful Numbers of Plug-In Hybrids Are Decades Away The mass-introduction of the plug-in hybrid electric car is still a few decades away, according to new analysis by the National Research Council. The study, released on Monday, also found that the next generation of plug-in hybrids could require hundreds of billions of dollars in government subsidies to take off. Even then, plug-in hybrids would not have a significant impact on the nation’s oil consumption or carbon emissions before 2030. Savings in oil imports would also be modest, according to the report, which was financed with the help of the Energy Department. **Twenty to thirty years is the normal length of time for any new tech**nology **to scale up and fully penetrate a large market**. But this study, as good as it was in calculating the time, scale, and cost parameters of technology innovation and penetration, still left out the issue of resource scarcity. **Is there enough lithium in the world to build all these cars? Neodymium? This is a fourth issue that deserves careful consideration, given the scale of the overall issue.** But even if we did manage to build hundreds of millions of plug-in vehicles, **where would the electricity come from?** Many people mistakenly think that we are well on our way to substantially providing our electricity needs using renewable sources such as wind and solar. We are not. Renewable timetable is a long shot Al Gore's well-intentioned challenge that we produce "100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years" represents a widely held delusion that we can't afford to harbor. The delusion is shared by the Minnesota Legislature, which is requiring the state's largest utility, Xcel Energy, to get at least 24 percent of its energy from wind by 2020. **One of the most frequently ignored energy issues is the time required to bring forth a major new fuel to the world's energy supply**. Until the mid-19th century, burning wood powered the world. Then coal gradually surpassed wood into the first part of the 20th century. Oil was discovered in the 1860s, but it was a century before it surpassed coal as our largest energy fuel. Trillions of dollars are now invested in the world's infrastructure to mine, process and deliver coal, oil and natural gas. As distinguished professor Vaclav Smil of the University of Manitoba recently put it, "It is delusional to think that the United States can install in a decade wind and solar generating capacity equivalent to that of thermal power plants that took nearly 60 years to construct." Texas has three times the name plate wind capacity of any other state — 8,000-plus megawatts. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas manages the Texas electric grids. ERCOT reports that its unpredictable wind farms actually supply just a little more than 700 MW during summer power demand, and provide just 1 percent of Texas' power needs of about 72,000 MW. ERCOT's 2015 forecast still has wind at just more than 1 percent despite plans for many more turbines. For the United States, the Energy Information Administration is forecasting wind and solar together will supply less than 3 percent of our electric energy in 2020. Again it turns out that **supplanting even a fraction of our current electricity production with renewables will** also **take us decades**. And **even that presumes that we have a functioning economy in which to mine, construct, transport and erect these fancy new tech**nologies. **Time, scale, and cost all factor in as challenges to significant penetration of new energy tech**nologies **as well.** So **where will all the new energy for economic growth come from? The answer**, unsurprisingly, **is from the already-installed carbon-chomping coal, oil, and natural gas infrastructure. That is the implicit assumption that lies behind the calls for renewed economic growth**. It's The Money, Stupid As noted here routinely in my writings and in the Crash Course, we have an exponential monetary system. **One mandatory feature of our current exponential monetary system is the need for perpetual growth. Not just any kind of growth; exponential growth**. That's the price for paying interest on money loaned into existence. Without that growth, our monetary system shudders to a halt and shifts into reverse, operating especially poorly and threatening to melt down the entire economic edifice. This is so well understood, explicitly or implicitly, throughout all the layers of society and in our various institutions, that you will only ever hear politicians and bankers talking about the "need" for growth. In fact, they are correct; our system does need growth. All debt-based money systems require growth. That is the resulting feature of loaning one's money into existence. That's the long and the short of the entire story. The growth may seem modest, perhaps a few percent per year ('That's all, honest!'), but therein lies the rub. **Any continuous percentage growth is still exponential growth**. Exponential growth means not just a little bit more each year, but a constantly growing amount each year. It is a story of more**. Every year needs slightly more than the prior year - that's the requirement.** The Gap **Nobody has yet reconciled the vast intellectual and practical gap that exists between our addiction to exponential growth and the carbon reduction rhetoric coming out of Copenhagen.** **I've yet to see any credible plan that illustrates how we can grow our economy without using more energy**. Is it somehow possible to grow an economy without using more energy? Let's explore that concept for a bit. What does it mean to "grow an economy?" Essentially, it means more jobs for more people producing and consuming more things. That's it. An economy, as we measure it, consists of delivering the needs and wants of people in ever-larger quantities. It's those last three words - ever-larger quantities - that defines the whole problem. For example, suppose our economy consisted only of building houses. If the same number of houses were produced each year, we'd say that the economy was not growing. It wouldn't matter whether the number was four hundred thousand or four million; if the same number of new homes were produced each year, year after year, this would be considered a very bad thing, because it would mean our economy was not growing. The same is true for cars, hair brushes, big-screen TVs, grape juice, and everything else you can think of that makes up our current economy. Each year, more needs to be sold than the year before, or the magic economic-stimulus wands will come out to ward off the Evil Spirits of No Growth. If our economy were to grow at the same rate as the population, it would grow by around 1% per year. This is still exponential growth, but it is far short of the 3%-4% that policymakers consider both desirable and necessary. Why the gap? Why do we work so hard to ensure that 1% more people consume 3% more stuff each year? Out of Service It's not that 3% is the right number for the land or the people who live upon it. The target of 3% is driven by our monetary system, which needs a certain rate of exponential growth each year in order to cover the interest expense due each year on the already outstanding loans. The needs of our monetary system are driving our economic decisions, not the needs of the people, let alone the needs of the planet. We are in service to our money system, not the other way around. **Today we have a burning need for an economic model that can operate tolerably well without growth**. But ours can't, and so we actually find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of pitting human needs against the money system and observing that the money system is winning the battle. The Federal Reserve exists solely to assure that the monetary system has what it needs to function. That is their focus, their role, and their primary concern. I assume that they assume that by taking care of the monetary system, everything else will take care of itself. I think their assumption is archaic and wrong. Regardless, our primary institutions and governing systems are in service to a monetary system that is dysfunctional. It was my having this outlook, this lens, more than any other, that allowed me to foresee what so many economists missed. **Only by examining the system from a new, and very wide, angle can the enormous flaws in the system be seen.** Economy & Energy Now let's get back to our main problem of economic growth and energy use (a.k.a. carbon production). **There is simply no way to build houses, produce televisions, grow and transport grape juice, and market hair brushes without consuming energy in the process. That's just a cold, hard reality**. **We need liquid fuel to extract, transform, and transport products to market. More people living in more houses means we need more electricity.** Sure, we can be more efficient in our use of energy, but **unless our efficiency gains are exceeding the rate of economic growth, more energy will be used, not less. In the long run, if we were being 3% more efficient in our use of fuel and growing our economy at 3%, this would mean burning the same amount of fuel each year.** Unfortunately, **fuel-efficiency gains are well known to run slower than economic growth**. For example, **the average fuel efficiency of the US car fleet** (as measured by the CAFE standards) **has increased by 18% over the past 25 years, while the economy has grown by 331%. Naturally, our fuel consumption has grown, not fallen, over that time, despite the efficiency gains.** So the bottom line is this**: There is no possible way to both have economic growth** (as we've known it in the past) **and cut carbon emissions.** At least not without doing things very differently.

**Innovation’s tapped out and about to sharply decline due to complexity---no chance tech can save us**

**Tainter & Patzek 12** - Joseph A. Tainter, Professor, Department of Environment and Society, Utah State University; and Tadeusz W. Patzek, Professor, Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin, Drilling Down: The Gulf Oil Debacle and Our Energy Dilemma, p. 48

We are often assured that innovation in the future will reduce our society’s dependence on energy and other resources while providing a lifestyle such as we now enjoy. We discuss this point further in Chaps. 5 and 9. Here we observe that rates of innovation appear to change in a manner similar to the Hubbert cycle of resource production. This finding has important implications for the future productivity and complexity of our society. Energy flows, technology development, population growth, and individual creativity can be combined into an overall “Innovation Index” which is the number of patents granted each year by the U.S. Patent Office per one million inhabitants of the United States of America. This specific patent rate has the units of the number of patents per year per one million people. Figure 3.16 is a decomposition of this patent rate into multiple Hubbert-like cycles between 1790 and 2009. Interestingly, the fundamental Hubbert cycle of the U.S. patent rate peaked in 1914, the year in which World War I broke out. The second major rate peak was in 1971, coinciding with the peak of U.S. oil production. The last and tallest peak of productivity occurred in 2004. Note that without a new cycle of inventions in something, the current cycles will expire by 2050. In other words, the productivity of U.S. innovation will decline dramatically in the next 20–30 years, with some of this decline possibly being forced by a steady decline of support for fundamental research and development. Energy and Complexity Each new complex addition to the already overwhelmingly complex social and scientific structures in the United States is less and less relevant, while costing additional resources and aggravation. Most of this complexity is apparent to the naked eye: look at the global banking and trading system, the healthcare system, the computer operating systems and software, military operations, or government structures. The scope of the problem is also obvious in the production pains of Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner, and in the drilling of the BP Macondo well.

#### Tech cannot solve

Taylor and Taylor ‘7, (Duncan M., assistant professor of environmental studies at the University of Victoria, Graeme M., Adjunct Reader with the School of Integrative Systems, University of Queensland)

**Many people hoped that** the introduction of information **tech**nologies **would reduce the need for natural resources and human labour**. **Instead profits have been increased through increasing the intensity of production. Smokestack industries have not disappeared; they have simply been transferred** from high-wage **to low-wage countries**. **New tech**nologies **may delay the collapse** of industrial civilization, **but** they will not prevent it. While technological advances will reduce waste and improve efficiencies, **they will not change the values and social structures that promote unsustainable exploitation**, **inequality**, **greed**, **and war**.

#### All the aff authors are biased

Trainer ‘7—Senior Lecturer in School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales [Ted, “Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain A Capitalist Society”, ebsco]

**There is a**n overwhelmingly powerful, **never questioned, assumption that all these problems can and will be solved by** moving to **renewable energy** sources. That is, it is generally believed that sources such as the sun and the wind can replace fossil fuels, providing the quantities of energy that consumer society will need, in the forms and at the times that they are needed. Surprisingly, **almost no literature has explored whether this is possible.** Unfortunately in the task of assessing the validity of this dominant assumption we have not been helped by the people who know most about the field, **the renewable energy experts**. They **have a strong interest in boosting the potential of their pet tech**nology **and in not drawing attention to its weaknesses, difficulties and limits**. **Exaggerated, misleading, questionable and demonstrably false claims are often encountered in the promotional literature**. **Minor** technical **advances** which might or might not become significant in the long run **are announced as miraculous solutions**. **Doubts** regarding the potential of renewable technologies **are rarely if ever heard from** within **these fields**. **This enthusiasm is understandable in view of the need to attract** public **support and** research **funding**, but it means that **contributions by those most familiar with these fields to the critical assessment of the potential and limits of renewables are quite rare.** In developing the following review, considerable difficulty has been encountered from people hostile to having attention drawn to the weaknesses in their technologies and proposals (including threats of legal action if data they have provided in personal communications is used). **Sources eager to provide information tend to dry up when they realize that limits are being explored**. In addition some of the **crucial information will not be made public by the private firms developing the new systems**. For example **it is almost impossible to get info**rmation **on** actual **windmill output** in relation to mean wind speeds at generating sites.

**( ) Efficient and renewable technology doesn’t solve—continuing profit and growth guarantees social conflicts, environment collapse, and Third World poverty.**

**Trainer ‘7**— Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales [Ted, “Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain A Consumer Society”, p. 125-159]

The core "limits to growth" claim is that the **huge global problems we are facing cannot be solved in a society that is driven by obsession with high rates of production and consumption**, **affluent living standards**, **market forces,** **the profit motive** **and** **economic growth**. **The resource demand** generated by this society **is the direct cause of ecological destruction**, **Third World poverty**, **resource depletion**, **conflict** **and** **social breakdown**. **These problems cannot be solved unless we move to** simpler lifestyles, more self-sufficient and cooperative ways, and **a very different economy**. Chapter II will detail what many see as "The Simpler Way." Again **energy depletion is only one of the alarming problems we are running into**, and **our limits to growth** predicament **would still exist even if renewable energy sources could provide all the energy we need**. Indeed **the more energy we get our bands on, the more enthusiastically we will dig up minerals**, **log forests**, **mine the sea floors**, **dam rivers**, **develop cities**, **clear land**, **travel**, **and buy.**

**Links**

### 2NC – Link – BITs

#### Bilateral investment treaties are the product of a western desire to dominate global economic markets through the protection and promotion of economic rationality

MacDougald 15 – Park MacDougald, writer for Truth-Out and ForeignPolicy.com, Trade Agreements Rigged to Protect Capital From Democracy, 12 March 2015, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/29595-trade-agreements-rigged-to-protect-capital-from-democracy

The bilateral investment treaty, or BIT, was originally the European alternative to FCN treaties, and had from the beginning more explicitly colonial overtones. The development of the BIT was spurred by the West German state, which, having had its imperial pretensions decisively crushed in two wars, nevertheless needed a means by which to protect and promote the interests of German capital abroad. The world's first BIT was signed by West Germany and Pakistan in 1959, and, with innovation of investor-state arbitration added during the 1960s, these agreements became the standard way for European states to govern relations with their capital-starved former colonies. FCNs and BITs, while similar, were not identical. FCNs, which included provisions about everything from currency convertability to humanitarian issues, had a number of disadvantages vis-à-vis BITs from the perspective of capital. For one, they were more difficult to negotiate, as they touched on more sensitive areas of policy that many states were unwilling to trade away, and provisions were often directly enforceable by national courts, making both negotiating partners more hesitant. FCNs were also sometimes negotiated between highly developed countries, meaning that legal equality for the negotiating partners was more than an academic question. In contrast, BITs were generally concluded between highly developed European economies and capital-poor, lesser-developed countries, and were characterized by a formal equality in wording masking a total asymmetry of power. The United States, negotiating an FCN with a capital-rich country like the Netherlands, may have hesitated to sacrifice sovereignty to the whims of foreign investors; no such scruples would have existed for France in negotiating with Senegal, given assumptions about the unidirectional flow of investment. In essence, however, both treaty types were attempts to "depoliticize" investment after direct Western rule had come to an end with postwar decolonization. The "Hull rule," formulated in 1938 by US Secretary of State Cordell Hull in response to Mexico's nationalization of assets belonging to US citizens, stated that "no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment." In 1961, this became the developed-world standard when it was incorporated into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) binding "Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements." (1) The United States belatedly moved to adopt the BIT in the 1970s at the urging of an increasingly militant US business community which, squeezed at home by high wages and taxation, had come to view the unwieldy FCN system as a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis European capital, and had grown hostile to the Carter administration's stated policy of neutrality on investment (i.e., indifference toward inward and outward investment flows). The last US FCN, with Thailand, was ratified in 1967, and a decade of failed attempts at new agreements followed before the first US BIT, with Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, was signed into law by Ronald Reagan in 1982. The new US BIT, however, had a number of significant modifications appropriate to its neoliberal origins. For one, while the neoliberals in the Reagan administration accepted the European practice of negotiating narrow agreements with weak, under-developed partners, the United States saw an additional opportunity to use its BITs a tool to rewrite international rules on investment. Conservative legal scholars had, by the late 1970s, revived expansive interpretation of what constituted "regulatory takings," or expropriation via regulation, which incorporated the Hull rule and added that "compensation had to reflect the 'fair market value ...' and be paid in a form that was 'effectively realizable [and] fully transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.'"

### 2NC – Link – Economic Engagement

#### Economic engagement entrenches capitalism through diffusion of capacity building and expertise. This designates any hindrance to the market as a threat which requires elimination.

Essex, Windsor political science professor, 2008

(Jamey, “The Neoliberalization of Development: Trade Capacity Building and Security at the US Agency for International Development”, Antipode, 40.2, March, ScienceDirect)

The term TCB is relatively new, and is meant to move the international system beyond the impasse between discredited but institutionally entrenched projects of development and aggressive efforts at global trade liberalization. Initially emphasized by developing states in the context of the WTO's 2001 Doha Round of negotiations, TCB has been operationalized in ways that reinforce and extend neoliberalization, focusing development resources on building political and economic capacity to participate in liberalized trade and globalizing markets. In this view, the ability to prosper through free trade drives economic growth and allows the greatest possible flowering of freedom and democracy. States and civil society must be brought into line with market mechanisms—civil society through active cultivation and states through limiting their functions to market facilitation and security provision. Phillips and Ilcan (2004) describe capacity building as one of the primary political technologies through which neoliberal govermentality is constructed and spatialized. They define neoliberal governance as the “ways of governing populations that make individuals responsible for changes that are occurring in their communities”, with responsibility exercised and enforced through markets, which increasingly emphasize “skill acquisition, knowledge-generation, and training programs” (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:397). This perspective highlights the ways in which discourses and practices of capacity building center on the creation and reproduction of social categories that mark off populations as either responsible members of open, market-based communities moving toward development, or irresponsible and potentially dangerous outliers (see Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003). Moving from the latter group to the former depends on acquiring the skills and knowledge that permit individuals to practice responsible behavior and allow for discipline via the marketplace. Diffusion of skills, knowledge, and training—investments in “social capital” and “human capital”—are the driving forces of neoliberalizing development (Rankin 2004). It is in this context, Jessop (2003) points out, that the networks praised by both Castells (1996) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) become a seductive but ultimately empty (and even celebratory) metaphor for understanding and challenging neoliberalization and neoimperialism. A more critical and useful analysis goes beyond recognizing the re-categorization of populations and places along axes of responsibility, and, as noted in the above discussion of the strategic-relational approach to the state, also considers the role of class-relevant social formations and struggles in the expansion and maintenance of political and economic power. A closer examination of how USAID has instituted TCB, and what this means for state institutions' strategic selectivity relative to development and securitization, is one way to analyze the process of neoliberalization and its significance for development and security. For USAID, adopting TCB comprises one means to revise the agency's mission and align it with the unique combination of neoliberal and neoconservative doctrines that dominate US trade and foreign policies. With development understood as a national security issue, USAID and its implementation of TCB have become central to the US state's articulation of the relationship between development, trade, and security. In a 2003 report on TCB, USAID (2003b:3) outlined a three-part framework for enacting successful development through TCB: participation in trade negotiations, implementation of trade agreements, and economic responsiveness to new trade opportunities. USAID portrays this as the most effective way to incorporate developing states into processes of globalization. This also poses new challenges for states, firms, and non-governmental organizations, however, as the “rewards for good policies and institutions—and the negative consequences of weak policies and institutions—are greater than ever”, while economic globalization “has also created the need for better coordination and harmonization” (USAID 2004b:7). USAID's three-part definition repositions development as a form of infrastructure, institution, and network building that can ensure the success of trade liberalization efforts. Defining development as the successful and total integration of a state and its economy into the fabric of neoliberal globalization represents a significant change in the cartography of development through which USAID works, and over which it has great strategic influence. Though national states remain at the heart of this new cartography, USAID development programs now pivot on building state institutions capable (primarily) of enacting and reproducing neoliberal economic policies within the context of capitalist internationalization. As the agency stated in its 2001 TCB report, US development policy “is committed to working in partnership with developing and transition economies to remove obstacles to development, among which are barriers to trade” (USAID 2001:3). The 2003 report likewise singles out trade negotiations as a powerful growth engine for developing countries, so long as they are supported by “sound institutions” that can “ensure transparency and predictability in economic governance, reinforcing economic reforms that are critical for successful development” (USAID 2003b:7). This follows from and reinforces the idea that state-managed foreign aid and assistance, the staple of past USAID programs, must be supportive of, and not a substitute for, trade and economic self-help by developing countries. This position echoes what USAID proclaimed at the development project's height, as discussed above, and relies on the idea that “development progress is first and foremost a function of commitment and political will directed at ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people” (USAID 2004b:11). USAID defines “ruling justly” as “governance in its various dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption”, while “investing in people” involves bolstering “basic education and basic health” services (USAID 2004b:11, fn 8). This language draws from existing discourses of social capital and state effectiveness long favored by Washington Consensus institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Fine 2001; Peet and Hartwick 1999). How closely on-the-ground implementation of TCB hews to these conceptualizations is rather more problematic. The invocation of political will, just rule, and state efficiency are hallmarks of neoliberal rhetoric, and suggests that TCB is the latest in a long line of strategies designed to further capital internationalization and the reproduction of the US-dominated international state system. Yet the vague, catch-all character of TCB in practice indicates that it is less a fully coherent strategic blueprint than the repackaging of existing development activities, meant to bring USAID in line with state and hegemonic projects predicated on the neoliberal doctrine of free trade and the neoconservative obsession with security. A USAID official remarked that initial attempts to institute TCB cast a very wide net: [In the field] you would get these surveys from Washington, and they would say, we're trying to conduct an inventory of all our trade capacity building activities. And in the beginning—and I don't know how this has evolved—but in the beginning of those surveys, I mean, it was sort of ludicrous because virtually anything that we were doing in the economic growth sphere could be described as trade capacity building (interview with the author, December 2004). The broad practical definition of TCB, coupled with the increased emphasis on international markets as a means of alleviating poverty and spurring economic development, belies the continuity between the current focus on trade liberalization and previous development programs. The same USAID official continued: My understanding … was that [developed countries] would ask the developing countries, what do you need in terms of trade capacity building, to get you ready to participate in the WTO and globalized trade regimes? And they would give these long laundry lists that would run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and the developed countries would go, “whoa, we can't do all this” … So we started developing these inventories of all our trade capacity building investments, and one of the objectives of those inventories was so we could talk to the developing world and tell them, look, we're doing all this stuff in trade capacity building already (interview with the author, December 2004). Despite this, there are two important changes that have occurred with the agency's adoption of TCB. The first relates to the institutional relations through which USAID operates; the second centers on changing understandings and practices of security and state weakness. As stated above, the emphasis now placed on ensuring that development is ideologically and institutionally subordinate to trade liberalization places the onus for successful development on “responsible” states that can adequately facilitate capitalist accumulation via free trade. This shift has necessitated that USAID alter the character and intensity of the partnerships through which it plans and implements capacity building and other development programs (see Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, on USAID's subcontracting activities). This has meant changes in how USAID serves as both site and strategy for class-relevant social forces institutionalized in and by the state. The most important partners with which USAID has strengthened or pursued relations to advance capacity building programs have been the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), USDA's trade-focused Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), and internationalizing fractions of capital. TCB therefore must be analyzed not as technocratic jargon, but as a new means of reproducing and re-institutionalizing class-relevant social struggles in and through the national state. The danger USAID faces in so tightly intertwining itself with market-oriented state institutions and capital arises from the continual narrowing of the agency's strategic selectivity—neoliberal doctrine serves as the basis for agency work, and further neoliberalization is the intended outcome. The benefit comes in the form of larger budgets and even the reproduction of USAID itself, and the agency has received large appropriations to implement TCB (see Table 1). While these numbers still represent a small portion of its total budget, TCB has moved quickly up the list of agency priorities, and has gained prominence as a guidepost for continued and intensified neoliberalization (USAID 2004a). It is important to note, however, that even as USAID funding for TCB projects has steadily increased, the agency's proportional share of overall US government spending on such activities has decreased, due to increases in TCB funding channeled into sector-specific trade facilitation activities or into WTO accession, areas where capital and USTR command greater expertise. Geographically, USAID has concentrated TCB funding in states where acceptable neoliberalization is already underway, in areas of geostrategic importance, particularly the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union (USAID 2001:6, 2003c:2), and in those countries eager to engage in free trade agreements. Since 2001, the agency's “TCB funding to countries with which the US is pursuing Free Trade Agreements (Morocco, the Andean Pact, CAFTA, and SACU) more than tripled”, with much of this funding targeted at building institutions compatible with the requirements of WTO accession or specific features of bilateral and regional agreements with the US (USAID 2004a).1 This differs from the geopolitical criteria previously underlying USAID development funding primarily in that trade policy has moved to the center of agency strategies, though this is complicated by emerging national security discourses focused on counter-terrorism and failing or failed states. The second strategically and institutionally important change accompanying USAID's adoption of TCB rests on the altered relationship between development and security, as outlined in the 2002 and 2006 NSS. Here, development bolsters “weak states” that might otherwise become havens for terrorist and criminal networks, which could then pose a threat to American interests abroad and domestically. USAID, the State Department, and the White House have therefore identified development, along with defense and diplomacy, as the three “pillars” of US security strategies (USAID 2004b:8; White House 2002, 2006). The focus on strengthening “weak states” in new development schema demonstrates how the neoliberal understanding of states as rent-seeking regulatory burdens on market relations becomes strategically intertwined with the security concerns and objectives of neoconservatism (USAID 2004b:12; on neoconservatism, see Lind 2004). Two points stand out here. First, recalling that neoliberalization does not only or even primarily imply the rolling back of the state apparatus, the emphasis on TCB demands that “weak” states be strengthened by removing trade barriers and making economic and social policy sensitive to liberalized global market signals. Second, weakness here stems directly from states' inability or unwillingness to properly insinuate themselves into the networks, flows, and institutions of neoliberal capitalism. Distanciation and disconnectedness from internationalizing capital is not only economically wrongheaded, but is the source of political and social weakness, producing insecurity that threatens continued capitalist accumulation under the rubric of neoliberalization. Roberts, Secor and Sparke (2003:889) thus identify an emphasis on “enforced reconnection” with the global capitalist system, “mediated through a whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices”. TCB offers a potential and enforceable technical fix for disconnectedness, as being outside neoliberalization is to be against neoliberalization, and thus to pose a security risk. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios made this clear in a May 2003 speech: For countries that are marginalized, that are outside the international system, that are outside development, that are not developing, that are not growing economically, that are not democratizing, look at the different factors that lead to high risk in terms of conflict. Income level is one of the highest correlations between marginalized states and risks in terms of conflicts (USAID 2003a:np). The agency's 2004 White Paper expanded on this to provide a more detailed strategic framework for development and aid programs, establishing a loose taxonomy of states according to the need for development assistance, the commitment to initiate neoliberalization, and the degree to which states are capable and “fair” partners in the use of development resources (USAID 2004b). This geographic categorization was updated and expanded further with the agency's 2006 Foreign Assistance Framework, which bases its categories on criteria developed from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a new (and thoroughly neoliberal) development institution established in 2004 (USAID 2006; see Table 2). In these frameworks, USAID identifies relatively weak institutions, particularly those necessary to establish and maintain market openness and political stability, as the crux of underdevelopment. Running across such taxonomies is a consideration of “strategic states”, a designation that depends less on USAID objectives than on the geostrategic and foreign policy goals of the US executive and Congress. The agency recognizes that the determination of which developing states are considered strategic is a matter for other US state institutions, but also notes: Increasingly, the primary foreign policy rationale for assistance may be matched by or indistinguishable from the developmental or recovery objectives. Thus, the strategic allocation of ESF [Economic Support Fund] and like resources will begin to benefit from the same principles of delineation, selectivity and accountability proposed in this White Paper (USAID 2004b:21).2 Incorporating developing states into networks of neoliberal globalization is, in this view, the essence of producing and maintaining security in line with US foreign policy objectives. This understanding of the link between development, trade, security, and state weakness is echoed in the strategies of other US state institutions, most notably the US Trade Representative (see US Trade Representative 2001). USAID articulates development progress and improved security in terms of the facilitation of liberalized market relations by stable developing state institutions. While more candid interviews with USAID officials indicate that not everyone at the agency is on board with this approach, it has nonetheless become official strategy, and presents a serious contradiction, as development comes to depend on internationalizing and liberalized market forces, even as these remain dominated by predatory finance capital (Harvey 2005; McMichael 1999, 2000a). Internationalizing market relations are fundamentally unstable and, as a means of achieving security outside the narrow concerns of capitalist accumulation, completely insecure. A brief examination of how food security fits into USAID strategies regarding trade, security, and state weakness demonstrates this.

#### The plan attempts to remake China in the image of Northern development through economic engagement. Challenging the limits of capitalism in public spaces is key to politicize alternative strategies.

Sheppard et al., Minnesota geography professor, 2010

(Eric, “Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking of global capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus”, Geoforum, 41.2, ScienceDirect)

We have shown that there have been marked periodic remakings of global capitalist governance from a Washington to a post-Washington consensus, and beyond, in ways that have begun to question some key aspects of global neoliberal governance. Taken together, they hardly represent a consensus. Yet such shifts and disagreements have been contained within a developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary that has, in effect, repeatedly legitimized discourses of first world expertise even as the policies based in this expertise repeatedly fail. In this section, we summarize the elements of this imaginary, and discuss how it has persisted even in the wake of crises that create space for alternative imaginaries. The developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary has three components that are closely intertwined: A stageist, teleological thinking that constitutes capitalism, Euro-North American style, as the highest form of development; a leveling metaphor, according to which a flattening of the world equalizes opportunities for all individuals and places; and an imagining of socio-spatial difference as coexisting with this leveling through its commodification. At the center of mainstream policymaking discussed above is the conception of a single trajectory of development, namely capitalist development, along which all places are imagined as sequenced. Rostow famously articulated such a trajectory in his modernist “non-communist manifesto”, The Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow, 1960). As dependency, post-colonial and post-development theorists have argued, this has the effect of presenting places with no choices about what development means, and of ranking places, and their inhabitants, on a scale of development—according to which the prosperous capitalist societies of western Europe and white settler colonies (North America, Australia and New Zealand) occupy the apex, with respect to which other places are imagined as incomplete in their development. This also implies the desirability of erasing or making over less adequate states of affairs, replacing them with their more efficient and rational Northern exemplars. Notwithstanding very substantial shifts and disagreements in how the apex is imagined (as liberal civilization during the colonial era, as Fordist industrialism after 1945, as neoliberal after 1980, and as good governance and poverty reduction after 1997), the effect is to locate expertise at the apex. If all places are on a common path, then those who have reached the end seem naturally pre-destined to teach others about how to achieve this—even when the paternalist advice is ‘don’t do as I do, but do as I say’ (cf. Chang, 2002 and Chang, 2008). The new development economics’ supplement of Keynesian strategies, while critical of and presenting itself as a departure from the Washington Consensus, still endorses a stageist imaginary. Sachs is explicit about his debt to Rostow, framing the specific diagnostic interventions in any nation in terms of the goal of achieving a healthy (first world capitalist) economic body. Sutured to stageist thinking is an imaginary of flattening, of globalization and capitalist development as a process that is flattening out the world, creating a level playing field that equalizes opportunities everywhere. It is this flattening that enables progress along the stages of development—what Blaut has termed a diffusionist conception of development (Blaut, 1993). Some claim that the world is actually flattening out—that socio-spatial positionality matters less and less, with the implication that it is the conditions in a place, rather than its connectivity to the rest of the world, that becomes the important differentiating factor (for critiques of such claims, in both the mainstream and political economic literatures, see Sheppard, 2002 and Sheppard, 2006). The Washington Consensus, in effect, sought to alter the conditions in place; pressing nations to adopt ‘best practice’ neoliberal governance norms, structural adjustment, which would then enable them to progress towards prosperity in a flat world. The ‘new’ development economists acknowledge that the world is not flat. Thus Sachs and Stiglitz argue that certain differences between nations persist in the face of globalization, creating unequal conditions of possibility for development. Sachs argues that certain biophysical differences can never be erased, making places ‘prisoners’ of their geography (Hausmann, 2001). This barrier can be overcome by directing more investment toward and/or giving more policy latitude to, ‘backward’ cities, regions, and nations. Stiglitz stresses how institutions of global governance reinforce power inequalities that disadvantage the global South, arguing for countervailing policies that favor the latter. Both advocate global redistribution and affirmative action for poor nations in order to redress inequalities resulting from disadvantaged geographical or political positionalities, in the belief that such interventions can level the playing field. Again, a flattened world, or leveled playing field, is seen as providing all places with the same opportunities to advance toward prosperity. Yet a flattened world, within this socio-spatial imaginary, does not mean a homogeneous world. Development economics has long recognized that places differ in their resource endowments, arguing that such differences need not be sources of inequality. Rather, each place is enjoined to find its comparative advantage, and trade in global markets on this basis. In doing so, places develop very different economic specializations, each of which is an equal basis for advancing along the developmental trajectory. More recently, both the World Bank and the new development economics have increasingly come to recognize and value persistent differences in cultural norms and practices across the globe, explicitly distancing themselves from previous quasi-orientalist rankings of cultures. Yet such cultural differences are recognized and valorized in terms of how they can be utilized in the market. As in the case of comparative advantage, the value of such socio-spatial differences is assessed in terms of their commodifiability. For example, Bergeron (2003) analyzes how the World Bank incorporates difference into its attempts to create subjects for the market. Taking the case of microfinance, she notes how the Bank, utilizing Putnam’s conception of social capital, takes the position that “developing social capital is best achieved by tapping into the communities’ own ‘premodern’ modes of collaboration and social life” (p. 403). Where such non-capitalist practices are seen as functional to incorporating subjects into microfinance, they are valued. However, social and cultural differences and practices that are not regarded as commodifiable are dismissed as barriers to development, in need of modernization. By the same token, Sachs’ concerns about geographical disadvantage can be regarded as identifying place-based characteristics that cannot be commodified in terms of comparative advantage, e.g., tropical or inland locations, thus requiring intervention. A variety of forces has contributed to the persistence of this imaginary, for at least the last century. First, its power geometry—its rootedness in hegemonic regions of the global system—has given the imaginary particular power to shape not only thinking in the global North, whose self-image it reinforces, but also the global South, whose residents often have been convinced that their own local knowledge and indigenous practices are inadequate. Second, the imaginary gains traction from its optimism and resonance with the notions of progress, equality, and acknowledgement of difference. While each is defined in a particular, commodified way, their capacity to connect with deep human desires for a better life is enticing. Notwithstanding the power and attractiveness of this imaginary, the failure of globalizing capitalism to bring about the prosperity that it promises, combined with the persistence of contestation, has periodically created moments of both material and cognitive crisis. Capitalism’s ability to reinvent itself through such moments of crisis, thereby reinvigorating this imaginary, can be understood through Derrida’s concept of the supplement. [T]he concept of the supplement…harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself…, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence… But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace…; if it fills, it is as one fills a void… As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence…, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. (Derrida, 1976, pp. 144–5) Both Keynesian and Hayekian governance discourses play this supplementary role for capitalism as, arguably, does any global governance discourse. Crises signal the incompleteness of capitalism—marks of an emptiness that require a supplement. Supplements fill capitalism’s emptiness and enrich it, promising a fuller measure of presence. Keynesianism provided exactly this supplement during the Great Depression, filling a gap in capitalism and reinvigorating the socio-spatial imaginary. Hayekian neoliberalism worked similarly when first world Fordism entered its crisis in the later 1970s, only to run into its own difficulties, described above, for which a new supplement is currently being sought. While there is no guarantee that a supplement must emerge to alleviate any crisis, to date this has been the case. 4. Conclusion We have argued that the shifting global governance discourses directed toward the third world since the 1970s can be conceptualized as capitalism’s supplements. As supplements, they have reaffirmed a persistent developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary. Recent discussions of such shifts (e.g., Evans, 2008 and Wade, 2008) invoke Karl Polanyi’s double movement: struggles within nation-states of North Atlantic capitalism, dating back to the 18th century, between those propagating free markets and those seeking to protect society through “powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labor, land and money” (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 79). The Washington Consensus entailed a shift from the latter to the former pole, albeit at a global scale, generating some nostalgia for national Keynesianism among critical scholars (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 38). Yet, while new development economics discourses resonate with Keynesian imaginaries, it is doubtful that we are experiencing a return to Polanyi’s institutions, even at a supra-national scale. The decommodification of land, labor and money is not evident, and emergent governance discourses in the US and the UK stress a paternalistic ‘nudging’ of individuals to make the right choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Nevertheless neoliberalism, as we know it, is in question. The current crisis has made Hayekian nostrums unpopular, but faith in the market runs deep, and it will probably take a decade before it becomes clear what supplement emerges to manage this crisis. There is no shortage of candidates for post-neoliberal governance regimes—both progressive and regressive (Brand and Sekler, 2009)—and in a moment of crisis, when supplements are in question, contestations can play a vital role in shaping capitalism’s trajectories, and viability. Challenging the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary, however, will require not just probing the limits of neoliberalism, but exploring imaginaries that exceed capitalism. Within the academy, a plenitude of conceptual alternatives highlight capitalism’s complicity in producing the inequalities and hierarchies that the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary claims to overcome, including Marxist, world-systemic, feminist, post-colonial and post-developmental scholarship (cf. Sheppard et al., 2009). These alternatives imagine capitalism, development and governance otherwise – seeking more just and sustainable alternatives that create space for variegated trajectories, uneven connectivities and ineluctable difference, instead of stageism, flattening and commodification. Beyond the academy, civil society is expanding the range of alternatives—and is arguably better equipped to disrupt the current experimentations of global policymakers. Experiencing the disabling effects of capitalism and its supplements, those living precariously actively contest neoliberalization, articulating alternative imaginaries and practices through actions ranging from local initiatives to transnational activist networks. The World Social Forum is just the most prominent of innumerable inter-related counter-neoliberal globalization movements (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003, Glassman, 2001, Evans, 2008, Sheppard and Nagar, 2004, Notes From Nowhere, 2003 and Reitan, 2007). Santos (2008, p. 258) regards its gatherings as a productive forum for “alternative thinking of alternatives”—where different kinds of knowledge about social transformation and emancipation, exceeding the hegemonic epistemologies of the West, are valorized and actively debated, and where the existence of alternatives is asserted without defining their content. It may seem unlikely that such emerging alternatives constitute a serious near-term challenge to capitalist imaginaries, but they are provincializing Western understandings of governance and social transformation, and re-politicizing capitalism. Politicization is essential to make space for transformative rather than affirmative remedies, changing the frameworks that generate unequal power relations, and dismantling EuroAmerican centrism “so as to undo the vicious circle of economic and cultural subordination” (Fraser, 1997, p. 28).

### 2NC – Link – Free Trade

**Free trade is meant to expand sovereign control over the rest of the world, it forces ideals of neoliberalism and privatization that draws violent distinctions between the rich and poor, creating those in the lower classes as disposable**

Giroux 6 – Henry Giroux, “Dirty Democracy and State Terrorism: The Politics of the New Authoritarianism in the United States” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26.2 (2006) 163-177

As the state of emergency, in Giorgio Agamben's aptly chosen words, becomes the rule rather than the exception, a number of powerful antidemocratic tendencies threaten the prospects for both American and global democrac**y**.[10](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html" \l "FOOT10#FOOT10) The first is a market fundamentalism that not only trivializes democratic values and public concerns but also enshrines a rabid individualism, an all-embracing quest for profits, and a social Darwinism in which misfortune is seen as a weakness—the current sum total being the Hobbesian rule of a "war of all against all" that replaces any vestige of shared responsibilities or compassion for others. The values of the market and the ruthless workings of finance capital become the template for organizing the rest of society. Everybody is now a customer or client, and every relationship is ultimately judged in bottom-line, cost-effective terms as the neoliberal mantra "privatize or perish" is repeated over and over again. Responsible citizens are replaced by an assemblage of entrepreneurial subjects, each tempered in the virtue of self-reliance and forced to face the increasingly difficult challenges of the social order alone. Freedom is no longer about securing equality, social justice, or the public welfare but about unhampered trade in goods, financial capital, and commodities. As the logic of capital trumps democratic sovereignty, low-intensity warfare at home chips away at democratic freedoms, and high-intensity warfare abroad delivers democracy with bombs, tanks, and chemical warfare. The global cost of these neoliberal commitments is massive human suffering and death, delivered not only in the form of bombs and the barbaric practices of occupying armies but also in structural adjustment policies in which the drive for land, resources, profits, and goods are implemented by global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Global lawlessness and armed violence accompany the imperative of free trade, the virtues of a market without boundaries, and the promise of a Western-style democracy imposed through military solutions, ushering in the age of rogue sovereignty on a global scale. Under such conditions, human suffering and hardship reach unprecedented levels of intensity. In a rare moment of truth, Thomas Friedman, the columnist for the New York Times, precisely argued for the use of U.S. power—including military force—to support this antidemocratic world order. He claimed that "the hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist. . . . And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps."[11](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html" \l "FOOT11#FOOT11) As Mark Rupert points out, "In Friedman's twisted world, if people are to realize their deepest aspirations—the longing for a better life which comes from their very souls—they must stare down the barrel of Uncle Sam's gun."[12](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html" \l "FOOT12#FOOT12) As neoliberals in the Bush administration implement policies at home to reduce taxation and regulation while spending billions on wars abroad, they slash funds that benefit the sick, the elderly, the poor, and young people. But **pu**blic resources are diverted not only from crucial domestic problems ranging from poverty and unemployment to hunger; they are also diverted from addressing the fate of some 45 million children in "the world's poor countries [who] will die needlessly over the next decade," as reported by the British-based group Oxfam.[13](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html" \l "FOOT13#FOOT13) The U.S. commitment to market fundamentalism elevates profits over human needs and consequently offers few displays of compassion, aid, or relief for millions of poor and abandoned children in the world who do not have adequate shelter, who are severely hungry, who have no access to health care or safe water, and who succumb needlessly to the ravages of AIDS and other diseases.[14](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html" \l "FOOT14#FOOT14) For instance, as Jim Lobe points out, "U.S. foreign aid in 2003 ranked dead last among all wealthy nations. In fact, its entire development aid spending in 2003 came to only ten percent of what it spent on the Iraq war that year. U.S. development assistance comes to less than one-fortieth of its annual defense budget."[15](http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:2115/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v026/26.2giroux.html" \l "FOOT15#FOOT15) Carol Bellamy, the executive director of UNICEF, outlines the consequences of the broken promises to children by advanced capitalist countries such as the United States.

### 2NC – Link – Zizek

#### Focus on easily identifiable flashpoints of conflict misses the boat – only focusing on the background can solve the root cause – they cannot be viewed from the same stand point – the call to act will be strong but responding creates a stop-gap which prevents engaging in criticisms of capital and economic rationality

Zizek, ’08 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and a professor at the European Graduate School, Violence, p. 1-4)

If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and **terror, civil unrest, international conflict**. But we should learn to **step back,** to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible “subjective” violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance. This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a “symbolic” violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being.” As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious—and extensively studied—cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call “systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our **economic and political systems**. The catch is that subjective and objective violence **cannot be perceived from the same standpoint:** subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the “normal,” peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious “dark matter” of physics, the counterpart to an all-too- visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be “irrational” explosions of subjective violence. When the media bombard us with those “humanitarian crises” which seem constantly to pop up all over the world, one should always bear in mind that a particular crisis only explodes into media visibility as the result of a complex struggle. Properly humanitarian considerations as a rule play a less important role here than cultural, ideologico-political, and economic considerations. The cover story of Time magazine on 5 June 2006, for example, was “The Deadliest War in the World.” This offered detailed documentation on how around 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo as the result of political violence over the last decade. None of the usual humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple of readers’ letters—as if some kind of filtering mechanism blocked this news from achieving its full impact in our symbolic space. To put it cynically, Time picked the wrong victim in the struggle for hegemony in suffering. It should have stuck to the list of usual suspects: Muslim women and their plight, or the families of 9/11 victims and how they have coped with their losses. The Congo today has effectively re-emerged as a Conradean “heart of darkness.” No one dares to confront it head on. The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless Congolese. Do we need further proof that the humanitarian sense of urgency is mediated, indeed overdetermined, by clear political considerations? And what are these considerations? To answer this, we need to step back and take a look from a different position. When the U.S. media reproached the public in foreign countries for not displaying enough sympathy for the victims of the 9/11 attacks, one was tempted to answer them in the words Robespierre addressed to those who complained about the innocent victims of revolutionary terror: “Stop shaking the tyrant’s bloody robe in my face, or I will believe that you wish to put Rome in chains.”1 Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which **prevents us from thinking**. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject’s report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content “contaminated” the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 The only appropriate approach to my subject thus seems to be one which permits variations on violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims.

**Alternative**

**2NC – Alt – Solvency Wall**

#### The alt solves best –

#### A. Comfort: By standing back and refusing to engage in the genocidal ideology, we force a confrontation with the evil of participating in Capital.  This exposition of Capitalism’s contradictions forces real change. Their call for action within the system has historically failed and sustained Capitalism, for example the Nazi Doctors excuse that they could minimize harm and the Democrats’ rhetoric of lesser evil, which initiated a slippery slope until Johnson, the architect of Vietnam, was the lesser evil.  Their advocacy’s merely a conscience easing exercise in futility.

#### B. Politics: The desire for pragmatic action forecloses electoral change because it produces choices in evil, which alienates the majority of the population.  A moral stance against Capitalism can mobilize the disenfranchised, whose votes their political analysis discounts as meaningless.

#### C. Try or Die: We have suffered through centuries of pragmatic action.  From the punishment after World War 1 to the assistance after World War 2 to the negotiations before Vietnam and Iraq.  Pragmatic actions have heralded a repetition of disaster.  As Einstein stated we must now change our ways of thinking, which permit genocide and exploitation in the name of profit or we’ll go extinct.

**The alt is both necessary and sufficient to dismantle the system from bottom up**

**Herod 04** – James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, **a strategy for destroying capitalism**. This strategy, at its most basic**, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization**. The image then is **one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells**. This is definitely **an aggressive strategy**. It **requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order.** **The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed,** but it is **not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it**, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus **capitalist structures** (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) **are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected**. We **stop participating in activities that support** (finance, condone) **the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations.** In this way **our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence**. This is how it has to be done. **This is a plausible, realistic strategy**. **To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight**, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism**, is foolhardy**. **Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations**. Such a **revolution will never happen automatically,** blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. **It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs.** But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t imply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). **Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life**, by millions of people. **It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so.** Nevertheless, **there are** many **concrete ways that** individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can **gut capitalism**, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always **keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves**. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. **By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets**, and so forth, we were **forced onto the labor market in order to survive**, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how **we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves** (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), **and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor** and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. **This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally**, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because **capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system**. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but **we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system**. Thus **our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else.** Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: **in order for capitalism to be destroyed** millions and millions of **people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want**. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather **it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire**, an overriding need. **What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way**, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. **Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.** The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. **The long term goa**l of communists, anarchists, and socialists **has always been to restore community**. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the **free development of each is a condition for the free development of all**. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. **The long term goals have always been clear**: to abolish wage-slavery, **to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world**.

#### As an intellectual your rejection of capitalism has emancipatory results - criticism allows capitalism to be challenged

Kovel 2 (Joel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard, The Enemy of Nature, p224)

Relentless criticism can **delegitimate** the system and **release** people into struggle. And as struggle develops, victories that are no more than incremental by their own terms- stopping a meeting stopping the IMF, the hopes stirred forth by a campaign such as Ralph Nader’s in 2000 – can have a **symbolic effect** **far greater** than their **external result**, and constitute points of rupture with capital. This rupture is not a set of facts added to our knowledge of the world, but a **change in our relation** to the world. Its effects are dynamic, not incremental, and like all genuine insights it changes the balance of forces and can propagate very swiftly. Thus the release from inertia can trigger a **rapid cascade of changes**, so that it could be said that the forces pressing towards radical change need not be linear and incremental, but can be **exponential** in character. In this way, conscientious and radical criticism of the given, even in advance of having blueprints for an alternative, can be a material force, because it can seize the mind of the masses of people. **There is no greater responsibility for intellectuals**.

**A2: Transition Wars**

**No transition wars – there aren’t any resources**

**Bennett and Nordstrom ‘00** (D. Scott, Timothy, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 1, Feb., pp. 33-61, JSTOR)

This leads to our first hypothesis, which is as follows: Hypothesis 1: Poor economic conditions lead to diversionary actions against the rival. Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a "guns versus butter" world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

**Their evidence relies on flawed models – economic collapse forces countries to focus inward – solves risk of conflict**

**Bennett and Nordstrom ‘00** (D. Scott, Timothy, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 1, Feb., pp. 33-61, JSTOR)

Most scholarly works that examine the effects of domestic economic woes on international behavior have focused on the theoretical possibility that leaders undertake adventurous foreign policies under conditions of worsening economic, social, and political problems (Levy 1989). Commonly known as either externalization or diversion, the main thrust of the argument is that political elites can solidify their relationship with their domestic constituents by transferring the public's attention from economic issues to the foreign enemy. Underlying the process is the assumption that the military action will cause the citizens to "rally 'round the flag" (Mueller 1973) and thereby the patriotic mass will see political elites in a more positive light. Early studies attributed to his rallying effect to a suspected in-group/out-group relationship. Simmel (1955) argued that an altercation with an out-group (the target of the externalization efforts) helps promote cohesion within the in-group (the troubled leader's citizenry) because it is natural for individuals to pull together with those they know when confronted by outsiders. Transferring the argument to action, it may be that if political elites realize that this in-group/out-group dynamic exists, then they will make advantageous use of externalization tactics. Auxiliary arguments might suggest that leaders will prefer short, manageable conflicts to boost their support without risking the long term costs of war. An additional implication of the theory when applied strategically to pairs of conflictual states is that while states with problems are likely to be conflict initiators, states without such problems are more likely to be the targets of diversion. If diversionary logic holds and states want to initiate a cheap and manageable incident to divert attention without imposing major costs, then leaders would prefer to initiate against states in a good economic or domestic situation. If the target is in bad shape domestically, then leaders in that target may have their own incentives to escalate the conflict to divert public attention. Initiators thinking strategically may try to avoid conflict against such an opponent. While diversionary conflict theory has been the subject of much scholarly attention, the evidence supporting the argument has been mixed. On one hand, studies that take the historical case study approach tend to support the notion that leaders do externalize when faced with domestic problems (Levy 1988, 667); in a related body of work, some case studies of deterrence failures have shown that these cases are often characterized by an attacker who is motivated by internal problems (e.g., Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). On the other hand, quantitative studies of externalization have not provided consistent support. Across studies of externalization in general (e.g., Leeds and Davis 1997) or in the context of specific states' foreign policies (Fordham 1998; Gowa 1998; Meernik 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Mintz and Russett 1992), findings about whether quantitative data support the theory have been mixed. The nature of the results has led some to question the validity of the theories. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985) posits that the logical flaw in externalization theory lies in the psychological nature of the original scapegoat hypothesis on which externalization theory is based. While the international relations version of this theory is indeed written in psychological terms (in-group/out-group), it may be that "the logical foundation for the leap from individual psychology to national action remains non-existent" (1985, 130). Similarly, Levy (1989, 266) puts forth four problems with the original causal process as described by Simmel (1955), Coser (1956), and other early writers on externalization(:1 ) little attention is paid to the direction of the relationship between internal problems and external conflict, (2) attempts to develop or test alternative theoretical relationships are rare,( 3) precise specifications of when externalization should occur theoretically are rare, and (4) the conditions under which externalization conditions should hold are unexplored. The conclusion that Levy draws from these theoretical issues is that many of the empirical studies suffer from problems of misspecified models (1989, 267). An additional possible source of discrepancies in findings about diversionary conflict may be attributable to differences in research design and variable measurement. Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states. Even the central concept of externalization, namely, domestic trouble, is unclear. Most studies to date have used presidential popularity, overall presidential success, the election calendar, or a misery index composed of inflation and unemployment as indicators of presidential problems. Cross-national studies have most frequently examined what James (1988, 103) categorizes as manifest conflict, a category which includes protest demon strations, political strikes, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic violence. This category can be opposed to latent conflict, which exists when sources of trouble are present but have not yet led to the physical manifestations of dissatisfaction. Diversionary conflict theory as presented is typically so general in its discussion of internal problems that it opens a Pandora's box of possible indicators of domestic conflict, and all of the types of measures discussed above fit with the theory. The vague nature of the theory may be contributing to this possible problem of model misspecification, but there are few arguments that suggest one indicator is superior to the others. Alternative relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator (1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the historical notion that leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full-in bad times, leaders may simply not be able to afford to go to conflict. Blainey's argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory. By coming at externalization from the substitutability perspective, we hope to deal with some of the theoretical problems raised by critics of diversionary conflict theory. Substitutability can be seen as a particular problem of model specification where the dependent variable has not been fully developed. We believe that one of the theoretical problems with studies of externalization has been a lack of attention to alternative choices; Bueno de Mesquita actually hints toward this (and the importance of foreign policy substitution) when he argues that it is **shortsighted** to conclude that a leader will uniformly externalize in response to domestic problems at the expense of other possible policy choices (1985, 130). We hope to improve on the study of externalization and behavior within rivalries by considering multiple outcomes in response to domestic conditions.5 In particular, we will focus on the alternative option that instead of externalizing, leaders may internalize when faced with domestic economic troubles. Rather than diverting the attention of the public or relevant elites through military action, leaders may actually work to solve their internal problems internally. Tying internal solutions to the external environment, we focus on the possibility that leaders may work to disengage their country from hostile relationships in the international arena to deal with domestic issues. Domestic problems often emerge from the challenges of spreading finite resources across many different issue areas in a manner that satisfies the public and solves real problems. Turning inward for some time may free up resources required to jump-start the domestic economy or may simply provide leaders the time to solve internal distributional issues. In our study, we will focus on the condition of the domestic economy (gross domestic product [GDP] per capita growth) as a source of pressure on leaders to externalize. We do this for a number of reasons. First, when studying rivalries, we need an indicator of potential domestic trouble that is applicable beyond just the United States or just advanced industrialized democracies. In many non-Western states, variables such as election cycles and presidential popularity are irrelevant. Economics are important to all countries at all times. At a purely practical level, GDP data is also more widely available (cross-nationally and historically) than is data on inflation or unemployment. 6 Second, we believe that fundamental economic conditions are a source of potential political problems to which leaders must pay attention. Slowing growth or worsening economic conditions may lead to mass dissatisfaction and protests down the road; economic problems may best be dealt with at an early stage before they turn into outward, potentially violent, conflict. This leads us to a third argument, which is that we in fact believe that it may be more appropriate in general to use indicators of latent conflict rather than manifest conflict as indicators of the potential to divert. Once the citizens of a country are so distressed that they resort to manifest conflict (rioting or engaging in open protest), it may be too late for a leader to satisfy them by engaging in distracting foreign policy actions. If indeed leaders do attempt to distract people's attention, then if protest reaches a high level, that attempt has actually failed and we are looking for correlations between failed externalization attempts and further diversion.

**Transition wars are an ideological lie---they’re happening now as capitalism inevitably collapses---it’s try or die for embracing alternative social models that challenge green capitalist measures like the plan**

Ingar **Solty 12**, Politics Editor of Das Argument, and co-founder and Board member of the North-Atlantic Left Dialogue (NALD), an annual summit of left intellectuals organized by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and funded by the German Foreign Office, 2012, “After neoliberalism: left versus right projects of leadership in the global crisis,” in Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, ed. Gill, p. 213-215

The alternative to a failure of utilizing this crisis for a renewal of capitalism and hegemony appears to be an increasing slide into some form of barbarism. Again, barbarism should also be understood as a cipher, inasmuch as it means an acceleration of trends already present within neoliberal capitalism. This includes the rise of authoritarian forms of rule as well as the forceful management of the growing contradictions of global capitalism through new imperial endeavours, motivated both by geo-economic and geopolitical considerations and the likely growth of ‘blowbacks’ and neoliberal ‘boomerangs’ from the global South. In other words, this development should be understood as a radicalization of the ‘new imperialism’ that emerged precisely in response to the crises produced by neoliberalism and particularly the attempt of the United States to use force as a means to avoid or deter hegemonic decline. The strengthening of elements of authoritarian capitalism would suggest growing inter-imperial rivalries, especially between the United States and China but possibly also between the United States and a German-led European Union. This scenario would also involve a potential fragmentation of the world market (e.g. through protectionism against German exports in the European Union, and possibly also in the United States, and against Chinese exports, especially in the United States but potentially also in Europe), a growing geoeconomic conflict over the world’s resources, particularly fossil fuels, and the necessary internal authoritarianism to complement and reinforce such inter-imperial rivalries. Nonetheless, this historic moment is open, and a third alternative does exist. This can be seen partly in the emergence of the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and their attempts at developing not only growing economic, political and ideological independence from the global North but also social and political alternatives to the status quo. At the same time, these semi-peripheral big players are in ideological struggles with, for example, those states of the Latin American ALBA coalition (the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America), which includes Venezuela and Bolivia, that seems to be moving more or less in the direction of an alternative to capitalism, or what it calls ‘twenty-first-century socialism’ – a move that is complemented by new regional military alliance structures. Similarly, also in the global North, the crisis of neoliberal hegemony has led not only to a vacuum filled by right-wing populist parties but, in some cases, most notably in Germany, the rise of political forces that, at least nominally, strive to replace capitalism with democratic socialism, understood as an economic system based on different forms of collective ownership. It is clear that the German situation is an exception throughout the (leading states of the) global North. All the same, it does mean that alternative political projects exist that challenge green capitalist ‘alternatives’ to neoliberal capitalism. Of course, it might be exactly the emergence and growing strength of such projects, alongside a noticeable new militancy within labour movements across Europe, that fuels the reestablishment of a new form of capitalist hegemony under a green capitalist order. At the same time, the differences between green capitalism and authoritarian capitalism must under no circumstances be downplayed, since, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels noted in a clear non-teleological moment in probably their most historico-philosophical text, the Manifesto of the Communist Party, the history of class struggle may also end with the ‘common demise of the struggling classes’ (Marx and Engels 1974 [1848]).

### 2NC – A2: Permutation – General

#### All links are disads to the perm --- they shouldn’t be able to sever their 1AC justifications --- that’s the framework debate --- voter for negative ground.

#### Two framing issues –

#### First, Any justification for the perm is just proof that the alt solves the case---we only need to win a residual link because stepping back and exploring the roots of their descriptions produces more effective engagement.

#### Second, No net benefit to the perm-all their advantages are intellectually suspect-both are on framework.

**Try or die for the alternative alone**

**De Angelis**, East London political economy professor, **2009**

(Massimo, “The tragedy of the capitalist commons”, December, <http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-5/capitalist-commons/>, DOA: 7-2-12)

This platform of management of the global commons is based on one key assumption: that capitalist disciplinary markets are a force for good, if only states are able to guide them onto a path of environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive growth. What this view forgets is that there is little evidence that global economic growth could be achieved with lower greenhouse gas emissions, in spite of increasingly energy-efficient new technologies, which in turn implies that alternatives might just be necessary to stop climate change. This raises the question of how we disentangle ourselves from the kind of conception of commons offered by Stiglitz, which allow solutions based on capitalist growth. COMMON INTERESTS? Commons also refer to common interests. To stay with the example of climate change, if there is any chance of significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions – without this implying some form of green authoritarianism – it is because there is a common interest in doing so. But common interests do not exist per se, they have to be constructed, a process that has historically proven to be riddled with difficulties – witness the feminist movement’s attempts to construct a ‘global sisterhood’; or the workers’ movement’s project of a ‘global proletariat’. **This is partly the case because capitalism stratifies ‘women’, ‘workers’ or any other collective subject in and through hierarchies of wages and power**. And therein lies the rub, because it is on the terrain of the construction of common global interests (not just around ecological issues, but also intellectual commons, energy commons, etc.) that the class struggle of the 21st century will be played out. This is where the centre of gravity of a new politics will lie. There are thus two possibilities. Either: social movements will face up to the challenge and re-found the commons on values of social justice in spite of, and beyond, these capitalist hierarchies. **Or: capital will seize the historical moment to use them to initiate a new round of accumulation** (i.e. growth). The previous discussion of Stiglitz’s arguments highlights the dangers here. Because Stiglitz moves swiftly from the presumed tragedy of the global commons to the need to preserve and sustain them for the purpose of economic growth. Similar arguments can be found in UN and World Bank reports on ‘sustainable development’, that oxymoron invented to couple environmental and ‘social’ sustainability to economic growth. **Sustainable development is simply the sustainability of capital**. **This approach asserts capitalist growth as the sine qua non common interest of humanity**. I call commons that are tied to capitalist growth distorted commons, **where capital has successfully subordinated non-monetary values to its primary goal of accumulation.** The reason why common interests cannot simply be postulated is that we do not reproduce our livelihoods by way of postulations – we cannot eat them, in short. By and large, we reproduce our livelihoods by entering into relations with others, and by following the rules of these relations. To the extent that the rules that we follow in reproducing ourselves are the rules of capitalist production – i.e. to the extent that our reproduction depends on money – we should question the operational value of any postulation of a common interest, **because capitalist social relations imply precisely the existence of injustices, and conflicts of interest**. These exist, on the one hand, between those who produce value, and those who expropriate it; and, on the other, between different layers of the planetary hierarchy. And, it is not only pro-growth discourses that advocate the distorted commons that perpetuate these conflicts at the same time as they try to negate them. The same is true of environmental discourses that do not challenge the existing social relations of production through which we reproduce our livelihoods. Given that these assertions are somewhat abstract, let us try to substantiate them by testing a central environmental postulate on subjects who depend on capitalist markets for the reproduction of their livelihoods.

**Perm fails---It is impossible to evaluate the subjective agent caused violence outlined in the 1AC and to criticize the forms of violence that are the root cause of graphic outbursts – the criticism is literally mutually exclusive with the plan**

**The permutations stance against “all violence” is a fantasy – inclusion of the plan drowns out the critical thought necessary for the alternative and actively participates in violence**Zizek ‘8 [Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology @ Univ. of Ljubljana, Violence, p 10-11]

**Opposing all forms of violence, from direct, physical violence** (mass murder, terror) **to ideological violence (racism, incitement, sexual discrimination), seems to be the main preoccupation of the tolerant liberal attitude** that predominates today. **An SOS call sustains such talk, drowning out all other approaches: everything else can and has to wait. . . Is there not something suspicious, indeed symptomatic, about this focus on subjective violence**—that violence which is enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds? **Doesn’t it desperately try to distract our attention from the true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view other forms of violence and thus actively participating in them?** According to a well-known anecdote, a German officer visited Picasso in his Paris studio during the Second World War. There he saw Guernica and, shocked at the modernist “chaos” of the painting, asked Picasso: “Did you do this?” Picasso calmly replied: “No, you did this!” Today, **many a liberal, when faced with violent outbursts** such as the recent looting in the suburbs of Paris, **asks the few remaining leftists who still count on a radical social transformation: “Isn’t it you who did this? Is this what you want?” And we should reply**, like Picasso: “**No, you did this! This is the true result of your politics**!”

**The Liberal Capitalist DA--The permutation is ideology at its purest—it attempts to disguise and neutralize the violent parts of the AFF with a supposed anti-capitalist action. Make no mistake, this is a token genuflection to the ALT that merely attempts to restore the smooth functioning of the global system**

**Žižek ‘8** [Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology @ Univ. of Ljubljana, Violence, p. 36-37]

We live in a society where a kind of Hegelian speculative identity of opposites exists. **Certain features, attitudes, and norms of life are no longer perceived as ideologically marked**. **They appear to be neutral, non- ideological, natural, commonsensical. We designate as ideology that which stands out from this background: extreme religious zeal or dedication to a particular political orientation**. The Hegelian point here would be that **it is precisely the neutralisation of some features into a spontaneously accepted background that marks out ideology at its purest and at its most effective**. This is the dialectical "coincidence of opposites": the actualisation of a notion or an ideology at its purest coincides with, or, more precisely, appears as its opposite, as non- ideology. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for violence. **Social-symbolic violence at its purest appears as its opposite, as the spontaneity of the milieu in which we dwell, of the air we breathe. This is why the delicate liberal communist-frightened**, **caring**, **fighting violence-and the blind fundamentalist exploding in rage are two sides of the same coin**. **While they fight subjective violence, liberal communists are the very agents of the structural violence which creates the conditions for the explosions of subjective violence**. **The same philanthropists who give millions for AIDS or education in tolerance have ruined the lives of thousands through financial speculation and** thus **created the conditions for the rise of the very intolerance that is being fought.** In the 1960s and '70s it was possible to buy soft-porn postcards of a girl clad in a bikini or wearing an evening gown; however, when one moved the postcard a little bit or looked at it from a slightly different perspective, her clothes magically disappeared to reveal the girl's naked body. **When we are bombarded by the heartwarming news of a debt cancellation or a big humanitarian campaign to eradicate a dangerous epidemic, just move the postcard a little to catch a glimpse of the obscene figure of the liberal communist at work beneath. We should have no illusions: liberal communists are the enemy of every progressive struggle today.** All other enemies-religious fundamentalists and terrorists, corrupted and inefficient state bureaucracies-are particular figures whose rise and fall depends on contingent local circumstances. **Precisely because they want to resolve all the secondary malfunctions of the global system, liberal communists are the direct embodiment of what is wrong with the system as such**. **This needs to be borne in mind in the midst of the various tactical alliances and compromises one has to make with liberal communists when fighting racism, sexism, and religious obscurantism**.

**Any participation in the system ensures that it is reproduced- capitalism demands complacence- by doing nothing we can actually do something**

**Zizek ‘8**-Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana (Slavoj, Violence, p 215-7)

While the parallel holds, the concluding characterisation seems to fall short: **the unsettling message** of *Seeing* **is not** so much **the indissolubility of both people and government as much the compulsive nature of democratic rituals of freedom.** What happens is that **by abstaining from voting, people effectively dissolve the government-not only in the limited sense of overthrowing the existing government, but more radically. Why is the government thrown into such a panic by the voters' abstention? It is compelled to confront the fact that it exists, that it exerts power, only insofar as it is accepted as such by its subjects-accepted even in the mode of rejection. The voters' abstention goes further than the intra-political negation**, the vote of no confidence: **it rejects the very frame of decision**. In psychoanalytic terms, the voters' abstention is something like the psychotic *Verwerfung* (foreclosure, rejection/repudiation), which is a more radical move than repression *(Verdrangung).* According to Freud, **the repressed is intellectually accepted by the subject, since it is named, and at the same time is negated because the subject refuses to recognise it, refuses to recognise him or herself in it**. In contrast to this, foreclosure rejects the term from the symbolic *tout court.* To circumscribe the contours of this radical rejection, one is tempted to evoke Badiou's provocative thesis: "It is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognizes as existent.''6 **Better to do nothing than to** engage in localised acts the ultimate function of which is to **make the system run more smoothly (acts such as providing space for the multitude of new subjectivities). The threat today is not passivity, but pseudoactivity, the urge to "be active," to "participate," to mask the nothingness of what goes on. People intervene all the time, "do something**"; academics participate in meaningless debates, and so on. **The truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw**. Those in power often prefer even a "critical" participation, a dialogue, to silence-just to engage us in "dialogue," to make sure our ominous passivity is broken. **The voters' abstention is thus a true political act: it forcefully confronts us with the vacuity of today's democracies. If one means by violence a radical upheaval of the basic social relations, then, crazy and tasteless as it may sound, the problem with historical monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not violent enough. Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.**

# \*\*AFF STARTS HERE

**2ACs**

**2AC – Cap K**

**You should evaluate the plan based on consequentialism – any alternative to capitalism is unethical and causes violence**

Richards 9– Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, “Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem,” pg. 31-32

Myth no. 1: The Nirvana Myth (contrasting capitalism with an unrealizable ideal rather than with its live alternatives) But the myth can have subtle effects even if we reject utopian schemes. To avoid its dangers, we have to resist the temptation to compare our live options with an ideal that we can never realize. When we ask whether we can build a just society, we need to keep the question nailed to solid ground: just compared with what? It doesn’t do anyone any good to tear down a society that is “unjust” compared with the kingdom of God if that society is more just than any of the ones that will replace it. Compared with Nirvana, no real society looks good. Compared with utopia, Stalinist Russia and America at its best will both get bad reviews. The differences between them may seem trivial compared to utopia. That’s one of the grave dangers of utopian thinking: it blinds us to the important differences among the various ways of ordering society. The Nirvana Myth dazzles the eyes, to the point that the real alternatives all seem like dull and barely distinguishable shades of gray. The free exchange of wages for work in the marketplace starts to look like slavery. Tough competition for market share between companies is confused with theft and survival of the fittest. Banking is confused with usury and exploitation. This shouldn’t surprise us. Of course a modern capitalist society like the United States looks terrible compared with the kingdom of God. But that’s bad moral reasoning. The question isn’t whether capitalism measures up to the kingdom of God. The question is whether there’s a better alternative in this life. “Those who condemn the immorality of liberal capitalism do so in comparison with a society of saints that has never existed—and never will.” —Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works If we’re going to compare modern capitalism with an extreme, we should compare it with a real extreme—like communism in Cambodia, China, or the Soviet Union. Unlike Nirvana, these experiments are well within our power to bring about. They all reveal the terrible cost of trying to create a society in which ev- eryone is economically equal. If we insist on comparing live options with live options, modern capitalism could hardly be more different, more just, or more desirable than such an outcome. That doesn’t mean we should rest on our laurels. It means we need to stay focused on reality rather than romantic ideals. So how should we answer the question that began this chap- ter: can’t we build a just society? The answer: we should do everything we can to build a more just society and a more just world. And the worst way to do that is to try to create an egalitarian utopia.

**Framework—focus of the debate should be on the material implications of the plan—key to AFF ground—their framework allows them to skirt the question of the necessity of the government taking action**

**Capitalism is sustainable and self-correcting---alt can’t solve**

**Seabra 12** (Leo, has a background in Communication and Broadcasting and a broad experience which includes activities in Marketing, Advertising, Sales and Public Relations, 2/27, “Capitalism can drive Sustainability and also innovation,” http://seabraaffairs.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/capitalism-can-drive-sustainability-and-also-innovation/)

There are those who say that if the world does not change their habits, even the end of economic growth, and assuming alternative ways of living, will be a catastrophe. “Our lifestyles are unsustainable. Our expectations of consumption are predatory.Either we change this, or will be chaos”. Others say that the pursuit of unbridled economic growth and the inclusion of more people in consumption is killing the Earth. We have to create alternative because economic growth is pointing to the global collapse. “What will happen when billions of Chinese decide to adopt the lifestyle of Americans?” I’ll disagree if you don’t mind… **They might be** wrong. **Completely wrong** .. Even very intelligent people wrongly interpret the implications of what they observe when they lose the perspective of time. In the vast scale of time (today, decades, not centuries) it is the opposite of what expected, because they start from a false assumption: the future is the extrapolation of this. But not necessarily be. How do I know? Looking at history. What story? The history of innovation, this thing generates increases in productivity, wealth, quality of life in an unimaginable level. It is innovation that will defeat pessimism as it always did. It was innovation that made life today is incomparably better than at any other time in human history. And will further improve. Einstein, who was not a stupid person, believed that capitalism would generate crisis, instability, and growing impoverishment. He said: “The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the true source of evil.” The only way to eliminate this evil, he thought, was to establish socialism, with the means of production are owned by the company. A centrally controlled economy would adjust the production of goods and services the needs of people, and would distribute the work that needed to be done among those in a position to do so. This would guarantee a livelihood to every man, women and children. Each according to his possibilities. To each according to their needs. And guess what? What happened was the opposite of what Einstein predicted. Who tried the model he suggested, impoverished, screwed up. Peter Drucker says that almost of all thinking people of the late nineteenth century thought that Marx was right: there would be increased exploitation of workers by employers. They would become poorer, until one day, the thing would explode. Capitalist society was considered inherently unsustainable. It is more or less the same chat today. **Bullshit. Capitalism, with all appropriate regulations, self-**corrects. It is **an adaptive system that learns and changes by design. The design is just for the system to learn and change.** There was the opposite of what Einstein predicted, and held the opposite of what many predict, but the logic that “unlike” only becomes evident over time. It wasn’t obvious that the workers are those whom would profit from the productivity gains that the management science has begun to generate by organizing innovations like the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone .. to increase the scale of production and cheapen things. The living conditions of workers today are infinitely better than they were in 1900. They got richer, not poorer .. You do not need to work harder to produce more (as everyone thought), you can work less and produce more through a mechanism that is only now becoming apparent, and that brilliant people like Caetano Veloso still ignores. The output is pursuing growth through innovation, growth is not giving up. More of the same will become unsustainable to the planet, but most of it is not what will happen, will happen more different, than we do not know what is right. More innovative. Experts, such as Lester Brown, insist on statements like this: if the Chinese also want to have three cars for every four inhabitants, as in the U.S. today, there will be 1.1 billion cars there in 2030, and there is no way to build roads unless ends with the whole area used for agriculture. You will need 98 million barrels of oil per day, but the world only produces about 90 million today, and probably never produce much more. The mistake is to extrapolate today’s solutions for the future. We can continue living here for 20 years by exploiting the same resources that we explore today? Of course not. But the other question is: how can we encourage the stream of innovations that will enable the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Africans .. to live so as prosperous as Americans live today? Hey, wake up … what can not stop the engine of innovation is that the free market engenders. This system is self correcting, that is its beauty. We do not need to do nothing but ensure the conditions for it to work without distortion. The rest he does himself. It regulates itself.

**Perm do both**

#### Epistemology and Ontology not 1st and cedes politics

**Jarvis 2K**

(D.S.L., Lecturer n Government - U of Sydney, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM, p. 128-9)

Certainly **it is right** and proper **that we** ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations**, engage in** epistemologicaland ontological **debate**, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. **But to suppose** that **this is the only task** of international theory, **let alone the most important one, smacks of** intellectual **elitism and displays** a certain **contempt for** those who search for guidance in their **daily struggles** as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project his deconstructive efforts, or valiant tight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed and destitute? **How does it help solve** the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, **the casualties of war,** or the emigres of death squads**?** Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rarionality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But **to suppose that problem-solving** technical theory **is not necessary—or** is in some, way **bad—**is a contemptuous position that **abrogates any hope of solving** some of the **nightmarish realities** that millions confront daily. Holsti argues, **we need ask** of these theorists and these theories tne ultimate question, “**So what?”** **to what purpose do they** deconstruct **problematize, destabilize**, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? **Does this** get us any further**, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition**? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judgedpertinent relevant helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

**The alt fails, causes transition conflicts, and flips their impacts**

**Aligica ‘3** (fellow at the Mercatus Center, George Mason University, and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute (Paul, 4/21. “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827)

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and **living standards**, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. **Any** serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority **is likely to fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions.** Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) is catastrophe-prone". At the minimum, "it would probably **require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments** or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be solved only in a continuing growth environment. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which **creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness** to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "**it is precisely this** position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters **which** most at its **advocates are trying to avoid**" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

**Permutation do the plan and [insert alt text]**

**The environment’s getting better because of innovation**

**Matthews** and Boltz, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation Internationanl, June **’12** (John and Frederick, “The Shifting Boundaries of Sustainability Science: Are We Doomed Yet?,” PLOS Biology, <http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001344>)

Humans have long caused irreparable harm to ecosystems, driven species to extinction, and have in turn endured major shifts in biogeochemical cycling. We agree that such incidents are avoidable and unacceptable and that the magnitude of current trends must not be dismissed. Humans have also developed ingenious and novel ways of making resource use far more efficient or exploiting new types of resources. Obvious developments here include the invention of agriculture and the domestication of wild plant and animal species, of course, but humans have also been innovative in energy development (wood, wind, coal, petroleum, hydropower, biofuels, geothermal, biogen, nuclear, solar, and wave power), the development of synthetic chemical fertilizers in the 19th century, and the discovery of modern antibiotics in the 20th century. Other innovations have been organizational, such as the development of cities in the Levant and east and south Asia, the birth of modern experimental science, and the transition from family-tribal-moeity structures to multiple scales of governance (including corporate, national, international, and global government structures and institutions). Some responses to economic and environmental change defy the longstanding predictions of overpopulation concerns, such as the widespread trend towards declining birthrates as living standards increase [32], though the relationship between per capita energy consumption and population growth is complex [33]. While Burger and colleagues point to increasing energy consumption over the past few centuries, they disregard important shifts in the sources of energy in progressive economies [1]; the expansion of low-carbon energy sources in China, Brazil, the European Union, and other regions in recent decades marks a critical transition, and a shift from coal-fired sources of power to hydropower or wind mark very significant transformations, with important implications for ecological footprints. For example, over 98% of Norway's electricity is derived from hydropower [34], about 20% of Brazil's transport fuels consumption is derived from renewable biofuels [35], while China has installed to date about 61 GW of windpower, or roughly three times the generation potential of the Three Gorges Dam [36]. The development of a global environmental movement is also notable in this context, as signified by both the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (attended by over 100 heads of state and 172 governments) as well as its planned 2012 successor conference, the Rio+20 Summit, in addition to important milestones achieved under the UN biodiversity and climate conventions (i.e., the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity [UNCBD] and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]). While these and other innovations in organization, efficiency, and technology have had unintended side effects, they also resulted in major transitions in human survivorship, resource extraction efficiency, and social and cultural organization. They were also largely unanticipated or very difficult to predict for most observers prior to their invention. Taken together, humans have demonstrated great creativity in how we use technological, social, and cultural “tools” to solve resource limitations. Not Doomed (Yet) Top Our “adjustments” to the view of sustainability science presented by Brown and colleagues [1] are not meant to obscure or downplay absolute declines in resources such as economically valuable metals and agriculturally productive land, our heedless approach to anticipated tipping points in greenhouse gas accumulation, and ecosystem transformation and species extinction. The availability of natural resources is less of a problem than absolute limits in the Earth's ability to absorb the different outputs of economic activities, while maintaining conditions necessary for human productivity, much less the survival of humans and other species. Anthropogenic climate change is perhaps the most prominent example of these new scarcities and emerging “limits to growth.” Indeed, we attribute great merit to these cautionary appeals and to the evidence of Earth system thresholds. We argue for positive responses in behavior, technological progress, and economic realignments commensurate with the challenge of fulfilling human needs while maintaining an Earth system suitable for the long-term survival of humans and other species. The authors ask, Can the Earth support even current levels of human resource use and waste production, let alone provide for projected population growth and economic development? They answer their question with little doubt: “There is increasing evidence that modern humans have already exceeded global limits on population and socioeconomic development, because essential resources are being consumed at unsustainable rates” [1]. We agree that our present consumptive trajectory risks surpassing perceived planetary boundaries in the safe operating space for humanity (c.f. [11]). We argue that these risks merit a paradigm shift, a global transformation—and that this paradigm shift is underway. We believe that the transition from relatively static approaches to sustainability to flexible green economies embedded in dynamic, variable ecosystems will prove to be a critical intellectual shift for humans this century.

**Markets key to peace**

**Gartzke ‘9** (The Capitalist Peace Erik Gartzke Columbia University 2009 Erik Gartzke is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University

The discovery that democracies seldom fight each other has led, quite reasonably, to the conclusion that democracy causes peace, at leastwithin the community of liberal polities. Explanations abound, but a consensus account of the dyadic democratic peace has been surprisingly slow to materialize. I offer a theory of liberal peace based on capitalism and common interstate interests. Economic development, **capital market integration**, and the compatibility of foreignpolicy preferences **supplant the effect of democracy in standard statistical tests of the democratic peace**. In fact, after controlling for regional heterogeneity, any one of these three variables is sufficient to account for effects previously attributed to regime type in standard samples of wars, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and fatal disputes.1 If war is a product of incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues when states lack differences worthy of costly conflict, or when circumstances favor successful diplomacy. Realists and others argue that state interests are inherently incompatible, but this need be so only if state interests are narrowly defined or when conquest promises tangible benefits. Peace can result from at least three attributes of mature capitalist economies. First, the historic **impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital**, factors that are more expediently enticed than conquered. Land does little to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through markets than by means of military occupation. At the same time, development actually increases the ability of states to project power when incompatible policy objectives exist. Development affects who states fight (and what they fight over) more than the overall frequency of warfare. Second, substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of **developed nations** in the post–WorldWar II period further **limits** **the scope and scale** of conflict**.** Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the rise of global **capital markets creates a new mechanism for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight.** Separately, these processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. **Together, they explain the absence of war among states in the developed world** and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace. The notion of a capitalist peace is hardly new. Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and others saw in market forces the power to end war. Unfortunately, war continued, leading many to view as overly optimistic classical conceptions of liberal peace. This study can be seen as part of an effort to reexamine capitalist peace theory, revising arguments in line with contemporary insights much as Kantian claims were reworked in response to evolving evidence of a democratic peace. Existing empirical research on the democratic peace, while addressing many possible alternatives, provides an incomplete and uneven treatment of liberal economic processes.Mostdemocraticpeace researchexamines trade in goods and services but ignores capital markets and offers only a cursory assessment of economic development (Maoz and Russett 1992). Several studies explore the impact of interests, though these have largely been dismissed by democratic peace advocates (Oneal and Russett 1999a; Russett and Oneal 2001). These omissions or oversights help to determine the democratic peace result and thus shape subsequent research, thinking, and policy on the subject of liberal peace. This study offers evidence that liberal economic processes do in fact lead to peace, even accounting for the well-documented role of liberal politics.

**Capitalism is inevitable and resilient---financial crises re-entrench the system**

**Mead, 9** – Senior Fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, Walter Russell, <http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2>)

And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the **U**nited **S**tates. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that **financial and economic crises do not**, by themselves, **threaten** either **the international capitalist system** or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way *sustain* Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones. Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and **especially relevant to the current meltdown.** Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. **T**reasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals.

#### Cap is key to space exploration and development

**Blundell ‘4**

[John, director general of the Institute of Economic Affairs, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed”, Feb 2, http://news.scotsman.com/marsexploration/Mission-to-Mars-must-go.2499794.jp]

Bush is not finding the billions himself. Rather the tab will be picked up by US taxpayers in perhaps 20 years’ time. **What arrests me is the** unchallenged **assumption that space exploration must be a nationalised industry**. The Soviet effort may be stalled but the Chinese seem committed to joining the race. The European Space Agency is a strange combination of nationalised bodies. NASA is a pure old-fashioned nationalised entity. I argue **we should relinquish the expectationthat space has to be limited to vast quangos.** The mindset we all share is an echo of the rivalry between the evaporated USSR and the still dynamic US. The first bleeps of the Sputnik galvanised the US into accelerating its space effort.   **What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law.** The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere.   With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, **none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites**. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? **These are business applications. Business is already in space.**   Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that **companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve**. Lift the veil of course and all those **satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market.**   What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations.   The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes.   From my reading the **best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant.** It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. **Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration.**   NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile.   **There are private space entrepreneurs already.** They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan **Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge private sector...**   "Some may say that commercialising portions of NASA’s functions is heresy. Others may think we are taking a path that will ruin the wonders of space. I believe that **when NASA can creatively partner, all of humankind will reap the benefits of access to open space".   Is it possible the Moon has a more noble future than merely a branch office of NASA? Is it tolerable that Mars could be a subsidiary of the USA? Could it be nominally a further state of the union? These are not silly questions. In time space will be defined by lawyers and accountants as property rights will need to be deliberated**.   One possibility may be that both environments are so hostile that Mars and the Moon will never be more than token pockets for humanity. On the evidence so far it is the orbiting satellites that have made us see the Earth through new eyes. **We can survey and explore the planet better from 200 miles up than stomping on the surface. The emerging commercial body of space law is derived from telecommunications law**.   It is perplexing and contrary to our immediate senses. How can you own or exchange something as intangible as digital messages bouncing off satellites? Yet we all pay our mobile phone bills.   **Many of the business results of space exploration are unintended consequences of NASA’s early adventures. Computer development would probably have been slower but for the need for instrumentation for Apollo**.   Are there prospects for Scottish firms in space? The prizes will not go to only the mega corporations. Perhaps Dobbies, the Edinburgh garden centre group, can create new roses by placing pots beyond gravity. Edinburgh University laboratories, or rather their **commercial spin offs, could patent new medicines**. Is it possible the genetic magicians at the Bush could hitch a ride into space and extend their discoveries?   NASA is a monopolist. All monopolies are bad for business. They only stunt opportunities. They blunt alternatives.   **By opening space to entrepreneurship we will be starting on what FA Hayek memorably describes as "a discovery procedure". Science is an open system. So is capitalism.**

#### Extinction

**Pelton ‘3**

[Joseph N. Pelton is director of the Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University and executive director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation “COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, Sept 12, http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html]

Actually **the lack of a space program could get us all killed**. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that **Homo sapiens as a species are** actually **endangered**. Surprising to some, **a well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival**. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow.  Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know **a quite largish meteor crashed into the earth, released poisonous** Iridium **chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time.  This could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program**. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. **Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other environmental dangers**. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. **The truth is we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced** Spaceguard **Program** **is** actually **a prudent course that could save our species in time.**

**1AR/A2s:**

**\*1AR – Alt Fails**

#### Alternative debate – your evidence is laughable – it defends the theoretical legitimacy of rejection, it doesn’t detail a spillover claim or a historical warrant for when rejection alone effaced capital – years of failed divestment projects, social movement, and social structures all disprove the efficacy of rejection

#### Conclusion of your article – don’t embrace abstractions, embrace real social change – it only takes place by redrawing the coordinates of political reality

**Herrod ‘4**

[your author, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm]

The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. **Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities** and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.  **These principles** however **must be embodied in** concrete social arrangements. In this sketch **they are embodied in** the following configuration of social forms: (a) autonomous, self-governing democratic Neighborhoods (through the practice of the Home Assembly); (b) self-managed Projects; (c) cooperatively operated Households; and (d) an Association, by means of treaties, of neighborhoods one with another. But how can this be achieved? Now we must turn to the task of fleshing out this strategy, but this time in concrete terms rather than abstractly.

**No mindset shift and no alt solvency**

Matthew Lockwood 11, previously Associate Director for Climate, Transport and Energy at the Institute for Public Policy Research, “The Limits to Environmentalism”, March 25, <http://politicalclimate.net/2011/03/25/the-limits-to-environmentalism-4/>

This brings us neatly finally to the third problem with PWG: politics. Jackson does have some discussion of the need for our old favourite “political will” towards the end of the book, and there are some examples of concrete ideas (e.g. shorter working week, ban advertising aimed at children), but there is basically no political strategy. Indeed, the argument is framed in terms of the need for “social and economic change” and “governance”, but not politics at all. The key question is how we are supposed to get from where we are to where he wants us to be. Jackson acknowledges that **at the moment, many people want growth (or more precisely, economic stability) and so demand it of politicians, who then have a political incentive to deliver it**. The quandary (not really acknowledged) is which strategy to adopt in this situation. Do you first reshape the economy to deliver economic stability without growth (e.g. by a shorter working week), which then demonstrates to people socially and politically that growth isn’t necessary for a good life, or do you first have to bring about major social change, moving people away from consumerism, as a precondition for transforming the economy and making the end of growth politically feasible? The discussion in chapter 11 of the book sort of implies that Jackson is thinking in terms of the latter route, but it actually has no strategy. He lays out (some quite conventional, even dare I say it, already proposed by economists) policies like carbon taxation and the aforementioned shorter working week but there is nothing on political narrative. The closest we get to a strategy for social transformation is banning advertising aimed at children (also a theme of Tom Crompton’s) and policies to drive greater durability of products. A counterview might be that all these changes are needed, and it doesn’t matter so much what happens first, that they all reinforce each other etc etc. But I don’t think that’s enough. The political party in the UK that comes closest to offering the Jackson vision is the Green Party. They got 1% of the popular vote in the 2010 general election, and one MP. **What stronger evidence can there be that the vision on its own is not enough?** A final point takes us back to equity (see previous post), but this time within rich countries. Certainly within the US and the UK, a large group of people in the low-to-middle part of the income distribution have seen their real incomes stagnate or fall over the last decade, as the rich have got richer. Telling this “squeezed middle” that economic growth is to end is not going to go down well unless there is a credible strategy for redistribution. That’s why a good initial step for a more sustainable economy might be a set of good old-fashioned social democratic policies on tax and spend. Prosperity without Growth raises some very important questions, and Tim Jackson shows how tight a squeeze we are in. But the book leaves some even more crucial questions hanging. Of course ending economic growth in rich countries would make a solution to ecological limits a bit easier, but **this would play only a small role**. In the absence of radical technological change, only serious “de-growth”, what Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows call “planned economic recession” would be sufficient to bring about the cut in emissions needed. With rapid growth in poor countries this conclusion is even stronger. So what we should be focusing on is achieving that technological change. Yes, it hasn’t materialised so far, but nor have the policies for low carbon innovation we need to produce it – like Gandhi’s Western civilisation, the low carbon revolution would be a good idea. And yes, getting those policies in place will require political effort. **But that effort will be as nothing compared with the political challenge of replacing capitalism with a new steady state system** either lacking innovation or with a disappearing working week. Perhaps the most fundamental, indeed philosophical issue here is that, despite the fact that Jackson has made a good effort to make an argument about limits into an argument about quality of life, his underlying message is (pace Obama): “No, we can’t”. But beyond the environmentalist camp, **this message will not work**. In the face of the biggest collective challenge that humanity has faced, we need a narrative that has the human potential to solve problems, and overcome apparently unbeatable odds, at its heart.

**Capitalism is resilient and no alternative solves – recent economic crisis proves**

**Freedman, ‘9**. Lawrence, Prof of war studies @ King’s College London. “A Subversive on the Hill,” The National Interest, May-June, Lexis.

And yet, even as we experience a crisis of liberal capitalism, so far the most striking feature of the economic meltdown is the lack of any deep ideological struggle within the advanced capitalist states. The crisis has opened up space for alternatives, but the obvious one—state socialism—was discredited by the Soviet experience. Even with the rebalancing of the relationship between the market and the state, and governments adopting measures that are frankly socialistic, there is no confidence in a socialist ideology; states are determined to get failing banks back into private hands as soon as possible. There are no alternative candidate ideologies with a potentially universal application. When times are hard, as can already be seen, populist, nationalist responses tend to come to the fore, and they can feed on xenophobia; problems are blamed on foreigners or fat cats. This can encourage protectionism, which is economic nationalism. But this is not a viable economic alternative because globalization, and its associated interdependence, is real. However much politicians may demand forms of economic self-reliance or energy independence, autarkic options are barely credible and are apt to backfire when attempted—which is not to say that the attempts won’t be made. Then, of course, there would be the possibility not of a clash of ideologies or even of nationalist economies but of civilizations, along the lines suggested by the late Samuel Huntington. These religion-based civilizations are compatible with a variety of economic and political forms. Potentially the most severe challenge would be posed by radical Islamism, though this has many different, and often contradictory, strands. In some states Islam provides the language of the privileged elite; in others it speaks for the disenfranchised and the marginalized. True, Islamism poses a challenge of sorts to the Western world, but it is of a quite-different nature to that posed by Nazism and Communism. This is not an ideology that has become harnessed to advanced industrial or technological strength, and it is unlikely to be so. Within the major powers, Islam is always going to be a minority identity, even if in many cases it is a growing minority. More so, extreme Islamists are only a minority of the minority. Partly because of their marginal position they turn their anger and violence against those of whom they disapprove, which can be a very broad category, but they have no economic program of which to speak. Where Islamists have had a chance to run countries they have not done very well. So, for all its extremist potential, Islamism will continue to pose security threats to Muslim and Western countries, but it lacks the positive capacity to become a viable competing model. Even China, the supposedly rising power, has wholeheartedly embraced the capitalist model, and the fact that a Communist party remains in charge results in ideological confusion, internal rigidity in the face of assertions of political rights and an absence of a broader appeal. If there were an alternative ideology that offered a compelling explanation for capitalism’s failures and a new way forward, the international position of the United States and its allies would be at risk. As there is not, America has an opportunity to reform capitalism, reassess the relationships between markets and the state, and reassert the strength and flexibility of liberal values and institutions at home while demonstrating caution about the extent to which they can be actively promoted abroad. Liberal capitalism is an elastic ideology. It can spring back because it can take on new forms while staying true to its core principles.

**\*1AR – Cap Inev**

**Their alt can’t overcome inevitability- only the perm solves- the alt gets absorbed into the system**

**Skonieczny ’10** (Interrupting Inevitability: Globalization and Resistance Amy Skonieczny\* Alternatives 35 (2010), 1–27 Prof at San Francisco State University, CA. E-mail: [askonie@sfsu.edu](mailto:askonie@sfsu.edu)

Critics of globalization, then, must **deride inevitability** arguments by pointing to the disruptions of alternative discourses. This has often taken the form of recognizing, identifying, and thinking through “contingency.”41 With a move to contingency, critics of teleological arguments emphasize the possibility of political action.42 For example, Gills represents this thinking when he states, “Globalization is not just an abstraction, but a felt experience by millions of individual people. It is for this reason that we believe that the logic of inevitabilism will not in the end prevail over the spirit of collective political resistance.”43 Thus contingency in the form of “collective political resistance” represents the negation of inevitability claims for this literature. However, this sets up a **dichotomous understanding** of globalization as either inevitable or contingent and **fails to engage the way** the tension of **contingency and inevitability functions** in the language, understanding, and practices (i.e., the shared discourse) of proponents and opponents alike. As the statements above indicate, there is a fundamental tension of inevitability and contingency within the discourse of globalization. It is understood and acted upon as if it were inevitable (“globalization is a fact, not a choice”), but nevertheless changeable (“you need to try and shape it”). While the dominant story of globalization insists that all anyone can do is adapt and adjust, it also suggests that the outcome is not predetermined—it is inevitable and contingent. By conceding (agentic) contingency yet claiming inevitability (or conceding aspects of inevitability but claiming contingency), proponents and opponents of globalization strengthen what has become a dominant discourse that is **increasingly successful at overcoming alternative visions** of the future. Analytically **pitting contingency against inevitability** as a way **to disrupt the discourse** that insists **that globalization is inevitable** **fails to address the complicated relationship between them** that is actually constitutive of this mainstream discourse of globalization. It is the **irresolvable tension** between contingency and inevitability that makes this discourse on globalization **powerful and pervasive and**, therefore, **dominant**. Because of this, searching out evidence of purposeful **action opposing globalization does not pose a significant challenge** to this dominant discourse of globalization; **contingency as purposeful action is already incorporated within the dominant discourse.** **Resistance is expected and readily absorbed.** Thus these **attempts at finding alternatives to a dominant discourse of globalization fail to address the function of inevitability** in collusion with contingency in propelling a dominant history of globalization. I claim that these two seemingly separate discourses instead form one logic of globalization—a logic of contingent inevitability that propels a dominant discourse and vision of globalization and enables it to subsume most criticism and opposition.

**\*1AR – Cap is Sustainable**

**Cap is sustainable-resources and shifts attitudes to conservation.**

Adler, Case Western law professor, 2008

(Jonathan, “Green Bridge to Nowhere”, The New Atlantis, Fall, <http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/green-bridge-to-nowhere>, ldg)

The first item on his agenda is the replacement of modern capitalism with some undefined “non-socialist” alternative. “The planet cannot sustain capitalism as we know it,” he warns, calling for a fundamental transformation. But he does not understand the system he wants to reform, let alone what he would substitute in its place. According to Speth, “most environmental deterioration is a result of systemic failures of capitalism.” This is an odd claim, as the least capitalist nations of the world also have the worst environmental records. The ecological costs of economic statism are far worse than those of economic liberty. The environmental record of the various Soviet regimes amply bears this out: The West’s ecological nightmares were the Soviet bloc’s environmental realities. This is not due to any anomaly of the Soviet system. Nations with greater commitment to capitalist institutions experience greater environmental performance. While Speth occasionally acknowledges pockets of environmental progress, he hardly stops to consider the reasons why some environmental resources have been conserved more effectively than others. Fisheries are certainly declining throughout much of the world—some 75 percent of fisheries are fully or over-exploited—but not everywhere. It is worth asking why. Tropical forests in less-developed nations are declining even as most temperate forests in industrialized nations are rebounding. Recognizing these different trends and identifying the key variables is essential to diagnosing the real causes of environmental deterioration and prescribing a treatment that will work. Speth acknowledges that much of the world is undergoing “dematerialization,” such that economic growth far outpaces increases in resource demand, but seems not to appreciate how the capitalist system he decries creates the incentives that drive this trend. Were it not for market-driven advances in technological capability and ecological efficiency, humanity’s footprint on the Earth would be far greater. While modern civilization has developed the means to effect massive ecological transformations, it has also found ways to produce wealth while leaving more of the natural world intact. Market competition generates substantial incentives to do more with less—thus in market economies we see long and continuing improvements in productive efficiency. This can be seen everywhere from the replacement of copper with fiber optics (made from silica, the chief component in sand) and the light-weighting of packaging to the explosion of agricultural productivity and improvements in energy efficiency. Less material is used and disposed of, reducing overall environmental impacts from productive activity. The key to such improvements is the same set of institutional arrangements that Speth so decries: property rights and voluntary exchange protected by the rule of law—that is, capitalism. As research by Wheaton College economist Seth Norton and many others has shown, societies in which property rights and economic freedoms are protected experience superior economic and environmental performance than those societies subject to greater government control. Indeed, such institutions have a greater effect on environmental performance than the other factors, such as population growth, that occupy the attention of Speth and so many other environmental thinkers. Speth complains that capitalism is fundamentally biased against the future; but the marketplace does a far better job of pricing and accounting for future interests than the political alternative. “Future generations cannot participate in capitalism’s markets [today],” says Speth. Fair enough, but they cannot vote or engage in the regulatory process either. Thus the relevant policy question is what set of institutions does the best—or least bad—job of accounting for such concerns, and here there is no contest. However present-oriented the marketplace may be, it is better able to look past the next election cycle than any plausibly democratic alternative.

**The system’s sustainable and the alt can’t solve**

**Kaletsky ’10** (Anatole, Masters in Economics from Harvard, Honour-Degree Graduate at King’s College and Cambrdige, editor-at-large of The Times of London, founding partner and chief economist of GaveKal Capital, He is on the governing board of the New York– based Institute for New Economic Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007– 2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics outside the orthodoxy of “efficient markets.” From 1976 to 1990, Kaletsky was New York bureau chief and Washington correspondent of the Financial Times and a business writer on The Economist,

The world did not end. Despite all the forebodings of disaster in the 2007– 09 financial crisis, the first decade of the twenty-first century passed rather uneventfully into the second. The riots, soup kitchens, and bankruptcies predicted by many of the world’s most respected economists did not materialize— and no one any longer expects the global capitalist system to collapse, whatever that emotive word might mean. Yet the capitalist system’s survival does not mean that the precrisis faith in the wisdom of financial markets and the efficiency of free enterprise will ever again be what it was before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. A return to decent economic growth and normal financial conditions is likely by the middle of 2010, but will this imply a return to business as usual for politicians, economists, and financiers? Although globalization will continue and many parts of the world will gradually regain their prosperity of the precrisis period, the traumatic effects of 2007– 09 will not be quickly forgotten. And the economic costs will linger for decades in the debts squeezing taxpayers and government budgets, the disrupted lives of the jobless, and the vanished dreams of homeowners and investors around the world. For what collapsed on September 15, 2008, was not just a bank or a financial system. What fell apart that day was an entire political philosophy and economic system, a way of thinking about and living in the world. The question now is what will replace the global capitalism that crumbled in the autumn of 2008. The central argument of this book is that global capitalism will be replaced by nothing other than global capitalism. The traumatic events of 2007– 09 will neither destroy nor diminish the fundamental human urgesthat have always powered the capitalist system— ambition, initiative, individualism, the competitive spirit. These natural human qualities will instead be redirected and reenergized to create a new version of capitalismthat will ultimately be even more successful and productive than the system it replaced. To explain this process of renewal, and identify some of the most important features of the reinvigorated capitalist system, is the ambition of this book. This transformation will take many years to complete, but some of its consequences can already be discerned. With the benefit of even a year’s hindsight, it is clear that these consequences will be different from the nihilistic predictions from both ends of the political spectrum at the height of the crisis. On the Left, anticapitalist ideologues seemed honestly to believe that a few weeks of financial chaos could bring about the disintegration of a politico-economic system that had survived two hundred years of revolutions, depressions, and world wars. On the Right, free-market zealots insisted that private enterprise would be destroyed by government interventions that were clearly necessary to save the system— and many continue to believe that the crisis could have been resolved much better if governments had simply allowed financial institutions to collapse. A balanced reassessment of the crisis must challenge both left-wing hysteria and right-wing hubris. Rather than blaming the meltdown of the global financial system on greedy bankers, incompetent regulators, gullible homeowners, or foolish Chinese bureaucrats, this book puts what happened into historical and ideological perspective. It reinterprets the crisis in the context of the economic reforms and geopolitical upheavals that have repeatedly transformed the nature of capitalism since the late eighteenth century, most recently in the Thatcher-Reagan revolution of 1979– 89. The central argument is that capitalism has never been a static system that follows a fixed set of rules, characterized by a permanent division of responsibilities between private enterprise and governments. Contrary to the teachings of modern economic theory, no immutable laws govern the behavior of a capitalist economy. Instead, capitalism is an adaptive social system that mutates and evolves in response to a changing environment. When capitalism is seriously threatened by a systemic crisis, a new version emerges that is better suited to the changing environment and replaces the previously dominant form. Once we recognize that capitalism is not a static set of institutions, but an evolutionary system that reinvents and reinvigorates itself through crises, we can see the events of 2007– 09 in another light: as the catalyst for the fourth systemic transformation of capitalism, comparable to the transformations triggered by the crises of the 1970s, the crises of the 1930s, and the Napoleonic Wars of 1803– 15. Hence the title of this book.

**Innovation and adaptation make growth sustainable---green tech investment solves warming and poverty**

**Harte and Harte 12** John, Professor of Ecosystem Sciences at the University of California, Berkeley and Mary Ellen, biologist and columnist who writes on climate change and population, “Alarmism Is Justified”, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5

The Limits to Growth predicted catastrophe: humanity would deplete natural resources and pollute itself to death. Its solution was less economic growth, more recycling, and organic farming. My essay documented how the book's predictions were wildly off, mainly because its authors ignored how innovation would help people overcome environmental challenges. Because the book's goal was so dramatic -- averting the end of the world -- its recommendation was for society to simultaneously do everything in its power to forestall that outcome. Today, much of the environmental movement continues to evince such alarmism and, consequently, is unable to prioritize. Developed countries focus as much on recycling, which achieves precious little at a high cost, as they do on attaining the much larger benefits from tackling air pollution, a massive, if declining, threat. Meanwhile, some environmentalists' demands are simply counterproductive. Avoiding pesticides, for example, means farming more land less efficiently, which leads to higher prices, more hunger, more disease (because of a lower intake of fruits and vegetables), and less biodiversity. My essay argued that although the The Limits to Growth's analysis has been proved wrong, much of its doomsaying and policy advice still pervades the environmental debate 40 years later. These four critiques, instead of refuting my argument, in fact vindicate it. First, only Dennis Meadows really tries to defend The Limits to Growth's predictions of collapse, and he does so with little conviction. Second, at least some of the responses accept in principle that society needs to prioritize among its different environmental goals and that economic growth will make achieving them easier -- in Frances Beinecke's words, "prosperity often leads to greater environmental protection." Third, all four of the critiques of my essay rely on the language of doom to motivate action, which, to the detriment of the environment, convinces society that it must pursue all its environmental goals at once, regardless of the costs and benefits. Finally, by focusing on the threats of economic growth to the environment, the authors generally neglect that growth has lifted billions of people out of grinding poverty and that others may remain poor because of the developed world's environmental concerns, real or imagined. WRONG AGAIN Defending The Limits to Growth, Meadows curiously complains that I address only the original book, which is "long out of print." He then posits that my case rests on one table from that book, on resource depletion, which he says I misrepresent. That is incorrect on several counts. First, it is patently false to claim, as Meadows does by way of a quotation from Matthew Simmons, that "nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000." (Jørgen Randers makes a similar point.) The Limits to Growth quoted approvingly the first annual report by the U.S. government's Council on Environmental Quality, in 1970: "It would appear at present that the quantities of platinum, gold, zinc and lead are not sufficient to meet demands. At the present rate of expansion … silver, tin and uranium may be in short supply even at higher prices by the turn of the century." Meadows' own table publicized "the number of years known global reserves will last at current global consumption," showing that gold, lead, mercury, silver, tin, and zinc would not last to the year 2000. The instances go on. According to the book's model, the main driver of the global system's so-called collapse would be the depletion of resources, and averting that outcome was the book's widely publicized rallying cry. So focusing on that aspect of the book can hardly be called a misrepresentation. What is more, claiming that this is my only critique ignores that I also showed how the book got pollution wrong and how its analysis of collapse simply did not follow. Meadows and Randers both claim that in their model, pollution consisted of long-lived toxics, not air pollution. In fact, they were much more vague on this question in 1972. In the best case for their predictions of deadly pollution, they meant air pollution, which today accounts for about 62 percent of all environmental deaths, according to the World Bank and the World Health Organization. But if they indeed meant long-lived toxics, their prediction that "pollution rises very rapidly, causing an immediate increase in the death rate" has been clearly disproven by the declining global death rate and the massive reductions in persistent pollutants. John Harte and Mary Ellen Harte put forth a similarly weak defense of The Limits to Growth, as they do not challenge my data. They quote an article by the ecologists Charles Hall and John Day to say that The Limits to Growth's results were "almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008." This is simply wrong when it comes to resource levels, as the data in my original article shows, and indeed the cited article contains not a single reference for its claims about oil and copper resource reductions. Harte and Harte further argue that the increase in the cost of resources during the last ten years is evidence of "the limitations on the human enterprise." Meadows claims that this uptick may "herald a permanent shift in the trend." Yet neither carries through the argument, because the empirical data from the past 150 years overwhelmingly undermine it. The reason is that a temporary increase in the scarcity of a resource causes its price to rise, which in turn encourages more exploration, substitution, and innovation across the entire chain of production, thereby negating any increase in scarcity. Harte and Harte demonstrate the unpleasant arrogance that accompanies the true faith, claiming that I "deny" knowledge, promote "scientific misconceptions," and display "scientific ignorance." They take particular issue with my assertion that DDT is a cheap solution to malaria, stating that I overlooked the issue of biological resistance. In fact, all malarial treatments face this problem, but DDT less so than the others. Whereas many malarial treatments, such as dieldrin, work only by killing insects, DDT also repels and irritates them. Dieldrin strongly selects for resistance, whereas DDT works in three ways and even repels 60 percent of DDT-resistant mosquitoes. FALSE ALARM All four critiques contain grand dollops of doom. Beinecke invokes "alarming" environmental problems from overfishing to the destruction of the rain forests and global warming. These are real issues, but they, too, deserve practical thinking and careful prioritization. Fish and rain forests, like other resources subject to political control, tend to be overused. By contrast, when resources are controlled by individuals and private groups, their owners are forced to weigh long-term sustainability. Indeed, Beinecke's response reflects the most unfortunate legacy of The Limits to Growth: because of its persistent belief that the planet is in crisis, the environmental movement suggests tackling all environmental problems at once. This is impossible, of course, so society ends up focusing mainly on what catches the public's attention. Beinecke acknowledges that campaigns to enact environmental policy "emerged from what people saw with their own eyes: raw sewage in the Great Lakes, smog so thick that it obscured the George Washington Bridge, oil despoiling Santa Barbara's pristine beaches." Yet the smog killed more than 300,000 Americans annually, whereas the effects of the oil spills, although serious, were of a much lower order of magnitude. She claims that the U.S. Clean Air Act somehow contradicts my argument, when I in fact emphasized that society should have focused much more on cleaner air. Today, roughly 135,000 Americans still die from outdoor air pollution each year, and two million people, mostly in the developing world, die from indoor air pollution. Instead of focusing on the many negligible environmental problems that catch the public's attention, as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency did when it focused so heavily on pesticides in the 1970s and 1980s, government should tackle the most important environmental problems, air quality chief among them. Beinecke misses this tradeoff entirely. Harte and Harte demonstrate a similar lack of proportion and priority. In response to my claim that a slightly larger portion of the world's arable land -- roughly five percent -- will need to be tapped in order to feed humanity, they offer an unsubstantiated fear that such an expansion would undermine "giant planetary ecosystems." Yet when they fret about pesticides, they seem impervious to the fact that eschewing them would require society to increase the acreage of land it farms by more than ten times that amount. COOL DOWN If The Limits to Growth erred in some of its quantitative projections, then perhaps, as Harte and Harte put it, its "qualitative insights [are] still valid today." Randers cites global warming as the new reason the book was right. Discussing his predictions for high carbon dioxide emissions, Randers writes, "This future is unpleasantly similar to the 'persistent pollution scenario' from The Limits to Growth." But the comparison is unfounded and leads to poor judgment. In The Limits to Growth's, original formulation, pollution led to civilizational decline and death. Although many environmentalists discuss global warming in similarly cataclysmic terms, the scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change project instead a gradually worsening drag on development. Standard analyses show a reduction of zero to five percent of global GDP by 2100, in a world where the average person in the developing world will be 23 times as rich as he or she is today. Moreover, although the responses to my essay invoke global warming as a new rallying cry for environmental activism, they fail to suggest specific actions to avert it. Harte and Harte claim that "the scientific community knows how to transition to renewable clean energy." Sure, developed countries have the technical know-how to adopt clean energy, but they have not done so because it would still be phenomenally expensive. Policies aimed at stopping climate change have failed for the last two decades because much of the environmental movement, clutching dearly to The Limits to Growth's alarmism and confident sense of purpose, has refused to weigh the costs and benefits and has demanded that countries immediately abandon all polluting sources of energy. Many economists, including the 27 climate economists involved in the 2009 Copenhagen Consensus on Climate conference, have pointed out smarter ways forward. The best means of tackling global warming would be to make substantial investments in green energy research and development, in order to find a way to produce clean energy at a lower cost than fossil fuels. As one of the leading advocates of this approach, I cannot comprehend how Harte and Harte could claim that I do not support clean-energy innovation. Unfortunately, the world will be hard-pressed to focus on smarter environmental policies until it has expunged the dreadful doom of The Limits to Growth. And unless the environmental movement can overcome its fear of economic growth, it will also too easily forget the plight of the billions of poor people who require, above all, **more and faster growth**.

**Advancements from strong economic growth prove societal sustainability will overcome obstacles—including agriculture, energy, medicine, and cognition**

Kelly, Cambridge engineering professor, 2013

(Michael, “Why a collapse of global civilization will be avoided: a comment on Ehrlich & Ehrlich”, July, <http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/280/1767/20131193.short#corresp-1>, ldg)

The population explosion (and its Malthusian societal disruptions) that Ehrlich FRS predicted for the 1990s has not come about [5,6], and the concerns in this present Ehrlich paper are not tempered by the mounting evidence of the demographic transition that occurs when the majority of people live in cities and have access to education. In Japan, Europe and North America the population, excluding immigration, is in decline. Some studies indicate that a peak of 9 billion people in 2050 will be followed by a decline to a population of approximately 6 billion in 2100—less than that in 2000 [7] and bringing new problems of unwanted infrastructure assets! The UN is revising its future population estimates downward [8]. If we look at the waste in the contemporary food chain, at the point of growth, in transit to the market and into the homes of consumers, and compound that loss by the amount of food thrown out rather than consumed, **we generate the quantity of food to feed the 9 billion today with the systems in place if we were less wasteful** and could distribute it [9]. Animal protein is now being generated in the laboratory and not on the farm [10]. Where is the discussion of the impact of mega-cities being self-sufficient in animal protein from factories within their city boundaries 40 years from now? This is the time scale on which synthetic fibre comprehensively displaced wool from most of its markets. Indeed, rather than speak of peak oil, we can speak of peak farmland—we will need smaller areas in future to feed the world, and we will oversee the managed return of excess land to the wild [11]. The starkest example in the consideration of material overconsumption is the smart phone [12]. This was developed within the paradigm of business as usual to improve the way in which we communicate. Two points are relevant. First, the small piece of metal, plastic and semiconductor that fits in the palm of a hand contains the functions of a camera, radio, telephone, answering machine, photo album, dictaphone, music centre, satellite navigation system, video camera and player, compass, stop-watch, Filofax, diary and more, which were all separate and bulky items only 20 years ago. **This represents the great dematerialization of modern civilization, well ahead of any imminent collapse of natural resources**. The shape of high streets and retail centres are changing to reflect this evolution. Indeed, the recycling of electronic systems will enhance further this capability of doing more with less material, and the market for extended time between recharging has driven extraordinary improvements in energy efficiency. It is these new low-resource technologies with ever-increasing recycled materials that will drive the world in future. Second, the mobile phone is being used in rural Africa and India to inform farmers of optimal times for taking their products to market, thus reducing greatly the loss of product and/or income, and reducing the stress on land from the need to overproduce to compensate for such losses [13]. Peak planet is now the new research topic [14]. Any perceived threat to the security of the energy supply from finite resources over the last 200 years has been met by a deeper search for reserves. Hansen et al. [15], and especially their fig. 6, show just how little (approx. 10%) of the known and accessible fossil fuel reserves (both conventional and unconventional) has been consumed, and we have had 40 years of future energy reserves to hand for some time [16]. We have not stopped looking for more, as with the recent discoveries of huge fields of methyl hydrates. In future, when we leave the fossil fuel age, it will not be because of the exhaustion of fossil fuels, **but because a cheaper, cleaner and more convenient alternative technology emerges, and we have ample time, probably 100 years, to get there.** Modern climate scientists seem to be fixated on human-produced CO2, and have missed what the Sun [17] and the biosphere [18] have been doing for the last 30 years. If the history of solar behaviour repeats itself and we were to enter another little ice age, every ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere would be a boon as we feed 9 billion people in 2050 compared with the less than 1 billion last time in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. The transition out of the Medieval Warm Period into the Little Ice Age harmed but did not collapse global civilization, and we are much better prepared this time. The growing amplitude of the Keeling cycles of CO2 in the atmosphere is evidence of the greening of the biosphere [18]. The present temperature stasis since 1998, if extended by another 5 years, as now suggested [19] at a time of ever-increasing CO2 emissions, implies that both the coupling between CO2 and globally averaged surface temperatures has been exaggerated in the climate models and natural variability has been underestimated. Indeed, Otto et al. [20] have just revised down their estimate of climate sensitivity to atmospheric CO2 to a value that is now half that cited in earlier IPCC reports. Akasofu's [21] projection of the future temperature, made originally in 2000, and based on extending previous climatic cycles without explicit reference to CO2, has been borne out very precisely, and it is more accurate than all the climate model projections put together—furthermore, he makes a projection of lower temperatures until 2030! An over-emphasis on the urgency of mitigation has had a direct societal consequence in the Gadarene rush to reduce fossil fuel consumption. We do have more time to develop proper alternatives to fossil fuels. The current bankruptcies of alternative energy companies are inevitable: their present technology is both immature and uncompetitive. It is an exact repeat of what happened in California in the 1980s in response to the 1970s oil crisis and for the same reasons: without massive subsidy the energy generated did not produce the profits needed to keep up maintenance. (Graphic images of green industrial dereliction can be seen by googling the phrases ‘abandoned solar farms’ and/or ‘abandoned wind farms’.) Two hundred years ago, windmills stopped turning with the advent of steam engines, which were more efficient, needed less maintenance, and provided energy when and where needed. Little has changed in relative terms since! Trends in solar photovoltaics suggest that in 20 years the technology could become absolutely competitive with fossil fuels [22] unless the price of the latter collapses from current high prices just as they did after the 1970s peak. Whatever happens, the total energy from practical and economic solar systems will play a small part in meeting the global energy demand for the foreseeable future: renewable energy sources are intrinsically dilute at source [23]. Energy storage at the large scale is way into the future, except for water for hydroelectricity, as in New Zealand and Norway. Pushing water uphill with alternative energies is woefully inefficient. Communications, new materials and health systems all present humanity with clear opportunities to avoid future problems with tools not available to earlier generations. The Internet, and its implication of all information available everywhere, instantaneously for everyone, will ensure that technical, medical and societal advances will proceed and propagate very rapidly. An advance in one corner of the world will almost instantaneously be accessible and adaptable anywhere. Human travel will change from becoming a necessity to an option, freeing up time, reducing emissions and enhancing business between continents [24]. New ‘designer’ materials and three-dimensional printing technology for manufacture are likely to massively reduce our reliance on depleting natural resources, providing for a far more adaptive approach to materials in applications. The incredible waste we currently produce is likely to reduce very significantly, making for greater resilience against resource depletion [25]. Ehrlich & Ehrlich [1] are concerned about future pandemics in a closely interconnected world. However, advances in medicine and diagnostics will result in significant economic gains in terms of treatment efficacy, in days lost from the workplace and in the ability of mankind to respond to a future pandemic. The recent response to the H5Nn series of bird flu viruses is very encouraging, and the strategies have existed for some time [26]. We can be a much more resilient race in future than we could be in the past. Similarly, with the advances in understanding the brain and President Obama's recent commitment to mapping the brain, we will enhance our cognitive and processing capability so as to further our ingenuity and resilience in response to future threats. **The mainstream scientific and engineering community can see nothing that suggests an imminent collapse of civilization, and it is well on track to deal with new problems as they emerge, in continuity with the history of the last 200 years**. Neo-Malthusians have proved comprehensively wrong so far, and this comment argues that this is set to continue into the foreseeable future. This comment is not denying challenges, but is really questioning defeatism. Weigh the evidence. **Finally, it is only civilizations backed by strong economies that are in a position to do the research and make the necessary scientific, engineering and technological advances to offset environmental threats.** Scientific views that undermine economic progress are a threat in themselves, and need a careful and robust justification before they are widely propagated.

**Cap sustainable – no resource scarcity**

**Taylor 2** [Jerry, Cato Natural Resource Studies Director, “Sustainable Development: A Dubious Solution in Search of a Problem,” August 26, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa449.pdf>]

If resources are growing more abundant while the concentration of pollutants in air sheds and watersheds continues to decline, how can we explain the proliferation of various stylized sustainability indices that point to a deterioration of the planet’s resource base? There are five common weaknesses with such reports. First, they are almost always built upon a selective but fundamentally arbitrary or irrelevant set of indicators. Second, they are often built not upon actual resource data but upon hypotheses or theories about resource health that do not comport with the data or that rest upon highly suspect data fundamentally inconsistent with the larger data sets available to analysts. Third, they ignore the well-documented propensity of capitalist societies to create and invent new resources when old resources become relatively more scarce (that is, they assume that resources are fixed and finite when they are not). Fourth, they are highly aggregated and often subjective calculations of data sets that lack common denominators. Finally, they are frequently heavily biased by ideological assumptions about politics and government action. Accordingly, they provide little help to policy analysts or political leaders.

**1AR – Epistemology Not First**

**Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge**

**Friedrichs, Oxford politics lecturer, 2009**

(Jorg, “From positivist pretense to pragmatic practice: Varieties of pragmatic methodology in IR scholarship. International Studies Review 11(3): 645–648)

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with **pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate**. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, **the way knowledge is generated** according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. **Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin**

**1AR – Transition Wars**

**U.S. transition from cap sparks nuke war**

**Nyquist 5** J.R. renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, WorldNetDaily contributing editor, “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash,” February 4, www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of anti-capitalist majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the **U**nited **S**tates from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs. But we cannot do this. As one observer recently lamented, “We drank the poison and now we must die.”

**A2: Cap Kills Environment**

**No impact-cap can’t destroy the environment to extinction**

**Schweickart, Loyola philosophy professor, 2009**

(David, “Is Sustainable Capitalism an Oxymoron?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 8.2-3)

Anti-capitalist ecologists always say this. In Kovel’s (2007) words, “capital must expand without end in order to exist (p. 38).” But is this true? It would seem not to be. Individual small businesses sometimes survive for long periods of time. Marx ’s prediction that the “petty bourgeois” sector would disappear has turned out not to be true. (Th e tendency toward monopoly/oligopoly, which he correctly identifi ed, has been off set by the continual rise of new entrepreneurial businesses.) Capitalism itself has survived prolonged depressions—the Great One of 1929 lasted a decade. Periods of stagnation have been even more common—witness Japan throughout the 1990s. To be sure, capitalism incentivizes growth, but it is not at all clear that thwarted growth leads to death. We can point to lots of counterexamples. It is not true either that the various ecological crises we are facing will bring about “the end of the world.”4 Consider the recently-released Stern Review , commissioned by the British government, which has been applauded by environmentalists for its strong recommendation that urgent action be taken. If nothing is done, we risk “major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depression of the fi rst half of the 20th century.”5 Th is is serious. Some sixty million people died in World War Two. Th e Stern Review estimates as many as two hundred million people could be permanently displaced by rising sea level and drought. But this is not “the end of the world.” Even if the effects are far worse, resulting in billions of deaths, there would still be lots of us left. If three-quarters of the present population perished, that would still leave us with 1.6 billion people—the population of the planet in 1900. I say this not to minimize the potentially horrifi c impact of relentless environmental destruction, but to caution against exaggeration. We are not talking about thermonuclear war—which could have extinguished us as a species. (It still might.) And we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that millions of people on the planet right now, caught up in savage civil wars or living beneath those US bombers currently devastating Iraq , are faced with conditions more terrible than anyone reading this article is likely to face in his or her lifetime due to environmental degradation.6 Nor will readers suff er more than most of the three billion people alive now who survive on less than $2/day.

**All environmental factors getting better**

**Lomberg 10**—Ph.D in pol science (4/21, Bjorn Earth Day: Smile, don't shudder; Ignore doomsday environmentalists. Things aren't so bad. And if rich countries would worry about the right things, all the better, USA Today, LexisNexis)

Given all the talk of impending catastrophe, this may come as a surprise, but as we approach the 40th anniversary of the first Earth Day, people who care about the environment actually have a lot to celebrate. Of course, that's not how the organizers of Earth Day 2010 see it. In their view (to quote a recent online call to arms), "The world is in greater peril than ever." But consider this: In virtually every developed country, the air is more breathable and the water is more drinkable than it was in 1970. In most of the First World, deforestation has turned to reforestation. Moreover, the percentage of malnutrition has been reduced, and ever-more people have access to clean water and sanitation. Apocalyptic predictions from concerned environmental activists are nothing new. Until about 10 years ago, I took it for granted that these predictions were sound. Like many of us, I believed that the world was in a terrible state that was only getting worse with each passing day. My thinking changed only when, as a university lecturer, I set out with my students to disprove what I regarded at the time as the far-fetched notion that global environmental conditions were actually improving. To our surprise, the data showed us that many key environmental measures were indeed getting better. ,

Capitalism checks global conflict and nuclear war with China - avoids the imperial downfalls of “democratic peace” theory

**Erich** Weede, 10. **Professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany, “the capitalist peace and the rise of china”, april, international interactions, online**

Historically, the rise and fall of great powers has been related to great wars. Both world wars of the twentieth century would not have been possible without the previous industrialization and rise of Germany. World War II, which in Asia was a war between the Japanese on the one hand and the Western powers and China on the other hand, would not have been con­ceivable without the previous rise of Japan. The early phase of the Vietnam War has to be understood against the background of a declining France. If the rise and fall of great powers indicate great dangers, then one should question whether the world can peacefully accommodate a rising China. Here it is argued that the **capitalist peace offers the best way to manage the coming power transition between China and the West**.1 China is rising. In the thirty years after Deng Xiaoping began economic reforms the Chinese economy grew nearly by a factor of ten. Recently, the West suffered from negative growth rates whereas China grows by about 8 percent a year. **The difference in growth rates between China and the West has been about 10 percent. A power transition of such speed is with­out historical precedent**. Given its size China is a "natural" great power— unlike Britain, France, or Germany. Even the combined population of the United States and the European Union does not approach the population size of China. If China outgrows poverty, then it must become a world power. Although war in the nuclear age threatens to be much worse than any previous world war, fear of nuclear war itself might exert some pacifying impact. Such **fear**, however, **need not be our only protection against future wars**. **Economic interdependence** itself **makes war less likely**. One finding of quantitative research is that **military conflict becomes less likely if a pair of nations**—say China and the United States, or China and India, or China and Japan—**trade a lot with each other** (Hegre 2009; Oneal and Russett 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). Fortunately, all of them do. One may label this effect "peace by free trade". Foreign investment has some beneficial impact, too (Souva and Prins 2006). Moreover, **economic freedom reduces involvement in military conflict, and financial market openness reduces the risk of war**, too (Gartzke 2005, 2007, 2009). Quantitative research **has dem­onstrated that there is something like a capitalist peace.** Until a few years ago it looked as if the democratic peace were solid and robust whereas the capitalist peace between free traders was less so. Now, however, the democratic peace looks more conditional: It is not only restricted to relations between democracies, but might also be restricted to developed or market democracies (Mousseau 2005, 2009). It has been doubted whether it applies to the poorest democracies. Moreover, the less mature or perfect the democracies are, the weaker the democratic peace is. By contrast, **peace by free trade or economic freedom looks more robust**. Pacifying effects are not restricted to relationships between free traders on both sides of a dispute (Russett 2009:19). Moreover, the trade to GDP ratio is no longer the only or even the best way to document the pacifying effects of economic freedom or the invisible hand. By applying innovative mea­sures of free markets, such as avoidance of too much public property own­ership and protectionism, one may argue in favor of much more robustly pacifying effects of economic freedom than of political freedom (McDonald 2009). The occurrence of World War I is the standard argument against peace by trade or economic interdependence because there was substantial eco­nomic interdependence between the Western powers and the Central European powers. Certainly, World War I serves as a useful reminder that commerce makes war less likely without making it impossible. But World War I is not as much of a problem for capitalist peace theory as frequently assumed. Moreover, there was no democratic contribution to pacification because the Central European powers were, at best, imperfect democracies. By contemporary standards, even the democratic character of the United Kingdom was not beyond suspicion because of franchise limitations. As far as trade linkages were concerned they were strongest where least needed— between Britain and France, between Britain and the United States, between Germany and Austria-Hungary. These pairs ended up on the same side in the war. Whereas strong trade links between Germany on the one hand and Britain or Russia on the other hand did not prevent them from fighting each other, Germany and France exemplify weak trade ties where strong ties were needed most in order to avoid hostilities (Russett and Oneal 2001.175). Skeptics rightly observe that increasing trade did not prevent World War I, but they overlook that trade volumes rose not because of free trade policies, but in spite of mounting protectionism. Trade increased because of falling transportation costs, but in spite of protectionist policies. Finally, capitalist or commercial peace theory is an admittedly incomplete theory. It says only how risks of war may be reduced but it says nothing about what generates them in the first place. But commercial peace theory is certainly compatible with World War II, which was even bloodier than the previous world war as well as with the later reconciliation between the former Axis powers and the West. There was little trade between the Western powers and the Axis powers. Since the Axis powers were not democracies, the democratic peace could also not apply between the Axis and the West. The different long-term effects of the settlements of both world wars may be explained by differences in application of a capitalist peace strategy toward the losers of the wars. After World War I France influenced the set­tlement more than anyone else. It did not even think of a commercial peace strategy. Misery and desperation within Germany contributed to Hitler's empowerment and indirectly to World War II. After World War II, the United States, however, pursued a capitalist peace strategy toward the vanquished. It promoted global free trade and subsidized even the recovery of the losers of the war. Germany and Japan became prosperous and allies of the United States. By and large, there is a lot of agreement within the research commu­nity that democracies rarely fight each other. If all major countries, including China, were ever to become democracies, then the risk of major power war or global war could be dramatically reduced. But the risk of conflict and war seems to be highest between democracies and autocracies rather than between two autocracies. That is why the U.S.-China dyad looks at risk. Moreover, there remain some doubts concerning the effectiveness of the democratic peace where nascent, or poor or not yet "contract intensive," or unstable democracies are concerned. Since China is still poor, since China cannot avoid a period of transition, if it ever becomes a democracy, a dem­ocratic peace between China and other major powers looks more like a distant hope than like a pacifier that might become available in the near future when the Chinese economy might equal the American one in size, albeit not yet in per capita income. Although few people in China expect a fast transition to democracy in the near future, the prospect for democracy in China is not hopeless. There is experimentation with elections at the local level. China is moving slowly toward the rule of law. Individual freedom has expanded. The press has become commercialized and investigative. For the sake of continuing eco­nomic growth and the achievement of a power status comparable to the United States, China has to become a knowledge society. The knowledge society requires liberalization. Those who criticize China for not moving faster toward democracy should remember some lessons from Western history. The sequence of establishing national identity, the rule of law, representative or accountable government, and mass franchise seems to matter. Establishing national identity first, the rule of law and accountable government second, and the mass franchise last is the best sequence to avoid political instability. China might need some time to institutionalize the rule of law and to move toward accountable government before it is ready for mass elections. **Economic cooperation and interdependence provide much more hope for the immediate future** than democratization. **The more countries trade with each other, the less likely military disputes between them become**. Given the size of both economies and the distance between America and China, they already trade a lot with each other. As China is the first Asian giant to become capable of challenging the U.S., these pacifying ties hap­pen to be in place where they are most needed. From a capitalist peace per­spective there is another piece of good news. Although trade between India and China had been negligible for a long time, since 1999 it has grown. By 2009, China had become India's biggest trading partner. **Economic interde­pendence** or trade **may exert some pacifying impact on the relationship between Asia's neighboring giants**. Comparing the war-proneness of the Middle East with the avoidance of major military conflicts in the Far East over the past three decades, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the East Asian focus on economic openness and interdependence, on commerce, exports and growth did contribute to the pacification of East Asia. The qualifications which might be required to the peace by trade prop­osition do not negate these optimistic conclusions. Possibly, it is not trade but cross-border investment, capital market integration or even a commit­ment to economic freedom that pacifies most effectively. Or, it might even be the contract-intensity of economies (Mousseau 2009). Should future research confirm a shift of focus away from trade to other aspects of eco­nomic interdependence as the main pacifier, then optimism about Sino-American relations might still be based on some kind of capitalist peace. By contrast to Chinese hesitation to democratize, the seriousness of China's commitment to global economic integration deserves admiration. China is extremely open for such a big economy. Its share of world trade increased eightfold within 25 years after its economic reforms. From an international trade perspective, all of East Asia has recently become a Chinese sphere of influence. China is the most important destina­tion of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese exports—ahead of the United States. Although Taiwanese politicians around the turn of the millen­nium rejected the idea of reunification on the Mainland's terms, and although some of them were attracted to the idea of declaring the legal independence of Taiwan, economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait grew vigorously at the same time. Taiwanese companies employ millions of people on the mainland. About a million people from Taiwan live on the Chinese mainland. Mainland China has been the preferred destination of Taiwan's foreign investment. **Since the** lateral **escalation of a military conflict between** the People's Republic of **China and Taiwan constitutes the most plausible scenario where**by **the U.S. and China might get into a war, economic interdependence** between China and Taiwan **contributes to the preservation of peace**. Recently, political relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan have improved fast. Given the record of Sino-Japanese wars in the past and the power of these neighboring states, the extent of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation pro­vides another reason for optimism. The capitalist peace stands a chance to apply between China and its neighbors and competitors. On the one hand, one may argue that the U.S. current account deficit and the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China served the purpose of stabiliz­ing China and integrating it into a U.S. dominated world order. Then, the economic relationship between the U.S. and China already served the national interests of both countries, at least until 2008. On the other hand, it has been argued that the global imbalance between Asian capital exports and American capital imports contributed to the crisis (Wolf 2009:100). Then the interdependence between China and the West explains not only how the Chinese economy can be affected by a crisis which began in the American housing market and banking system. The same interdependence, or more specifically, a division of labor, where China exports goods in return for American treasury bonds and where Americans consume too much, might be one of the determinants of the crisis. But this conceivable link between Chinese or Asian savings, American capital imports, and the current crisis is by no means generally accepted. The Fed and its monetary policy might be the main culprit. Had it followed the "Taylor rule" in setting interest rates in response to growth and inflation rates, then there would have been higher interest rates between 2002 and 2007, much less of a housing boom in the U.S., and at worst a minor recession instead of the descent into the depression from which the world has suffered (Taylor 2009). Or, the promotion of home ownership for everyone—without regard of credit worthiness—should have been avoided (Sowell 2009). It is important to note that the capitalist peace is a less dangerous idea than the democratic peace. As the example of the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate, **the idea of a democratic peace has been married to a** crusading spirit **in the recent past** (Russett 2005). Moreover it was combined with an utter disregard of the meager prospects of success in bringing democracy to poor or oil-exporting societies with a long heritage of autocracy (Weede 2007). Legitimating current wars by hopes for regime change and future pacific benefits is dangerous. By contrast, **the capitalist peace depends on decisions by private business.** As the Sino-American dyad or even the PRC-Taiwan dyad demonstrate, **strong and growing economic ties need not wait for regime similarity, democratization, or a lot of political agreement with each other**. China's positive response to the opportunity of exploiting its comparative advantages within a global market, as well as its lack of readiness to reform its regime according to Western preferences, demonstrate that **a capitalist peace between China and the West is feasible,** whereas a democratic peace is not for a considerable time to come. There are two reasons why the capitalist peace is more important than the democratic peace. First, **the balance of empirical evidence has been shifting** from supporting pacifying effects of democracy **toward supporting pacifying effects of commerce and economic freedom, of trade and capitalism**. Whereas early research investigated only pacifying effects of trade, more recent work also looks at capital market integration, protectionism, state ownership or economic freedom. It is too early to say which specific feature of market economies is most effective in underwriting peace. But **one may dare to say that free markets promote peace.** Second, the democratic peace—where its existence has rarely been called into question, i.e., among mature and prosperous market-oriented democracies themselves—is an effect of commerce and capitalism. **Without** capitalism and free trade, with­out **economic development** and prosperity, **democracy is unlikely to be established and to survive** (Inglehart and Welzel 2009; Lipset 1994). In this perspective, the democratic peace is little more than a component of the capitalist peace. The promotion of peace by peaceful means is obviously preferable to the promotion of peace by war. The shining example of capitalist prosperity in the West, together with the demonstration by the early East Asian tiger economies that the West permits poor countries to catch up, sufficed to elicit home-grown reforms in China and elsewhere in Asia which improved the material conditions of life of hundreds of millions of people. There is an important difference between the promotion of peace by capitalism and commerce and its promotion by democratization. **If one wants to enforce democratization by military means, then one may run into severe problems of implementation**, as the United States has found out in Afghanistan and Iraq. **The capitalist peace requires nothing more than the virtue of patience. It relies on limited government, whereas war easily expands the scope of government**. Globalization promises to enlarge the market and therefore to increase the division of labor and to speed productivity gains and economic growth. **By promoting economic freedom, trade, and prosperity, we simul­taneously promote peace.** For the capitalist peace to apply, there are two requirements. First, **cap­italist peace theory has to be valid**. In spite of some open issues, **the** research literature **justifies some optimism in this regard.** Second, global capitalism has to demonstrate good health and vitality. Since the financial and economic crisis of 2008, it is difficult to be optimistic in this regard. Open markets in rich countries for exports from poor countries generate credibility for free market institutions and policies. They complement export-oriented growth strategies in poor countries. Foreign direct invest­ment by private enterprises and donations from private Western sources to poor countries are more likely to have a positive effect on the growth path of poor countries than official aid does. The more capitalist the rich countries become, the more they provide a model for emulation by poor countries as well as a market and a source of technology and investment for them. **By resisting protectionism Western nations may** simultaneously **strengthen their own economies, improve the lot of the poor in the third world, and contrib­ute to the avoidance of conflict and war**. In a period of financial distress or during a global economic crisis, **resistance to protectionism and other attempts to roll back capitalism are the most important tasks for those who prefer prosperity and peace over poverty and war.** In the first five months of 2009 global trade did decrease by as much as 30 percent. Globalization seems to be in retreat. When discussing the stimu­lus package, the American Congress had to be persuaded to include only a watered down "buy American" clause. It is still dubious whether the Obama administration is ready to lead the global fight against protectionism. During the depression of the 1930s the fight against protectionism was lost at the beginning when Smoot and Hawley succeeded in 1930 to raise American tariffs. Although the rise of Asia's demographic giants, China and India, makes a capitalist peace more urgent than ever, politicians do not fight hard enough for the Doha Round and global free trade.

**No environment impact-ecosystems aren’t that connected.**

**Ridder, Tasmania Environmental Studies PhD, 2008**

(Ben, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation” Biodiversity and conservation, 17.4, proquest)

Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This ‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity. An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to fi replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1982, pp. 95–96). This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 in his response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101). The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence. **That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction**. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation: Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192) Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001). The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasizing the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence. The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors. The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity.

**Capitalism is being transformed by new clean tech- this avoids their impacts**

**Chichilnisky ’10** (Professor Graciela Chichilnisky was the architect of the Carbon Market, and lead author on the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change which won the 2007 Nobel Prize. She is UNESCO professor of mathematics and economics, director of Columbia Consortium for Risk Management and professor of economics statistics at Columbia University, NY, 10 (“will 20th century capitalism go green?”, The Ecologist, 9/21/10,

Capitalism is transforming itself. Having caused the worst environmental excesses of the 20th century – overconsumption of fossil fuels and forests in rich nations and the attendant denuding of poor nations’ resources needed for survival– capitalism is now changing its stripes.   New global scarcities have emerged, and with them new limits on the use of critical natural resources such as air, water and energy that are key to human survival. The limits on resources are in turn creating new markets. These new markets – for clean air, water, fossil and **clean fuels - are transforming capitalism**. An example is the US Clean Air Act, which put limits on the emission of sulphur dioxide by power plants, from which emerged a market that trades rights to emit SO2 at the Chicago Board of Trade. The SO2 market successfully and quickly eradicated acid rain in the US. At the global level a similar market mechanism emerged in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol laid limits on carbon emissions by rich nations. From these limits a carbon market was created that became international law in 2005, is now trading $165 billion/year at the EU Emissions Trading System, and is expected to become the largest commodity market in the world. The carbon market privatises the atmosphere of the planet, but favours the poor nations who have more rights to emit; as a result $50 billion has so far been transferred from rich to poor nations for productive projects that have allowed their economies to reduce carbon and leapfrog into clean development strategies, avoiding the heavy industrialization followed by rich nations. The USA being left behind The transformation is causing a clash between the old and the new. There is a heated political debate about whether to continue the Kyoto carbon limits after 2012. The nation that led capitalism during the last century is the most resistant to change: the US is the only advanced nation that has accepted no limits on carbon emissions, and the largest emitter among them. Last week the US steelworkers union sued the Chinese government at the World Trade Organisation, for offering favorable credit and subsidizing land used for its clean technology industry, and President Obama plans to follow suit at the national level. In contrast, China is an enthusiastic supporter of the Kyoto Protocol and has become the leading exporter of clean energy equipment, having created one million jobs in clean energy manufacturing. The US is the single advanced nation that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol and does not trade in its carbon market. It desperately needs to create jobs as it has 9.6 per cent unemployment, the highest unemployment since the Great Depression - a major challenge to the Democratic administration in the November 2010 elections. One million jobs would be very valuable in the US right now, whilst 14.6 million people are unemployed and 170,000 families are living in homeless shelters. The US has every reason to emulate China. But instead of investing in clean tech jobs, the US invested hundreds of billions of taxpayers funds in the past three years to provide credit and bail out venerable old financial institutions - the heroes of last century’s capitalism - who have created the US’s main exports, financial services and products. These are the same financial institutions that caused the worst financial crisis of our times. China, India and Brazil go renewable As the OECD nations slowly emerge from the worst financial crisis in 80 years, a completely different transformation is taking place in the rich nations and in the less industrialised world. Less industrialised nations for the first time lead world economic growth. China received tens of billions from the Kyoto Protocol Clean Developing Mechanism for clean energy infrastructure, and is emerging as the world’s leading exporter in clean energy equipment – exporting wind turbines and solar energy equipment to Europe and the US. India is quickly growing its clean technology industry based on its engineering capabilities, and is the largest exporter of software in the world, topping $60 billion per year in exports from Bangalore. Brazil and other large developing nations are quickly stepping up to the challenge using the Clean Development Mechanism and leapfrogging over heavy industrialisation to a clean future while they combat their citizens’ hunger and deprivation. Among advanced nations, the US is alone in resisting change and denying the need for carbon limits. US Senators face more acceptance from the power plant industry for creating a US carbon market than they do from their constituents at home, who will vote in the November 2010 elections and will decide the nations’ political future for the next few years. The US public still regards clean technology as a cost and not a profit, asking how much the transformation will ‘cost’. Instead, the Chinese, the Indians, and the Brazilians see investment in clean tech as an opportunity for profits and growth. US reaction to China’s export leadership is to sue the Chinese, rather than to compete and take over the reins in an area where, due to its own technological prowess, the US should be a natural leader. Economics of restraint and preservation But the world is moving on. Markets for biodiversity and for watersheds and forests will emerge in the near future. The United Nations, which created the carbon market as part of the Kyoto Protocol, is working on new global environmental markets. We need to create these market solutions before it is too late, before we destroy the remnants of the planet’s biodiversity in seas and soils. We are in the midst of the 6th largest extinction event in the history of the plant and the first caused by human action. The new markets **that arise from ecological constraints will dominate the 21st century economy**, and so will markets for knowledge. The carbon market will become the largest commodity market in the world because carbon is emitted in producing energy, energy is the mother of all markets, and 89 per cent of the energy produced in the planet comes from fossil fuels. Energy creates today the largest source of carbon emissions in the world – about 41 per cent. The **transformation of capitalism is unstoppable** because we need limits on resources for humans to survive. And from these limits, new markets will emerge as we trade the rights to use resources. These new markets are **quite different** from what we had until now and will **change capitalism**. They involve ‘non rival’ goods, since carbon in the atmosphere, biodiversity in the planet and even global knowledge are non–rival goods, they are the same for all and can be shared without losing them. No more private goods This is very different from the private goods that characterised capitalism until now, where ‘whatever you have, I cannot have’. Markets for private goods divide us and create competition because goods are rival in consumption - ‘what I consume you cannot consume’. The new markets involve non–rival goods that are the same for all. This is for physical reasons. Since CO2 distributes uniformly all over the planet and we all face the same atmospheric carbon concentration, we must all cooperate to find a global solution, rich and poor, young and old, black or white**. The markets of the future are here today. They are starting to cause a great and most welcome transformation for capitalism**. The question now is how long the transformation will take, and whether we will experience ecological and climate disasters. Human civilisation as we know it may not be able to survive during the transition. Time is not on our side. The longer it takes, the greater the risk we face.

**A2: Cap Causes War**

**Cap reduces the risk of war**

**Gartzke 5** - Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University

(Erik, Capitalist peace or democratic peace, Dec 2005, "Institute of foreign affairs review," Vol57, Proquest)

The intellectual liberal tradition of economic peace beginning with Montesquieu, Mill, Adam Smith and others, and progressing through Richard Cobden, Norman Angel1 and Richard Rosecrance suggests a variety of ways in which **capitalism can encourage peace**. Perhaps the most general explanation is that **economic interdependence creates something of mutual value to countries, which** then **leaves states loath to fight for fear of destroying economic benefits** that they prize. While this is not implausible, the explanation depends on the supposition that items of mutual value do not themselves spark or facilitate conflict. Thomas Schelling tells a story of two mountain climbers tied together by a rope that in effect creates one common destiny. Schelling shows how something of mutual value can be used strategically to manipulate a counterpart; states that share economic linkages can in fact use the economic linkages to play a game of chicken: the more valuable the linkages, the more effective and telling is the game. If a state is reluctant to endanger the benefits of prosperous economic ties, it does not follow that peace will ensue. Other countries must be tempted to view a reluctance to fight as a vulnerability. To ensure peace, all possible participants must be unwilling to play the game of chicken or, indeed, to use military force. Students of international relations traditionally looked to motive and opportunity (capability) to explain war. However, as murder-mystery novels and the game of Clue make clear, these conditions are seldom sufficient. Individuals, groups, and countries often disagree, but **usually entities with different interests find that they can negotiate bargains that avoid more costly or flamboyant behaviour.** Economic freedom is important to peace for at least two reasons. First, **free markets act as a sounding board for political activity. Actions that frighten markets discourage investment, drive down economic conditions domestically, and** thus **are likely to be avoided by local leaders.** **The use of force abroad is** often **associated with a decline in domestic investment and with outflows of capital.** To the degree that leaders are willing to make foreign policy statements that scare capital markets, and to the extent that free monetary policies are in place that make it difficult for the government to interfere with capital flows, the international community may be able to infer a leader's true resolve. **Knowing what an opponent is willing to do makes it possible to bargain more effectively, so that resorting to violence to obtain what one side needs is less often necessary. Autonomous global markets create a venue through which leaders can establish credibility without needing to escalate to military force.**

**Capitalism promotes peace**

**Bandow 05** (Doug Bandow, Cato Institute, Spreading Capitalism Is Good for Peace, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/spreading-capitalism-is-good-peace>, Published in Korea Herald November 10th,  2005.)

In a world that seems constantly aflame, one naturally asks: What causes peace? Many people, including U.S. President George W. Bush, hope that spreading democracy will discourage war. But new research suggests that expanding free markets is a far more important factor, leading to what Columbia University's Erik Gartzke calls a "capitalist peace." It's a reason for even the left to support free markets. The capitalist peace theory isn't new: Montesquieu and Adam Smith believed in it. Many of Britain's classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, pushed free markets while opposing imperialism. But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent rampant nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears from trumping the power of markets. An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq. An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq. But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states. Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor.The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches.Free flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends. Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then, neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight, just usually not each other. Contends Gartzke, "liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether states fight." In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels." Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains. His conclusion hasn't gone unchallenged. Author R.J. Rummel, an avid proponent of the democratic peace theory, challenges Gartzke's methodology and worries that it "may well lead intelligent and policy-wise analysts and commentators to draw the wrong conclusions about the importance of democratization." Gartzke responds in detail, noting that he relied on the same data as most democratic peace theorists. If it is true that democratic states don't go to war, then it also is true that "states with advanced free market economies never go to war with each other, either." The point is not that democracy is valueless. Free political systems naturally entail free elections and are more likely to protect other forms of liberty - civil and economic, for instance. However, democracy alone doesn't yield peace. To believe is does is dangerous: There's no panacea for creating a conflict-free world. That doesn't mean that nothing can be done. But promoting open international markets - that is, spreading capitalism - is the best means to encourage peace as well as prosperity. Notes Gartzke: "Warfare among developing nations will remain unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain fettered by governmental control." Freeing those economies is critical. It's a particularly important lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently denounce war, often in near-pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to encourage peace. If market critics don't realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets - prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest; globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war. Nothing is certain in life, and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business. And capitalism is good for peace.

### A2: Root Cause

**Root cause wrong – also proves Cap’s not as powerful as they say**

**Geras ‘5**

(Norman, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester, "The Reductions of the Left," Dissent, 52:1, Winter, p. 57-58)

THE SECOND PART of the answer- to which I now turn—is a seeming lack of ability, of the imagination, to digest the meaning of the great moral and political evils of the world and to look at them unflinchingly. This is a complementary failure. Elsewhere I have argued that Marxism is as familiar as any other intellectual tradition with **the realities of** humanviolence and oppressionand the more negative traits and potentialities in the makeup of human beings. At the same time, because of its Utopian aspiration—-which I do not mean in any pejorative sense—because of its progressive and meliorative impulse, there has always been a tendency within this tradi¬tion to minimize, or sometimes just deny, the independent force of such negative character¬istics. They **come to be treated, genericallv, as the product of** class societies and, today, as the product of **capitalism. The affinity between this** overall intellectual **tendency** within Marxist and other left thinking, **and the** practical **reductionism** I have just described—**in which America** **is identified as the source of all worldly wrongs—should be transparent**. **The effect** of the tendency, however, **is, to** **denature what one is looking at when one looks at the horrors of the world:** a massacre of in- nocents; a woman being beaten in a public place or hanged in a football stadium; a place in which a man can have his ears surgically re¬moved or his tongue cut out, or be broken and destroyed, to be followed by the next such vic-tim, and the next, in a continuous sequence ol atrocity; or a place in which a parent can be forced to watch her child tortured and mur¬dered in front of her; or a place in which a hus¬band can be forced to watch his wife repeat-edly raped; an "ethnic^leansing" or a genocide in progress, in which entire communities are pulled up by the roots-arid people are shot or hacked or starved to death by the thousands or the tens of thousands; mass graves opened to yield up their terrible story. The list, as anyone knows who keeps read¬ing when the overwhelming temptation is to look away, could be much extended. The items on it are moral and political realities **in their own right.** They need to be registered and fully recognized as such. **To collapse them too quickly into their putative original causes, to' refer them immediately, or refer from them, to other things that have preceded them is not to give them their due as the specific phenomena they are**, the horrors, tor those destroyed by them or enduring them, for those whose lives are torn and wrecked and filled with grief by them, are in a double sense reduced by this quick and easy reference back to something else, putatively their real cause or origin. Furthermore, not all the contributory causes of such grim events are of the type that the section of the left under discussion here likes to invoke—that is, causes arising else- where, either geographically (in the United States) or societally (in the dynamics of capi- talism). Moral and political **evils of this order** and I make no apology for calling them that— can and generally do **have causes that are** more **local** in a spatial sense; **and they are governed or influenced by political, ideological, and moral specificities every bit as real as the capitalist economy. Not everything is systemic**, in the sense of being an effect of pressures or ten¬dencies of economic provenance, whether from the global economy or from some more par¬ticular region of it. **There are independent patterns of coercion and cruelty, both interper¬sonal and embedded within political structures**; forms of authoritarian imposition; **types of invasive assault and violence**, at the micro-level and at the macro-level, **involving large social forces.**

### A2: SVio/V2L

**The status quo is structurally improving**

Indur **Goklany 10**, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24, <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has **advanced globally** since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in **population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide** emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.

**A2: Tech Doesn’t Solve**

**Tech solves- their authors make flawed assumptions**

Paul **Spicker 12**, Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University in Scotland and Director of the Centre for Public Policy and Management, “Limits to growth, again”, January 7, <https://paulspicker.wordpress.com/2012/01/07/limits-to-growth-again/>

More than 200 years ago, Malthus argued that the world was going to run out of resources, because population inevitably increased faster than our ability to provide for it. The argument has been disproved time and again, but its adherents remain convinced that it must be true sooner or later. It doesn’t seem to matter how often the arguments are shot down in flames – there is always someone ready to pick up the standard. This week’s New Scientist has four pages praising The Limits to Growth, the book that argued that come what may, we were going to run out of the things we need. Part of the problem is the flakiness of the predictions – the birth rate has not followed the projected path, and nor will most of the consequent projections. The NS article comments that economists claimed that “Limits underestimated the power of the technological fixes humans would surely invent.” If you can’t counter an argument, misrepresent it. The basic objection from economists is not that new technologies will inevitably appear – even if they might. The point is that many alternative technologies already exist, and **costs are relative**. If a resource becomes scarce, it will cost more, and other technologies which are initially too expensive become preferable. The fundamental economic mechanism is one which pushes people to use substitutes. As coal has become more expensive, options for producing energy which once seemed unrealistic – nuclear power, bio-fuels – start to be feasible. As wood has become more expensive, plastics have expanded. If food production through conventional methods becomes unsustainable, there is a range of viable technologies, such as hydroponics, which stand in readiness. There is, certainly, an incentive to develop new technologies, such as electric cars, water purifiers or solar power, and many will be developed, but that is not the central mechanism. **We will never use the last piece** of coal, the last drop of oil, or the last lump of copper; long before then, it will cost too much. **The argument that we are about to run of resources is just plain wrong**.

**Innovation is limitless**

Robert **Bradley** Jr. **12**, CEO and founder of the Institute for Energy Research; an adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a visiting fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs, a senior research fellow of the Center for Energy Economics at the University of Texas at Austin, “On Sustainable Energy (Part I)”, January 9, <http://www.masterresource.org/2012/01/sustainable-energy-i/#more-18083>

Feared mineral depletion and the false allure of renewables have colored energy economics and public policy from the beginning. W. S. Jevons pessimistically calculated the coming end of Britain’s coal abundance. Samuel Insull, a resource pessimist, feared the decline of coal supplies and saw natural gas as but a fleeting respite from the past and future of gasified coal. In 1981, leaders of the natural gas industry voiced their pessimism about future supply and prices. “Domestic oil and gas will never be in an oversupply position,” said Jack Bowen of Transco. “Planning is going forward for the day when the market may require a versatile substitute fuel for natural gas,” stated Robert Herring of Houston Natural Gas. Both gentlemen, heading the largest interstate and intrastate gas pipeline systems in America, respectively, would be proved wrong within a year. “Peak gas” fears, not only running-out-of-oil concerns, are not new. Expanding ‘Depletable’ Resources The paradox of growing exhaustible or depleting minerals—such as oil, natural gas, and coal—can be explained in terms of improving knowledge and expanding capital. “Knowledge is truly the mother of all resources,” Erich Zimmermann concluded. Julian Simon called human ingenuity the “ultimate resource,” a nondepletable, expansive resource. “Discoveries, like resources, may well be infinite: the more we discover, the more we are able to discover,” Simon said. This was the opposite of a “closed system,” Simon found, allowing “human beings … [to] create more than they destroy.”

**A2: Zizek**

#### Their subjective/objective violence distinction is useless- the alternative is utopian nonsense

Grayling 8 – Grayling professor of philosophy at London University 2008 A.C. The Australian 6/28 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23915460-16947,00.html

**One** disconcerting **consequence of Zizek's take on violence is that** this kind of **moral imagination, which sees value in trying to rescue individuals from the danger and effects of violence, has to be seen not merely as beside the point or only a distraction from the real task,** which is to "learn, learn and learn" about the true nature of violence, but as somehow complicit in its causes. **That is why we must do nothing about it. The world may be in the midst of agonies, but we must be brave and not yield to the temptation to let any practicality sully the crucial task of theorising.** Zizek's main argument is that "subjective violence" -- demonstrators throwing stones at police, for example -- gets put into perspective when we switch viewpoint and see its background is not a neutral state of peaceful order but a far greater violence: the "objective violence" of the system, in particular the capitalist system, which is a monster feeding its gross appetites in blithe unconcern for people or the environment. This is the "fundamental systemic violence" that the fat cats of the World Economic Forum, meeting annually at Davos, try to persuade themselves and us is in our interests. The leading figures among capitalists -- Bill Gates, George Soros -- go further and commit themselves to vast acts of philanthropy to prove the point, but the humanitarian mask conceals the face of exploitation that brought the surplus wealth into these philanthropic hands in the first place. For Zizek, the philanthropists, whom he bizarrely calls "liberal communists", are "the enemy of every progressive struggle today". Terrorists, religious fundamentalists and corrupt bureaucrats are merely local figures in contingent circumstances, minor in comparison to these true enemies of progressive endeavour, who are the embodiment of the system that is itself the true violence in the world. Zizek has much else to say, not least in analyses of media coverage of crime and unrest, and the role of fear in motivating attitudes in societies that think of themselves as liberal without being so. This is therefore and emphatically a topical book, whose approach to present preoccupations with terrorist attacks, Danish cartoons, the clash of civilisations and Islam is unconventional. But the plausibility of its approach turns on the idea just described: that the main violence to which contingent acts of violence are a response is the globalised capitalist system itself and the apologetics that work on its behalf. The problem is not the rather wearisome invocation of views owed to Karl Marx, Jacques Lacan, Walter Benjamin, Alain Badiou and the other usual suspects who shape a certain (arguably implausible and certainly tendentious) way of thinking but the key logical fallacy in Zizek's premise, namely, the equivocation on the word violence. **You can, and should, complain vociferously about the harms and wrongs perpetrated by capitalism, but to describe them all as violence makes it impossible to distinguish between what happens when an multinational oil company raises its prices and when it pays to have people bullied off land above an oil deposit.** Being paid a low wage and being shot in the head are two different things. If you use the same word for both you are muddling, weakening and misdirecting your argument. This underlies the discussion in Zizek's book and it is why the discussion is not about the difference between the relatively infrequent situation in which, say, a small number of religious fanatics carry out mass murder and the standard situation in a Western liberal democracy in which security forces, existing at the implicit and occasionally explicit desire of its citizens, are maintained to enforce laws arrived at, and changeable by, non-violent political processes. **So there is no discussion here of the psychology of violence, or of the tensions and contradictions in non-totalitarian polities that occasionally express themselves violently, or of the forms of non-political violence** (evidently this phrase has to be a contradiction for Zizek) **that take place at football matches, with much greater frequency than politically motivated violence.** Can football violence be blamed on capitalism? Might Zizek think it is not really violence, despite broken heads and black eyes? On the evidence of this book, the answer to both would seem to be affirmative. **The least plausible idea is that the response to the systematic objective violence of the dominant ideology and its institutions, namely global capitalism, is to do nothing:** "The first gesture to provoke a change in the system is to withdraw activity, to do nothing: the threat today is not passivity but pseudo-activity, the urge to 'be active', to 'participate'." This is not consistent with the remark quoted earlier, that to oppose racism, sexism and religious obscurantism one has to compromise with the system, for to do any of these things is to be active and to participate; revealingly, the system's efforts to oppose these things have to be compromised with because they are tainted: presumably they are bad opposition to racism and so on, whereas non-capitalist anti-racism is ostensibly good anti-racism. **But such a view is altogether too self-serving, too precious. We have to fight on many fronts at once: against the system, with the individual, for the good whatever its shape and local name. The idea of the disengaged intellectual is an unappealing one, and lends weight to the distrust and suspicion that transfers to the intellectual's stock in trade, which is ideas**. Moreover, **ideas themselves are empty vessels unless applied, tested, connected with practice.**

**Zizek’s model reinscribes exclusion and violence**

Robinson 5 (Andrew Robinson, PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham,“The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique - Andrew Robinson” <http://libcom.org/library/political-theory-constitutive-lack-critique>)

Ernesto Laclau, for instance, claims that a ‘world in which reform takes place without violence is not a world in which I would like to live’ (1996, 114). He also calls for ‘a symbolisation of impossibility as such as a positive value’ (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000, 199). Badiou, meanwhile, insists that ethics remain confined by the Real. ‘At least one real element must exist… that the truth cannot force’ (2001, 85).

Žižek’s anti-capitalism has won him friends in leftist circles, but the capitalism to which he objects is not the capitalism of classical Marxist critique. One could, indeed, question whether Žižek is attacking capitalism (as opposed to liberalism) at all. His “capitalism” is a stultifying world of suffocating Good which is unbearable precisely because it lacks the dimension of violence and antagonism. It is, he says, ‘boring’, ‘repetitive’ and ‘perverse’ because it lacks the ‘properly political’ attitude of ‘Us against Them’ (2001a, 237-8). It therefore eliminates the element of unconditional attachment to an unattainable Thing or Real, an element which is the core of humanity (2001c, 8-9; Žižek and Salecl, 1996, 41-2). It delivers what Žižek fears most: a ‘pallid and anaemic, self-satisfied, tolerant peaceful daily life’. To rectify this situation, there is a need for suffocating Good to be destroyed by diabolical Evil (2000a, 122). ‘Why not violence?’ he rhetorically asks. ‘Horrible as it may sound, I think it’s a useful antidote to all the aseptic, frustrating, politically correct pacifism’ (2002c, 80). There must always be social exclusion, and ‘enemies of the people’ (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000, 92). The resulting politics involves an ‘ethical duty’ to accomplish an Act which shatters the social edifice by undermining the fantasies which sustain it (1997a, 74). As with Mouffe, this is both a duty and an acceptance of necessity. ‘By traversing the fantasy the subject accepts the void of his nonexistence’ (1999, 281). Baudrillard takes a position similar to Žižek’s, denouncing an empty world in which ‘[e]ven the military has lost the privilege of use-value, the privilege of real war’ (1995, 28). His critique of the Gulf (non-)War has an overtone of distaste for the sanitization of war and the resultant loss of the dimension of antagonism: if this were a real war, it would be more acceptable. Elsewhere, he denounces simulation for the absence of violence and death. ‘Completely expunged from the political dimension, it is dependent… on production and mass consumption. Its spark has disappeared; only the fiction of a political universe is saved’ (1988, 181). On a political level, this kind of stance leads to an acceptance of social exclusion which negates compassion for its victims.  The resultant inhumanity finds its most extreme expression in Žižek's work, where 'today's "mad dance", the dynamic proliferation of multiple shifting identities... awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror'.  It is also present, however, in the toned-down exclusionism of authors such as Mouffe.  Hence, democracy depends on 'the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "them"', and 'always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion'[28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn28).  'No state or political order... can exist without some form of exclusion' experienced by its victims as coercion and violence[29](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1robinson.html#_edn29), and, since Mouffe assumes a state to be necessary, this means that one must endorse exclusion and violence

#### Zizek’s alternative is political nihilism – they have no example of a successful anti-capitalist struggle

Ernesto **Laclau**, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex and Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at SUNY-Buffalo, **2004**, Umbr(a): War, p. 33-34

Here we reach the crux of the difficulties to be found **in Zizek**. On the one hand, he is committed to a theory of the full revolutionary act that would operate in its own name, without being invested in any object outside itself. On the other hand, **the capitalist system**, as the dominating, underlying mechanism, **is the reality with which the emancipatory act has to break**. The conclusion from both premises is that there is no valid emancipatory struggle except one that is fully and directly anti-capitalist. In his words: “I believe in the central structuring role of the anti-capitalist struggle.” **The problem**, however, **is** this: **he gives** no indication **of what an anti-capitalist struggle might be. Zizek quickly dismisses multicultural, anti-sexist, and anti-racist struggles as not being directly anti-capitalist. Nor does he sanction the traditional aims of the Left**, linked more directly to the economy: the demands for higher wages, for industrial democracy, for control of the labor process, for a progressive distribution of income, are not proposed as anti-capitalist either. Does he imagine that the Luddites’ proposal to destroy all the machines would bring an end to capitalism? Not a single line **in Zizek’s work gives an example of what he considers an anti-capitalist struggle. One is left wondering whether he is anticipating an invasion of beings from another planet**, or as he once suggested, some kind of ecological catastrophe that would not transform the world but cause it to fall apart. So **where has the whole argument gone wrong? In its very premises**. Since **Zizek** refuses to apply the hegemonic logic to strategico-political thought, he is stranded in a blind alley. He **has to dismiss all “partial” struggles as internal to the “system” (whatever that means), and** the “Thing” being unachievable, **he is left without any concrete historical actor for his anti-capitalist struggle**. Conclusion: **Zizek cannot provide any theory of the emancipatory subject**. At the same time, **since his systemic totality,** being a ground, **is regulated exclusively by its own internal laws, the only option is to wait for these laws to produce the totality of its effects. Ergo: political nihilism**.